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ABSTRACT 
 
Qualitative theories of ethnic violence and rebellion have traditionally argued the 
importance of broad long-term processes that escalate ethnic tensions.  Alternatively, 
quantitative scholarship has focused more narrowly on the question of onset.  In this 
dissertation, I break with this tradition and quantitatively examine the structural factors 
associated with the escalation of ethnic tensions, including, but not limited to, the onset 
of ethnic rebellion.  I build upon and refine elements of a power and legitimacy school of 
scholarship to shed light on three critical points of escalation in ethno-political power 
relations.  First, the politicization of ethnic boundaries is more likely in states with 
limited resources and lower levels of ethnic diversity or abundant resources and higher 
levels of ethnic diversity.  Second, in those states where ethnic boundaries have already 
been politicized, state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is more likely when resources are 
scarce and ethnic diversity is higher or resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is 
lower.  Third, in those states where state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is practiced, ethnic 
rebellion is more likely when the size of the excluded population increases but the ethnic 
diversity of the excluded population remains lower.  Importantly, even when the excluded 
population is very large, ethnic rebellions become less likely as the ethnic diversity of the 
excluded population increases.  I test these hypotheses using the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR) Dataset, which includes the world’s independent states from 1946 through 2005.  
Aside from the substantive contributions regarding the escalation of ethnic tensions, as a 
whole, the dissertation argues for, and demonstrates, the importance of quantitatively 
engaging with the entirety of qualitative theoretical perspectives, rather than just limiting 
quantitative inquiry to the onset of ethnic violence.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Overview 
Throughout modern history, the idea of popular sovereignty and the right of 
national self-determination linked the “nation” to the state and defined the demos in terms 
of the nation itself.  The modern political era, forged in the trenches of World War I, and 
tempered in the fires of World War II, ended the age of empire and institutionalized the 
nation-state system on a global scale.  Within the United Nations, safeguards were 
established to limit large scale conventional warfare and emphasize the central 
importance of human rights, the dignity of the individual person, and equal rights of all 
“nations” large and small.  Consequently, since 1945, popular sovereignty and the right 
of self-determination for “we, the people,” has been the singularly largest source of 
political legitimacy for the modern state.   Moreover, the wide acceptance of popular 
sovereignty and self-determination within the world polity has made wars motivated by 
territorial expansionism all but a relic of an increasingly distant past.  The nation-state 
form is global.  There are no more territorial empires which can disintegrate on a globe 
full of internationally recognized states.    
Notwithstanding the reduction in the scale of interstate violence, ethnic rebellion 
and civil war have become the primary forms of organized violence in the modern 
political era.  Over the past century ethno-nationalist wars have been an increasing 
portion of the world’s violent conflicts. Where ethno-nationalist violence accounted for 
only 20 percent of the wars fought between the Congress of Vienna (1814) and the Treaty 
of Versailles (1919), between 1919 and 2001, ethnonationalist wars made up 45 percent 
of total wars fought.  Between the end of the Cold War and 2005 that figure increased 
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still, to 75 percent (Wimmer et al. 2009).  As events in Syria and Sudan remind us (to 
name but two recent examples), the toll of human suffering is both tragic and alarming. 
The trend in ethno-nationalist violence has not gone unnoticed by the social 
scientific community.   The last three decades have witnessed a surge in research on 
ethnic conflict and violence.  While our collective understanding has improved 
substantially, the sheer scope, complexity, and weight of the subject matter has left the 
field substantially fragmented (See Wimmer 2013b for an excellent book length review).   
Moreover, there is hardly consensus among social scientists on the underlying dynamics 
and determinants of ethnic violence.  For example, one leading school of thought--the 
“greed-and-opportunity school”--largely rejects the ‘ethnic’ facet of the term ‘ethnic 
violence’ altogether, viewing the concept as a mere descriptor by rebels and academics 
without real explanatory power (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Laitin 
2007).  Growing research from a power and legitimacy school, on the other hand, 
convincingly argues that (1) a prerequisite of ethnic conflict is the politicization of 
ethnicity; and (2) ethnic exclusion from state power is directly related to ethnic rebellion 
(Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2004; Wimmer 2013b).  
In brief, despite the wide variety of studies on ethnic conflict and violence, there remains 
basic disagreement over the role that ethnicity plays in the onset of ethnic violence itself.  
While social scientific debate often resolves around competing explanations for a given 
phenomenon, it is perhaps rare for so much ink to be spilled on the very existence of the 
phenomenon in question.  Hence, even as the importance of understanding the dynamics 
of ethnic conflict has grown, the body of research on ethnic violence and civil war has 
also grown increasingly fragmented. 
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How can we better understand the processes that lead to ethnic rebellions?  How 
might we incorporate the insights from such diverse and fragmented perspectives to grasp 
the foundations of ethnic rebellion and civil war?  Building upon and expanding 
Wimmer’s power and legitimacy approach, I diverge from a narrow focus on the onset of 
ethnic rebellions that typifies the quantitative conflict literature, to pursue an empirical 
analysis of the institutional thresholds that solidify political boundaries along ethnic lines.  
The recent wave of quantitative research on ethnic violence and civil war relies on a host 
of theoretical assumptions drawn from a body of case-based qualitative research.  For 
example, it is readily acknowledged that ridged ethno-political cleavages do not simply 
materialize but rather result from processes and actions that escalate tensions between 
ethnic groups and the state.  But many quantitative studies treat these processes as a mere 
backdrop to conditions focusing solely the onset of ethnic violence.  If real progress is 
going to be made in understanding (if not averting) ethnic conflict and civil war, it will be 
by better understanding the institutional factors that escalate ethnic tensions.  In this way, 
de-escalation might occur prior to a point where categories of peoples find it necessary to 
pick up arms.   To be sure, the scope of most case based and comparative work regarding 
ethnic rebellion at least implicitly addresses these foundational elements.  Yet if the 
quantitative wing of social science is to make its fullest contribution, it should work in 
concert with qualitative research to examine such factors as the politicization of ethnicity 
and ethnically based exclusion as important outcomes to be explained.  Simply put, 
examining the onset of ethnic violence and civil war should be considered the beginning 
of inquiry, not the end. 
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Expanding the scope of inquiry has a fundamental influence on case selection, 
which is important for two reasons.  First, it leads to misleading parameter estimates.  
Wimmer et al. (2009) demonstrate this clearly by noting that only in states where 
ethnicity has been politicized is ethnic violence possible.  In turn, ethnic rebellions, 
nearly by definition, are instigated by those outside of power and thus only possible 
where some form of ethnic exclusion exists.  This insight motivates the first two of three 
questions addressed in this dissertation: (1) Which institutional factors promote the 
politicization of ethnicity? and (2) Which institutional factors promote the escalation of 
ethnic politics into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in states where ethnicity is 
politicized?  While Wimmer et al. (2009) note that improper case selection biases 
parameter estimates and results, the issue is actually more problematic than they 
acknowledge.  Indeed, a second way improper case selection distorts research is by 
obscuring the actual substantive meaning of model results.   
Let me illustrate by briefly anticipating a single result.  The greed-and-
opportunity school (GAO) argues that rebellions are most probable where states are weak 
and insurgents have ample terrain within which to avoid capture by the government 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003).  As evidence, Fearon and Laitin note that percentage of 
mountainous terrain is a significant predictor in their model of civil war, while their 
measure of ethnic diversity is not.  Their dataset, however, combines both ethnic and 
non-ethnic civil wars, which is troubling.  As the authors do not account for the processes 
that are theoretically linked to ethnic exclusion, their interpretation of the actual 
coefficient is problematic.  Their theory only links mountainous terrain to the onset of 
civil war through the enabling mechanism, so it should not be a significant predictor of 
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ethnic exclusion.  Yet, as shown in the results I present in chapter 3, mountainous terrain 
is a structural factor positively linked to the probability of ethnic exclusion but shows no 
relationship to the onset of ethnic rebellion in results provided in chapter 4.  Since the 
Fearon and Laitin study does not account for ethnic exclusion, the mountainous terrain 
measure may actually be indicating an exclusion effect.  In this regard, my result is more 
consistent with the difficulty states with large amounts of rough terrain have in providing 
equal access to public services than it is evidence supporting Fearon and Laitin’s 
opportunity theory.  The example illustrates the necessity of expanding beyond a narrow 
focus on the onset of ethnic rebellion and civil war and placing such research, both 
methodologically and theoretically, within the broader processes and mechanisms of 
escalation. 
Within this dissertation I analyze configurations of institutional and structural 
factors connected to the escalation of ethnic tensions, including ethnic rebellion.  Firmly 
situated within the power and legitimacy approach, I take the perspective that ethnic 
violence is the culmination of broader long term processes which involve culturally 
marked ethnic categories, increase their salience through politicization, and 
institutionalize these now politicized boundaries of social closure through state 
sanctioned exclusion.  As will be seen, these processes emerge as fundamental dynamics 
of state building and solidification (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, 
Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).  From this 
standpoint, ethnic rebellion is seen as a result of a series of institutional escalations that 
have locked embattled states into turning the deadly machines of modern warfare on their 
own populations.   
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In chapter 2, I use data from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Cederman, Min, 
and Wimmer 2009) to test a set of theoretical expectations regarding the politicization of 
ethnicity.  In chapter 3, I take those states where ethnicity has been politicized, and 
examine a set of hypotheses regarding the institutional and structural conditions 
conducive to state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. In chapter 4, I further restrict the sample 
to those states that have excluded at least one ethnic category of people from state access, 
and test a series of hypotheses concerning the onset of ethnic rebellion.  Over the course 
of chapters 2, 3 and 4 I systematically expand upon and refine Wimmer’s (2002) theory 
of national exclusion and ethnic violence, which provides the foundation for the power 
and legitimacy approach.  Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss the substantive implications of 
my findings as well as a vision of social research that embraces a dialogue across the 
methodological divide.  
Although the forgoing series of analyses are fundamentally aligned with 
Wimmer’s power and legitimacy school, I also examine explanatory factors from two 
other relatively distinct schools to empirically assess a number of alternative explanatory 
factors for the politicization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion, and ethnic rebellion.  First, the 
actual onset of violence has been linked to availability of resources and terrain that enable 
rebel movements to operate and survive.  This GAO School holds that the onset of any 
form of anti-state violence is fundamentally related to opportunity structures and 
incentives, such as weak governments (Fearon and Laitin 2004), insurgent friendly 
terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007), and lootable resources, 
such as oil (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Alternatively, a second, “diversity-breeds-
conflict” school (DBC) argues that ethnic tension and violence result from the 
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intersection of ethnic diversity and the functional necessities of modernization (Gellner 
2006), unequal modernization (Horowitz 1985), or decreased organizational costs 
achieved by utilizing ethnic ties (Sambanis 2001).  While the GAO School downplays the 
role of ethnicity, within the DBC School the role of ethnicity varies substantially.  In 
addition to the power and legitimacy school, the analysis I present here applies insights 
and empirically tests hypotheses derived from each of these competing schools.  My aim 
is to clarify where in the processes of ethnic tension escalation mechanisms suggested by 
each of these schools plays a role, and where the empirical evidence does or does not 
substantiate their predictions.  My dissertation thus presents one of the most systematic 
and comprehensive quantitative analyses of ethnic rebellion to date.  
Let me take a moment to provide an introductory summary of my results.  
Contrary to the direct link to ethnic violence proposed by the DBC School, my findings 
show that ethnic diversity plays its biggest role in the escalation of ethnic tensions 
through its interaction with the resources available to elites.   The central finding of 
chapter 2 is that the influence of ethnic diversity on the probability that ethnicity will be 
politicized is not constant.  Rather, I find evidence that when elites have an abundance of 
resources to distribute, increased ethnic diversity increases the probability of ethnicity’s 
politicization.  However, when resources are limited, higher levels of ethnic diversity 
actually lower the probability of ethnicity’s politicization.   These findings represent an 
important contribution to our understanding of ethnic rebellion in three ways.  First, 
contrary to assumptions made by Wimmer’s resource availability theory and the DBC 
school, increased ethnic diversity does not necessarily result in higher potential for 
ethnicity’s politicization.  Wimmer (2002) has argued that where resources are scarce 
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elites tend to restrict access to the state along ethnic lines because they lack sufficient 
resources to distribute to the entire population.  Yet, as Tilly (1999) and Wimmer (2013a) 
both argue, political cleavages mobilize populations on both sides of the divide.  Thus 
when resources are scarce but ethnic diversity is high, states tend to pursue the 
politicization of ethnicity only as a last resort due to concerns of state fragmentation and 
increased repression costs.  Second, these results expand and refine Wimmer’s (2002) 
theory in a manner consistent with expectations from his micro work on ethno-political 
boundary formation (Wimmer 2013a).  Finally, economic hardship has been one of the 
few common explanatory factors supported in the literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).  
Yet my findings show that its contribution to the onset of ethnic civil war is far more 
profound as it is an important element in the processes that politicize ethnicity and thus 
lay the foundation for ethnic exclusion and rebellion.   
The analysis of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion shown in chapter 3 demonstrates 
a similar pattern.  Once again the relationship between ethnic diversity and state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion is shown to be contingent upon levels of resources available 
to elites.  Contrary to the totally inclusive nationalism proposed in Wimmer’s (2002) 
theory of ethnic exclusion, states with abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity are 
found almost universally to exclude some portion of their population along ethnic lines.  
However, states with abundant resources and high ethnic diversity are shown to be 
substantially less likely to exclude along ethnic lines, as ruling elites have resources and 
incentives to create a multiethnic state.  For states where resources are limited an 
alternative pattern holds which supports my further revision of Wimmer’s (2002) theory.  
States with high ethnic diversity and limited resources tend to pursue divide and rule 
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strategies since the ethnic fragmentation of the excluded population lowers the repression 
costs associated with exclusion.  One the other hand, the benefits to elites of state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion in states with limited resources and limited ethnic diversity is 
substantially reduced as exclusion may create a relatively homogenous population which 
could compete for the state.  Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that 
mountainous terrain is the result of geopolitical and uneven-development factors 
suggested by Horowitz (1985), rather than the opportunity mechanisms argued for by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003).  My extension and refinement of Wimmer’s power-and- 
legitimacy based theory is thus empirically supported while also raising questions about 
the interpretation of previous results from the GAO School.  Additionally, where a 
refinement of Wimmer’s theoretical approach is empirically supported, no such revisions 
to the DBC expectations are supported.  The ethnic diversity of the state is clearly central 
in explaining state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, but not in the manner expected by 
proponents of the DBC approach.  In this regard the emphasis on ethnic power relations 
proposed by Wimmer’s power and legitimacy school is far more compelling and 
empirically supported. 
In chapter 4, I further examine support for and the efficacy of divide and rule 
strategies.  Once again, although the spirit of the power and legitimacy school receives 
empirical support, the mechanisms regarding ethnic rebellions outlined in Wimmer et al. 
(2009) require some refinements.  The Wimmer et al. (2009) argument holds that as the 
proportion of the population that is excluded increases, the likelihood of ethnic rebellion 
increases as well.  My analysis shows that this relationship only holds in states where the 
number of excluded ethnic groups is low.  When the proportion of the excluded 
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population is high but the excluded population is also divided between large numbers of 
excluded ethnic groups, the risks of ethnic rebellion actually decrease substantially.  
Increased ethno-political fragmentation amongst a large excluded population actually 
lessens the probability of an onset of ethnic rebellion.  These findings lend further 
evidence to the efficacy of divide and rule strategies by ruling elites.  In a world where 
modern states have penetrated their societies deeper than at any point in history, the 
human cost of ethno-nationalist exclusion and violence results in limitations on careers, 
marriage, and state sponsored discrimination.  Yet rebellion may still not occur.  Wimmer 
(2002) refers to the ethnicization of the bureaucracy as the “race for the state.”  These 
findings suggest that once the public goods of the state have been appropriated for one 
ethnic group, when there are multiple excluded ethnic categories and the excluded 
population is large, the organization of politics along ethnic lines tends to inhibit multi-
ethnic alliances due to tensions and mistrust among excluded peoples themselves. 
Collectively, my results suggest that the politicization of ethnicity, exclusion 
along ethnic lines, and ethnic rebellion should be considered as critical institutional 
points of ethnic-tension escalation, upon which the factors commonly linked solely to the 
onset of ethnic rebellion suggest a variety of theoretically interesting relationships.  By 
identifying which factors relate to which points of escalation, this dissertation 
demonstrates the value of heeding Brubaker’s (1996; 2004; 2006) call for an examination 
of how ethnicity becomes an actual practical category.  Moreover, it provides further 
insight into how macro-institutional forces escalate those practical categories into the 
institutionalized categorical points of ethnic exclusion that lead to civil war.  As such, this 
study expands upon insights developed by Tilly (1996; 1999; 2005; 2007) regarding the 
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nature of what he describes as durable and categorical inequality.  Reconceptualizing the 
politicization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion as points of institutional 
escalation and boundary hardening at a mid-range theoretical level expands the 
explanatory power of the power and legitimacy school in a manner directly useful from a 
policy perspective.  Furthermore, expanding the quantitative empirical analysis of ethnic 
rebellion to include the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion also helps explain 
the fragmentation in the academic literature on this issue.  Simply put, the literature often 
fails to account either theoretically or methodologically for the broader processes that 
create the proverbial “powder keg” at the center of most ethnic rebellion metaphors.  
Overall this project helps to clarify our understanding of ethnic rebellions through a 
sustained focus on the structural factors that are conducive not only to the onset of ethnic 
violence but to the emergence and solidification of their underlying ethnic tensions.   
In the remainder of this introductory chapter I provide an overview of the ethnic 
conflict literature, and then present the central theoretical framework that treats the 
politicization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion as points of institutional 
escalation on the spectrum of ethnic tensions.  I then briefly explicate the specific factors 
and hypotheses examined in greater detail in chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
The State of the Field in Ethnic Violence, Rebellion, and Civil War 
In an effort to understand the surge in ethnic conflict that has marked world 
political affairs since 1919, three competing schools of thought have emerged within the 
academic literature.  Somewhat ironically, the most prominent perspective on ethnic 
conflict and civil war within the quantitative literature maintains that ethnicity holds little 
explanatory power.  Aptly described as the greed and opportunity school, they argue 
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ethnic conflict is relatively rare.  Primarily in response to arguments emerging from the 
DBC School, they argue that since ethnic grievances are nearly ubiquitous across the 
globe, they cannot possibly explain the relatively rare occurrences of civil war across the 
world (Laitin 2007).  Instead, they argue that ethnic actors on both sides of a potential 
divide usually work to avoid the potential risks of an escalating cycle of violence through 
in-group policing (Fearon and Laitin 1996).  In those moments where these mechanisms 
fail, Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasize a specific set of opportunity structures that 
make the escalation of tensions more feasible.  Specifically, they highlight the role of 
weak governments, mountainous terrain, limited economic development, and lootable 
resources as the primary motors of civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Laitin 2007).  As Table 1 indicates, they highlight the opportunity structures 
that allow economic grievances to become militant and violent, but see their ethnicization 
as an unfortunate rhetorical descriptor used by both scholars and activists themselves.   
Although, consistent with Brubaker’s (2006) findings concerning the 
politicisation of ethnicity at the local level, scholarship emerging from the GAO School 
does not actively address the role that the state plays in either fomenting or mitigating 
ethnic violence.  Moreover, the narrow focus on the immediate predictors of conflict 
itself results in a failure to account for the structural conditions of a state that make 
conflict and violence a moral and cognitively acceptable possibility.  Lootable resources 
and terrain that benefits rebels only promotes conflict when there are grievances of some 
kind inciting a need to rebel.  Thus, while the GAO School does an admirable job 
highlighting structural factors that lower the threshold of tensions necessary for an 
outbreak of violence, the perspective does a rather poor job explaining why violence 
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should occur in the first place.  Although these twin elements of onset can be separated 
analytically, they are nevertheless intimately connected in both practice and theory.  
Their models should convey this. 
  Table 1.1 
Schools of Thought on the Causes of Ethnic Conflict 
 
School of Thought Central Focus 
Role of Ethnicity 
and 
Ethno-Nationalism 
Mechanism 
of 
Effect 
Historically 
Situates 
Ethnicity 
 
 
Greed and Opportunity 
 
 
 
Weak Governments, 
Mountainous Terrain, 
Low Economic 
Development, 
Lootable Resources 
 
Descriptive --- No 
 
Diversity Breeds 
Conflict 
 
 
Uneven Economic 
Development, 
Ethnic Diversity 
 
Causal 
Resource 
Competition, 
Relative 
Deprivation, 
 and  
Reduced 
Mobilization 
Costs 
 
No 
Legitimacy and Power 
Low Economic 
Development, 
Lack of Civil Society 
 
 
Causal 
Power Relations 
between  
Ethnic Groups 
and the State 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Standing apart from the GAO School is the diversity breeds conflict school, 
which offers multiple lines of argument focusing on the central role that ethnicity plays in 
ethnic conflict.  Unfortunately, each line of argument tends to treat the institutions of the 
modern state in a quite limited fashion.  Perhaps the most well known functionalist line of 
argument has been offered by Ernest Gellner (2006), who maintains that economic 
modernity requires a certain level of cultural homogenization, which the nation-state 
framework has excelled at providing.  This version of the DBC perspective maintains that 
conflict develops as a result of ethnic groups grating against the imposition of 
nationalistic ideologies aimed at creating a common pool of labor for industrialization.  A 
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second perspective, championed by Horowitz (1985), sees ethnic conflict as the result of 
the unequal distribution of modernity’s economic goods (See Esser 1988, cited in 
Wimmer 2002, as the original article is in German).  Gurr and Harff (1994) continue in 
this vein and emphasize the interplay of communal economic grievances that result in 
relative deprivation and the various opportunity structures provided by different regime 
types.  Finally, Sambanis (2001) argues that states which are more ethnically divided are 
at a higher risk of ethnic conflict specifically because ethnicity reduces the cost of 
organizing a rebellion.  Within this vein of research, Elkins and Sides (2007) have also 
found that ethnic minorities have less attachment to the state than majorities, implying 
that not only does ethnic diversity decrease organizational costs but also lowers 
constraints preventing the state from being considered an acceptable target.  Yet in all 
three versions of the DBC perspective modernization is seen as forcing the integration of 
peoples and breaking down smaller forms of self-segregation.  During this process, states 
are argued to work hard to create a national consciousness that overcomes these divisions 
through institutions such as mass public education and other social services (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008).  Whether it is the nationalist threat to minority culture, the unequal 
spread of the fruits of modernity, or these threats in conjunction with reduced 
mobilization costs, the DBC School places much more emphasis on the motivations of 
ethnic violence than on its plausibility in terms of opportunity—thus standing in stark 
opposition to the GAO School of thought. 
There are, however, at least three weaknesses with the DBC School relevant to 
this project.  First, the perspective fails to explain why ethnic divisions are triggered by 
modernization processes and not others.  In response to this criticism, DBC scholars have 
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argued that the rise of the nation-state system has occurred, at least in part, because of the 
innate importance of ethnic ties in their primordial fight for self determination (Smith 
1987; Smith 1995; Smith 2003).  However, such an argument cannot be reconciled with 
research showing that ethnicity has not historically been the primary trigger of violence 
in human history.  Rather, it has been the multiethnic empire that has been the dominant 
form of social organization for most of recorded human history (Hobsbawm 1992; Motyl 
2001).  Second, the perspective ultimately reduces ethnic conflict to a byproduct of “the” 
economic modernization process.  Gellner’s argument paints modernization as a much 
more homogeneous process than the extant evidence suggests, while Horowitz’s position 
essentially maintains that that only when the fruits of modernity spread to the whole of a 
state’s population can ethnic, as well as other divisions, be overcome.  Economic 
concerns are certainly a factor but these approaches do not elaborate fully on the role of 
state sanctioned exclusion and other state driven factors.  Where one can face everything 
from limitations on careers and marriage choices, to state sponsored discrimination and 
extermination, access to the state is everything.  The DBC school correctly highlights that 
conflict is not the product of everyday interactions between individuals but rather the 
result of organized ethnic groups challenging the state (Cederman and Girardin 2007) 
(see also, Brubaker 2006).  Unfortunately, focusing on those institutions, such as 
universal education and other inclusive institutions of the state, the perspective overlooks 
the fact that states often implement the very exclusionary practices that lead to ethnic 
rebellion.  Scholarship from the DBC school thus tends to take the role of ethnic 
economic grievances in fomenting conflict as a given, a priori, just as the GAO School 
overwhelmingly treats the state as an ethnically neutral actor.  
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The Power and Legitimacy School: The State, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic 
Conflict 
 In opposition to both the GAO and DBC schools, the power and legitimacy school 
draws upon a broader theoretical tradition regarding the rise and spread of the nation-
state.  It builds on Breuilly’s (1993) account linking nationalism and nation-state 
formation to the rise of political modernity, as well as insights highlighted by a number of 
macro comparative-historical realists (specifically, Mann 1993; Moore 1993 [1963]; Tilly 
1992).  Wimmer’s (2002) historical institutionalist approach holds that the nation-state is 
itself a form of social closure based on ethno-national principles that define the “national 
we” and the “alien other.”   In brief, the initial rise of the nation-state is seen as the result 
of two parallel processes.  The first is suggested by Tilly’s (1992) capital and coercion 
argument that gave the nation-state a competitive advantage in the international arena.  
The second is the simultaneous development of a new foundation for the legitimacy of 
rule, or what Wimmer (2002) refers to as the nationalist cultural compromise.   Drawing 
on a line of scholarship stretching back to Bendix (1978), Wimmer situates his central 
concept of nationalist cultural compromise within an international nation-state system 
originally based on ethno-nationalist principles.  The ideal typical example of a 
successful nationalist cultural compromise is the Western European state.  In these cases, 
the ruling elite have exchanged all the rights associated with political modernity (equality 
before the law, democracy, and citizenship) for the power to tax, raise armies, and 
otherwise substantially regulate the everyday lives of their citizens.  When successful, the 
benefits of political modernity have been extended to nearly (if not) all of the state’s 
permanent population, thereby distinguishing a territory’s permanent residents from its 
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“aliens” that permanently reside outside of the state territory.  The national “we, the 
people” are largely coterminous with a state’s permanent residents and are thus in 
keeping with the principles of self-determination and its corollary, state sovereignty.  
Wimmer thus supplements Tilly’s (1992) argument about why the nation-state form was 
superior to other state models with an analysis that outlines why the domestic populations 
in the initial wave of nation states supported their development. 
For Wimmer, the success of the nationalist cultural compromise is central to 
explaining ethnic violence because when successful it removes the threat of ethnic 
exclusion from the state and therefore the prospects of ethnic rebellion.  But the 
nationalist cultural compromise is not always successful.  As the major empires fell, they 
were broken up into states within a world increasingly populated by the nation-state form 
(Wimmer and Feinstein 2010).  The deceptively neat lines on the global map followed 
old imperial legacies and interests of the major world powers (Hobsbawm 1992) and still 
serve to reify national distinctions that are hardly realities on the ground (Calhoun 1997).  
In many cases, statehood was bequeathed to the colonies of imperial powers, with little 
thought to the ethnic makeup of these regions.  Whereas in the early Western nation-
states nationalism and the modern state had grown up together (Greenfeld 1992), newly 
formed states in the post-WWII era have rarely had readymade nations to transform into a 
titular nationality (a major exception was the breakup of the Soviet Union).  Thus, in 
many cases, these new political entities were states without “nations,” within a 
community of nation states.  When the nationalist cultural compromise fails, the field has 
documented two alternative paths: the politicization of ethnicity, also known as the 
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ethnicization of the bureaucracy, and populist nationalism (Kroneberg and Wimmer 
2012; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).   
When the nationalist cultural compromise fails, efforts at state formation, building 
and solidification do not cease but are argued to take an alternative trajectory which 
Wimmer (2002) describes as the “ethnicization of the bureaucracy.” In his view, the 
ethnicization of the bureaucracy occurs for two principle reasons.  First, when states lack 
enough resources to distribute public goods to the whole of its population, those in 
control of the state tend to favor one ethnic group over another.  Second, even when the 
state has enough resources, if civil society is weak and interest group politics have not 
developed, ruling elites can use ethnic solidarity as a framework for amassing political 
support through the development of clientlist networks of patronage.  In both cases ruling 
elites tend draw on ethnic divisions reinforced by the international system or colonial 
past.  When the state bureaucracy is ethnicized the benefits of the state (i.e., public 
goods) are not made available to the entire permanent population.  Instead, public goods 
are distributed along ethnic lines.  In such cases, a reduced variant of the nationalist 
cultural compromise is carried out with only an ethnic portion of the state’s permanent 
population.  The process of social closure continues but draws points of distinction 
between elements of the state’s permanent population, thus excluding a portion of the 
population from the protections and public goods provided by the state along ethnic lines.  
When distinctions of social closure slice through the territorial population excluding 
those of the “wrong” ethnicity from state access, ethnic rebellions can often ensue 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).  Wimmer 
(2002) thus links both economic and civil society development to processes of nation-
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state building by tying these factors to distinct configurations of shifting power and 
legitimacy structures.  From these configurations emerge the politicization of ethnicity 
and the exclusion of ethnic groups, thus generating the foundations of ethnic conflict.  
By linking the rise of the nation-state system to political modernity, the power and 
legitimacy school avoids an ahistorical explanation with mechanisms that are firmly 
situated within clearly delimited time frames that coincide with the shaping of the 
international world system and its waves of state formation (Wimmer and Min 2006; 
Wimmer and Feinstein 2010).  Unlike the first historical cases of nationalism (Greenfeld 
1992), the formation of internationally recognized nation-states within the world polity 
during the post WWII political era commonly proceeded prior to the development of 
organic and comprehensive national identities (Wimmer 2002).  Anti-colonial 
movements certainly marshaled nationalist rhetoric in their bids for independence.  Yet 
once independence had been achieved, most splintered along factional and ethnic lines as 
anti-colonial nationalisms proved far less cohesive than their earlier imperial ancestors 
(Mayall 1990).  The ethno-nationalist bend in the right of national self-determination 
justified these forms of anti-colonial nationalism, but also raised the question of who, 
exactly, constituted the “national we.”   Minahan (1996), for example, finds that there are 
an estimated 9000 stateless nations, with over 200 of them making organized claims of 
independence.  Within the modern political era, ethnicity has been increasingly 
politicized as disparate ethnic groups vie for control of the state, with often violent 
consequences (Moynihan 1993; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer 2002). 
By linking the rise of political and economic modernity, Wimmer’s theory of nationalist 
exclusion gives a historically contingent account of how ethnicity became the primary 
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fault line of organized conflict within the modern political era.  In doing so it avoids the 
error of assuming ethnicity is politically relevant a priori.  In turn, the rising importance 
of state membership within the modern political era explains why exclusion from access 
to the state would plausibly escalate into violent civil war.   
 As modern states have become increasingly powerful, the human cost of ethno-
nationalist exclusion is more extreme than ever (consider, for example, the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, the Rohinga people in Myanmar, or the expulsion of the Armenians from 
Turkey).  Simply put, exclusion from the public goods provided by the state influences 
every sector of life.  The power and legitimacy perspective does not necessarily run 
counter to the expectations of the other three schools, but rather gives them context.  For 
example, opportunity structures such as mountainous terrain may make the escalation of 
political tensions to violent rebellion more feasible, but only the power and legitimacy 
school articulates why such an escalation would be accepted in the first place.  The 
consequences of exclusion from the state are simply too high.  On the other hand, the 
Wimmer perspective forces substantial reinterpretation of other findings.  For example, 
the Sambanis (2001) argument that ethnicity reduces the organizational costs of rebellion 
may indeed hold, but to examine the validity of that specific interpretation requires that it 
be separated from the effect of ethnically based exclusion.  However, at the time of this 
writing quantitative analyses of ethnic rebellion and violence have not branched out 
beyond the narrow question of violent onset. 
 The present moment is ripe for just such an expansion.  Through one of the most 
impressive data collection efforts in the discipline, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2009) 
have recently engaged in a massive effort to assess the quantitative empirical support of 
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what had largely been a qualitative endeavor based on case study and limited 
comparative research.  To date, the Wimmer School has garnered substantial empirical 
support.  Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) stress compellingly that ethnic rebellions 
are more likely when greater proportions of the population are excluded along ethnic 
lines.  These findings are supplemented at the group level by research suggesting that 
ethnic groups that are increasingly excluded, better organized and have recently 
experienced violent conflict are more likely to engage in conflict with the state 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).  Collectively, these findings have implications for 
both the greed and opportunity school and the diversity breeds conflict school.  First, 
contrary to the GAO School, the power and legitimacy school finds that, when 
politicized, ethnicity presents an organizational framework through which individuals 
attempt to gain access to state power.  Here the politicization of ethnicity is not merely 
descriptive but ultimately related to ethnically based exclusion. Second, quantitative 
findings from the power and legitimacy school suggests that it is unequal power relations 
between ethnic groups that breeds conflict, not simply the existence of diverse 
populations grating against the homogenizing forces of economic modernity (as argued 
by the Gellner wing of the diversity breeds conflict school).  Quantitative research 
findings simultaneously expand Horowitz’s hypothesis concerning the equal spread of 
modernity’s economic goods to the realm of political modernity as well.  On the other 
hand, findings from the power and legitimacy school contradict DBC School results, 
showing that ethnic rebellions tend to be initiated by excluded ethnic majorities rather 
than by ethnic minorities as they struggle to gain control of the very means of organized 
violence with which they are confronted.  In short, the recent quantitative scholarship 
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from the Wimmer School has clearly demonstrated that ethnic power relations play a 
decisive role in fomenting ethnic violence.  
 Unfortunately, the recent spate of quantitative analysis within the power and 
legitimacy school on the subject of ethnic violence and state formation has not subjected 
the entirety of Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict to empirical 
scrutiny.  The majority of Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence 
focuses on how ethnicity is politicized and why states commit to a course of ethnic 
exclusion, but only the link between exclusion and ethnic rebellion has been seriously 
treated in the quantitative research.  Thus there are several elements of Wimmer’s (2002) 
theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict that further require empirical 
assessment.  First, as it stands, the formation of ethnic power relations requires analysis 
in its own right because the finding that excluded majorities, for example, are more likely 
to rebel, raises the question of why ethnic majorities would be excluded in the first place.  
Such an act not only runs counter to the idea of national self-determination, but also more 
rational actor based approaches which would predict efforts at developing a broad base of 
support (See Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012 for a game theoretic elite-masses alliance 
based analysis).  
 Second, and more importantly, however, beyond the influence of ethnic 
exclusion, the same factors that are theorized to contribute to the onset of ethnic rebellion 
are also theorized to influence the politicization of ethnicity and the act of ethnic 
exclusion itself.  These effects need to be disaggregated to be accurately understood.  
Finally, although the power and legitimacy school focuses on the boundaries between 
groups and the state, the perspective conflates the politicization of ethnicity with ethnic 
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exclusion.  Ethnicity is certainly a practical category when membership means exclusion 
from the state, but ethnicity can be politically relevant without the presence of ethnically 
based exclusion.  For the power and legitimacy school the politicization of ethnicity is 
primarily addressed in the context of nation-building and state-formation, while the onset 
of ethnic conflict is seen to result primarily from ethnically based exclusion.  But this 
distinction is analytical.  The roots of rebellion lay in exclusion and the roots of exclusion 
lay in the politicization of ethnicity, for they are part and parcel of the same overarching 
process.  What is necessary is (1) a better conceptualization and empirical assessment of 
the politicization of ethnicity; (2) a reexamination of the factors thought to contribute to 
the onset of ethnic exclusion; and, in light of such an analysis, (3) an examination of the 
implications of these findings in regards to the onset of ethnic rebellion. 
Theorizing the Institutionalization of Ethnic Tensions: The Politicization of Ethnicity, 
Ethnic Exclusion, and Ethnic Rebellion 
Wimmer’s theory of ethnic conflict and nationalist exclusion is ultimately a two 
level theory.  On the one hand it emphasizes the importance of analyzing configurations 
of power relations between ethnic groups and the state (Wimmer 2013b), which is the 
locus of the current project.  On the other hand, Wimmer’s theory is also fundamentally 
about the negotiation of group boundaries, and cultural compromises that legitimate the 
rule of some set of elites (Wimmer 2013a).  However, within the modern political era, 
rule in the name of “we the people,” has largely become the principle foundation for the 
legitimacy of rule around the globe.  The values of state sovereignty and national self-
determination are enshrined in the United Nations Charter, but both states, and aspiring 
ethno-nationalist movements, draw upon these values to defend their aspirations (Mayall 
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1990).  As this analysis is concerned with explaining ethnic rebellions within the modern 
political era (i.e., post WWII), the historically specific circumstances of state formation 
within this period are directly relevant.  In the midst of post-independence fragmentation, 
elites attempted nation-building within relatively fixed territorial boundaries, often 
containing peoples from an array of ethnic categories, many with organizations aspiring 
to transform themselves into recognized nations (Mayall 1990; Meyer 1999; Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Moynihan 1993).   
 Yet, even if the nation-state form is all but ubiquitous, the politicization of 
ethnicity is not.   That is, ethnic cleavages do not necessarily represent boundaries along 
which public goods are distributed and state membership defined.  Nor are all the world’s 
states characterized by attempts to gain political support along ethnic lines.  Kroneberg 
and Wimmer (2012) argue that the elites and masses negotiate an exchange alliance-- 
trading political participation for military support and taxation for public goods, 
ultimately producing one of three states of equilibrium: a successful inclusion of a state’s 
population through a nationalist cultural compromise; the incorporation of all but the 
counter elites through populist nationalism; or the politicization of ethnicity through the 
formation of alliances along ethnic lines.  When the alliances fall along ethnic lines they 
are characterized by three features that serve to reproduce them.  As Wimmer 
(2013a:110) states, “Highly salient, socially closed, and culturally marked ethnic groups 
will produce high degrees of identifications among its members and thus stabilize a 
boundary through path dependent effects.”   Following Wimmer’s institutional work, I 
conceive of the negotiated legitimacy and boundary work as micro-level processes and 
treat them as the backdrop in my analysis.  Similarly, I place Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) 
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cycles of repression and reprisal that characterize contentious politics in the same 
category.  Placing them backstage, as exogenous micro-mechanisms, it becomes clear 
that the quote from Wimmer can be reformulated in solely institutional terms.  Thus 
stated, the institutionalization of highly salient, socially closed, and culturally marked 
ethnic categories solidify the boundaries that foment ethnic rebellion.   
To provide some context on why the institutionalization of highly salient, socially 
closed, and culturally marked ethnic categories create the foundation for ethnic 
rebellions, consider the following.   Minahan (1996) finds that there are an estimated 
9000 stateless nations, with over 200 of them making organized claims of independence, 
within a limited number of recognized sovereign territories (Mayall 1990; Wimmer 
2002).  In states where ethnic categories are culturally marked, highly salient, and 
socially closed, organized members of ethnic categories and aspiring nations are hemmed 
in a world of presumptive nation-states.  There they play a deadly version of musical 
chairs for a limited number of seats at the United Nations table.  If one acknowledges the 
truism that any ideological framework, once institutionalized, tends to gain a certain 
advantage and momentum, three points of institutional escalation become fundamental to 
understanding ethnic rebellion.  The first such point concerns the macro-structural 
conditions under which ruling elites endorse, reify, and create the highly salient, and 
culturally marked ethnic categories that characterize the politicization of ethnicity.  The 
second are the macro-structural conditions under which these politicized ethnic categories 
become the criteria for state-based exclusion.  And the third are the macro-structural 
conditions that light the proverbial powder keg of ethnically based exclusion, ushering in 
the onset of ethnic rebellion.  Before presenting the specific hypotheses regarding each 
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threshold, I briefly develop the mid-level theoretical framework within which each is 
situated. 
The research on the politicization of ethnicity, and why exclusion from the state 
often follows ethnic cleavages, is actually quite limited relative to the vast literature on 
ethnicity.  In part this can be explained by the foundational Herderian remnants of the 
concept itself.   The Herderian roots of ethnicity, as a concept, made such questions 
difficult to pose since it was assumed that all peoples of the world naturally belonged to 
ethnic groups with unique cultural traits.  Initially the idea that peoples could be sorted 
according to the Herderian trinity of ethnic community, culture, and identity, was largely 
taken as a given (Wimmer 2013a: Chapter 2).  The literature has of course moved on 
from Herder, but until the last decade the question of ethnicity’s politicization, let alone 
its relationship to ethnic exclusion, remained largely unaddressed because it seems self 
evident.  Brubaker’s (2004; 2006) call to the academy to stop treating ethnic groups as 
firmly bounded and integrated peoples that possess individual agency apriori, is more 
than a call to reformulate the way we think about ethnicity.  More concretely, it endorses 
the search for, and analysis of, what he calls practical categories.  If groups are 
conceptualized as bounded collectivities with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity, and 
capacity for concerted action, then ethnic categories are at best, as Brubaker (2004:12) 
states, only “a potential basis for group formation.”  Nearly all but the poorest states in 
the world today have some center for national statistics with an ethnic classification 
system for their population.  The world’s populations are indeed ethnically categorized, 
but the crux of Brubaker’s argument is that just because they can be classified, does not 
mean that those classifications have practical consequences.  The task is thus to discover 
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the structural circumstances under which ethnicity might act in various ways: as a 
relatively meaningless category in the eyes of the state; a practical category in political 
life; the practical criteria for state sanctioned exclusion; or the organizing principle for 
ethnic rebellion. 
The politicization of ethnicity is addressed in two sub-literatures within the power 
and legitimacy school.  Most of the work addressing the politicization of ethnicity as an 
outcome has emerged as a byproduct of work on nation-building and nation-state 
formation.  Wimmer (2002) claims that when ruling elites do not have enough resources 
or when civil society is weak, they tend to favor co-ethnics in their distribution of public 
goods.  Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) follow up on this analysis by providing evidence 
that ethnically based social closure results when civil society is weak and/or states are 
less centralized (For a complete review, see Wimmer 2013b).  On the other hand, the 
conflict wing of the power and legitimacy school has placed more weight on its 
consequences.  For example, Wimmer et al, (2009) make the case that the politicization 
of ethnicity is a necessary condition for the ruling elite to commit ethnic exclusion, thus 
possibly fomenting ethnic rebellion.  Given the substantial role institutionalized power 
explanations play in the power and legitimacy school, the lack of analysis focusing 
explicitly on the institutional factors that increase the salience of marked ethno-cultural 
diacritics is somewhat surprising.  However, such an omission is understandable insofar 
as Wimmer (2002) subsumes both the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion as 
elements of what he terms ethnicized bureaucracies.  That is to say, ethnicized 
bureaucracies emerge where the politicization of ethnicity has been institutionalized and 
the fault lines of exclusion fall along these politicized ethnic cleavages and categories. 
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Within the power and legitimacy school, the mechanism of institutionalization is 
important because it locks a state into a particular equilibrium that narrows the set of 
potential trajectories and plausible outcomes.  Wimmer’s ethnicized bureaucracy is just 
such an outcome.  Nevertheless, this institutional approach can be expanded to usefully 
understand the series of institutional points of escalation that place some states at a much 
higher risk of ethnic rebellion than others by separating the politicization of ethnicity and 
ethnic exclusion.  The methodological critique Wimmer et al. (2009) levels against the 
field, regarding the improper inclusion of cases without politicized ethnicity in the study 
of ethnic violence, rests upon his conceptualization of ethnicized bureaucracies.   But it 
also points toward a series of institutional escalations that characterize what could be 
described as partial and fully ethnicized bureaucracies.  Both Wimmer et al. (2009) and 
Cederman et al. (2010) imply and assume that a salience threshold must be met prior to 
the possibility of ethnic exclusion by the state.  In short, ethnic exclusion from the public 
goods of the state is an inherently political act that can occur only if a state’s politics are 
framed around ethnic categories with political organizations mobilizing political support 
along ethnic lines.   
By extending the logic of this argument, three specific institutional thresholds 
become clear preconditions for the onset of ethnic rebellion.  First, ethnic categories must 
become so salient that they are politicized and ultimately become institutionalized as the 
principle organizing framework of political support.  At this point, power sharing 
mechanisms between ethnic political organizations may be able to stop the escalation but 
this condition can be best described as partial ethnicization of the bureaucracy.  If not, 
however, a second threshold is reached when one of the competing ethnic organizations 
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successfully gains control of the state and formally excludes some or all of its 
competitors along ethnic lines.  In other words, once this second threshold is met, such 
states could be described as having fully ethnicized bureaucracies.  Fully ethnicized 
bureaucracies are essentially proverbial powder kegs of ethnic rebellion.  The final 
institutional threshold of organized violence is reached when organizations representing 
excluded categories of peoples violently or non-violently contest their exclusion from the 
public goods of the state and ruling elites turn the military on the “rebelling” population.  
To borrow Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) term, cycles of repression and reprisal dominate 
fully ethnicized bureaucracies, but once the state turns its military on an ethnic category 
of its population, the final institutional threshold of escalation has been reached.  Limited 
ethnic rebellion turns into ethnic civil war, as the state turns the means of organized 
violence against an ethnic category of people now considered foreign (Consider, for 
example the current civil war in Syria). 
It is important to note that these trajectories of institutional escalation are long 
term processes that move between thresholds of equilibrium.  As these points of 
institutional escalation are also points of equilibrium, they do not tend to vary greatly 
over time in terms of years, but rather decades and centuries from the moment of state 
formation.  Thus, the conceptualization of institutional escalation should not be 
interpreted in simple linear fashion.  All states do not enter at the lower end of the 
continuum and then proceed through each successive point.  Rather, for the newest states, 
which have been formed in the modern political era, the state of ethnic tensions at the 
moment of formation is crucial. Over the course of their emerging history they may 
slowly move up or down the ethnic tension spectrum, but the extent to which ethnicity is 
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institutionalized in the state’s political processes places the state that much closer or 
further away from potential ethnic rebellion and civil war.   
The newest state of South Sudan is a case in point.  South Sudan is a new state 
formed out of civil war and threatened by yet more internal divisions.  Rebels in support 
of deposed deputy Machar have been targeting President Kiir’s ethnic category, the 
Dinka, while government forces have been targeting those who share Machar’s Nuer 
background.  Ethnicity has been politicized in South Sudan from the very beginning of its 
existence, with Machar receiving the second highest governmental post as a compromise 
intended to get members of the Nuer ethnic community to buy into the new government.  
Although the conflict has ethnic overtones, both Machar and Kiir have some support 
outside of their respective ethnic groups, and thus Southern Sudan may yet step back 
from the precipice.   Regardless, ethnicity will, at best, remain politicized for some time.  
It will take some deft political maneuvering to avoid a potentially catastrophic race for 
the state that could emerge if political leaders from the Dinka and Nuer fully pursue the 
building of ethnically homogenous constituencies.  In such a case, the fear of exclusion 
from state access would no doubt escalate tensions.   The fallout is a reality that South 
Sudan, the rest of Africa, and the world will have to deal with well into the future.   
Clearly, the formation of South Sudan as a state renders the probability that ethnicity 
remains politically dormant in the near future all but impossible.   
On the other hand, state building projects have resulted in a wide range of ethnic 
tensions, including several political frameworks where ethnicity is politically irrelevant.  
The best operational definition of politically relevant ethnicity in the field is provided in 
the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR).  The EPR codes an ethnic category as 
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politically relevant if, “at least one significant political actor claims to represent the 
interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category 
are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public 
politics” (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2008:1).  Using these criteria, Tunisia, Libya, 
Venezuela, Denmark, Tanzania and Oman are just a few of the world’s states with long 
histories of politically irrelevant ethnicity.  To provide several illustrations: ethnicity is 
not politically relevant in Denmark; yet it is politically relevant with no ethnic exclusion 
in the Netherlands.  In Sweden and Norway ethnicity is irrelevant, while ethnicity is 
politically relevant with no ethnic exclusion in Finland.  As of 2005, ethnicity was 
politically relevant with no ethnic exclusion in Burundi, Cameroon, and the Central 
African Republic, while in the respective bordering states of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sudan at least one ethnic category was excluded from 
state access.  Even in well developed Western Europe such a divide occurs.  As of 2005, 
ethnicity was politically relevant with ethnically based exclusion in France, while 
ethnicity was politically irrelevant in Germany.  Looking further up the spectrum of 
ethnic tensions, as of 2005 the states of Sudan, Chad and Iran were locked in violent 
struggles against organized ethnic rebel forces, while the DRC, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria 
were systematically excluding ethnic groups but not facing such rebellions.  The wide 
array of economic development which this brief selection entails presents a puzzle with 
regard to the available resources element of Wimmer’s theory of the politicization of 
ethnicity.    
Figure 1.1 provides a list of the world’s states with populations of 1 million or 
more—or a total square area of 500,000 kilometers—placed along an ethnic tensions 
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spectrum from 1946-2005.  Four specific categories are highlighted.  For states in the 
lowest category ethnicity is not politically relevant, while states in the top category 
experienced at least one ethnic rebellion between 1946 and 2005.   In the second from the 
bottom category you find states where ethnicity has been politicized but people are not 
excluded from the state along ethnic lines.  In the third from the bottom category are 
those states where the politicization of ethnicity has escalated into state sanctioned ethnic 
exclusion.  Although levels of ethnic tension vary substantially for the states within each 
of these categories, membership in a category indicates a certain institutionalization of 
politicized ethnicity that draws attention to quantitative scholarship’s focus on the ethnic 
rebellion category.  As Wimmer et al. (2009) illustrate, an ethnic rebellion versus no 
ethnic rebellion variable is inadequate because it includes the category of states where 
ethnicity is not politicized.  Hence they focus on the remainder of the world’s states in an 
analysis of multiple types of ethnic violence.  In this project I have purposefully restricted 
my focus to ethnic rebellions to highlight the importance of the politicization of ethnicity 
and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in placing ethnic rebellion in context.  I will now 
briefly outline the forgoing dissertation. 
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Afghanistan, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,  Chad, China, 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Dem. Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Syria, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, 
Uganda, United Kingdom, 
Yemen, Yugoslavia, 
Zimbabwe 
Onset of One of More 
Ethnic 
Rebellions between  
1946 and 2005 
State-Sanctioned 
Ethnic 
Exclusion 
Ethnicity 
Not 
Politicized 
Ethnicity 
Politicized: No Ethnic 
Exclusion 
Brazil (pre-1977), Cuba (post-1960), Madagascar (post-1993), 
Gambia (post-1994), Yemen People’s Republic (1967-1989),  
Burkina Faso, Denmark, East Germany, East Timor, Germany,  
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Lesotho,  Libya, North Korea, Oman, 
Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Somalia, South Korea, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, West Germany 
Albania (pre-1990), Belgium 
(pre-1980), Benin (1970-1995), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (post-
1996), Burundi (post-2002), 
Cameroon, Central African 
Republic (1966-1969, post-
1994), China (1966-1976), 
Congo (1991), Cote d’Ivoire 
(post-2003), Finland, Gabon 
(post-1968), Gambia (1965-
1993), Ghana (1957-1969, post-
1972), Guinea (1958-1985), 
Guinea-Bissau (1981-1999), 
Haiti, Japan (1952-1971), 
Liberia (post-2004), Madagascar 
(1973-1992),  Malawi, Mali 
(1991-1993, post-1996), 
Mauritania, Netherlands (1946-
1956, post-1983), New Zealand, 
Senegal, South Africa (post-
1994), Switzerland, Syria (1949-
1957, 1961-1969), Togo (1963-
1966, 1991), Trinidad and 
Tobago (1986-1990), Uganda 
(1962-1965), Yemen Arab 
Republic (pre-1989, then 
Yemen), Zambia, Zimbabwe 
(1980-1981, 1992-1999) 
Afghanistan, Albania (post-1990), Algeria, 
Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium (post-1980), Benin(1964-1969, 
post-1996), Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1992-1995), Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi(1966-2001), 
Cambodia, Canada, Central African 
Republic(1960-1965, 1970-1993, 2001), 
Chad, Chile, China (1946-1965, Post-1977), 
Colombia, Congo (1960-1990, post-1992), 
Costa, Rica, Cote  d’Ivoire (1960-2002), 
Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, France, Gabon(1960-1967), 
Georgia, Ghana(1970-1971), Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea(post-1986), Guinea-
Bissau(1974-1980, post-2000), Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,  
Israel, Japan(post-1972), Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia(1946-2003), 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar (1960-
1972), Malaysia, Mali(1960-1990, 1994-
1995), Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands (1957-1982), 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Republic of Vietnam, Romania, 
Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra 
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa 
(1946-1993), Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Syria (1946-1960, 1970-2005), Taiwan, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo(1960-1962, 
post-1967), Trinidad and Tobago (1962-
1985, post-1991), Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda (post-1966), Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yugoslavia,  
Zimbabwe (1965-1979, 1982-1991, 2000-
2005) 
 
Figure 1.1: The Institutionalization of Ethnic Tensions in the World’s States  
from 1946 to 2005 
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Chapter 2 pursues an examination of the structural and institutional factors 
associated to with the politicization of ethnicity.  From examining Figure 1.1, it is clear 
that all states in the second box from the bottom and higher have some version of 
politicized ethnicity.  The literature on the politicization of ethnicity has primarily 
emerged from the power and legitimacy school.  Wimmer’s (2002) theory of nationalist 
exclusion and ethnic violence houses within it a theory of ethnicity’s politicization.  In 
his eyes, ethnicized bureaucracies tend to emerge where ruling elites have limited 
resources and where civil societies are weak.  However, his approach requires refinement 
in two ways.  First, it does not treat ethnic exclusion and the politicization of ethnicity as 
analytically distinct.  Although ethnicity is often politicized by elites with the aim of 
excluding certain segments of the population from the state, this is not always the case.  
One need only look at the politicization of ethnicity in Canada.  Ethnicity is certainly 
relevant, as the narrowly failed Quebec secession referendum of 1995 illustrates, yet it 
would be hard to argue that the French-Canadian population was excluded from the state.  
Secessionist movements that wish greater autonomy often force the politicization of 
ethnicity on states where it may otherwise not emerge.  Here the term ethnic exclusion 
does not really hold in the conventional sense and ideas of national self determination 
that motivate the politicization of ethnicity still emerge.  Second, the role actual ethnic 
diversity of the state plays in ethnicity’s politicization is left undeveloped in Wimmer’s 
approach. His lack of treatment may suggest that ethnic diversity has a relatively constant 
effect on the politicization of ethnicity or that it is simply not a factor.  After all, by 
analytically combining politicized ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, diversity only matters 
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when an ethnic category is excluded.  Chapter 2 is explicitly devoted to disentangling and 
empirically examining these countervailing theoretical possibilities. 
Continuing to move up Figure 1.1, in chapter 3 I shift to examining state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion. State based ethnic exclusion is the second characteristic of 
Wimmer’s theory of politicized ethnicity.  As such, the role of ethnic diversity in 
promoting exclusion is also glossed over.  To paraphrase the opening of Karl Marx’s 18
th
 
Brumaire, men may make history, but they seldom do so in the setting of their choosing.  
So too proceeds the process of state building, state formation and solidification.  Ruling 
elites operate within the confines of the existing system.  If ethnicity is already 
politicized, the status quo may be continued, or escalated to ethnic exclusion, or attempts 
can be made to depoliticize the boundary.  As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, just as ethnic 
rebellions cannot occur where ethnicity has not been politicized so too does state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion require the requisite politicization of ethnicity.  The structural 
elements of available resources and ethnic diversity once again are the major players, but 
in chapter 3 I analytically separate the processes of ethnic exclusion from the 
politicization of ethnicity in an effort to develop their separate and opposing logics.  As 
such, I reduce the pool of cases to only those cases where ethnicity is politically relevant 
focus on the distinction between the presence or absence of ethnic exclusion.  
In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of ethnic rebellion proper to examine the role 
ethnic diversity plays within the excluded population in fomenting rebellion in states with 
state sanctioned ethnic exclusion already in place.  Where the DBC School focuses on a 
wide variety of grievances when attempting to explain ethnic rebellion, the power and 
legitimacy school remains transfixed on state sanctioned exclusion.  In terms of ethnic 
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rebellion specifically, Wimmer et al. (2009) find that as the proportion of the population 
excluded from the state increases, so too does the probability of ethnic rebellion.  
Conversely, Laitin (2007) argues that ethnic grievances and exclusion are so ubiquitous 
that they cannot possibly explain ethnic rebellion.  In chapter 4, I develop an explanation 
that accounts for why the Wimmer et al. (2009) finding should hold, while the rarity of 
ethnic rebellion would initially seem to support the Laitin perspective.  As previously 
noted, it would be naïve to assume that ruling elites would not expect at least some 
opposition to state sanctioned exclusion.  Through an extension of findings from chapter 
3 and Wimmer et al. (2009) findings regarding ethnic infighting, chapter 4 presents a 
“power and legitimacy” explanation for the rarity of ethnic rebellion and civil war.    
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Chapter 2: The Institutionalization of Ethnic Politics 
In spite of the shift in emphasis from group rights to individual rights enshrined in 
the United Nations Charter, during the modern political era (roughly 1946-present) ethnic 
and ethno-national divisions continue to provide principal cleavages around which 
politics are organized.  From 1946 through 2005, between 80 to 85 percent of the world’s 
states were characterized by some form of ethnic politics.
1
  The ethnic organization of 
state level politics is undeniably widespread.  Given the widely accepted nature of ethnic 
politics, many scholars have opted to simply acknowledge this dominance, and move to 
explaining ethnic exclusion and conflict, which necessarily take the politicization of 
ethnicity as given.  Yet, within any framework, public politics are characterized by what 
the late Charles Tilly (2005: 173-174) described as the “creation, activation, and 
transformation of visible us-them boundaries, as well as reversal of those processes: 
destruction, deactivation, or restoration of us-them boundaries.”  Contentious politics, to 
borrow Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) term, are thus not restricted to states where ethnicity 
has been politicized.  Realizing this insight, a major vein of civil war literature argues 
that ethnicity is just a descriptive element.  Other scholars have responded, arguing that 
only where ethnicity has been politicized to a point where it becomes the primary 
organizational framework for political action can contentious politics escalate into ethnic 
exclusion and ethnic civil war.  Unfortunately, many studies of ethnic rebellion and 
exclusion have assumed the political relevance, or irrelevance, of ethnicity, choosing to 
steer clear of the empirical question.  Although this dissertation seeks to address the 
                                                 
1
 Data for this claim are drawn from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, in which an ethnic category was 
coded as politically relevant if “at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of 
that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and 
intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics.”  Cederman, L. E., B. Min, and A. 
Wimmer. 2009. "Ethnic Power Relations Dataset." Dataverse Network, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796  
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questions of exclusion and ethnic rebellion as well, in this chapter I purposely bracket 
these questions in an effort to focus explicitly on the politicization of ethnicity.  
Why has the politicization of ethnicity not received more direct academic 
attention?  Why are the majority of the world’s states characterized by some form of 
ethnic politics?  Which structural factors tend to motivate the politicization of ethnicity?  
Answers to these questions that directly address the politicization of ethnicity remain 
surprisingly incomplete.  Quantitative work on the issue is especially sparse.  Indeed, 
literature on the politicization of ethnicity has largely developed as theoretical backdrop 
to the broader questions of ethnic discrimination, exclusion and conflict within three 
veins of inquiry.  Neo-romanticist approaches take the existence of ethnically framed 
grievances as a given a priori.  They therefore simply assume that ethnicity is nearly 
always politically relevant or that ethnic divisions are simmering just below the surface.  
As a result neo-romanticists’ explanations of ethnic conflict rest on the assumption that 
higher amounts of ethnic diversity tend to result in its politicization.  Alternatively, 
rational actor approaches seek to understand how and why ethnicity lowers the costs of 
mobilization and the maintenance of political support.  The rational actor approach 
largely side steps the question of politicization by arguing that the ethnicization of 
politics operates like any other tool which legitimates struggle and garners support.  Such 
strategies and tactics are argued to follow a common logic and research focuses on the 
conditions which allow the politicization of ethnicity to solve efficiency and utilitarian 
problems.  Perhaps the most prominent argument in this vein is Michael Hechter’s (2000) 
position which links a history of indirect rule to the politicization of ethnicity.  Hence the 
neo-romanticist approach has a specific theoretical locus that narrowly limits the scope of 
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analysis—a problem it shares with the rational actor school (despite the latter’s greater 
contribution to the dynamics of ethnic politicization in the modern era).   In fact, rational 
actor studies pay special attention to specific historical conditions, which are then argued 
to make the politicization of ethnicity more attractive in terms of efficiency or utility, 
thus resolving the perennial free rider problem.  Once again, however, the role of ethnic 
diversity is largely overlooked. 
In contrast to these perspectives, the power and legitimacy school (PAL) has been 
diligent in its engagement with the politicization of ethnicity, pursuing the topic along 
two paths.   First, drawing on insights from Barth and Bourdieu, power and legitimacy 
scholars offer an ethnic group formation perspective that highlights the micro-level social 
processes and mechanisms that individuals employ to reinforce, dismantle, redefine, 
manage and ultimately navigate the boundaries between ethnic categories of peoples.  In 
many ways, this approach is an ethnically focused version of Tilly’s work on boundary 
formation and categorical inequality.  A second macro-strand of research argues that the 
widespread politicization of ethnicity has resulted from the same historical forces that 
ostensibly engendered the rise of political modernity and the nation-state form over the 
longue duree.  Taking radically distinct points of departure, yet relying on the other as 
backdrop, these dual approaches both focus on the power relations and resources 
available to elites in constructing a nationalist cultural compromise.  The structural and 
institutional argument holds that where resources are scarce an inclusive nationalizing 
project cannot succeed because ruling elites lack the means to distribute the public goods 
of the state to the entire population.  In these cases ethnicity is more likely to be 
politicized as ruling elites struggle to develop and maintain the foundations of political 
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support along narrower ethnic lines.  I argue that each of these three perspectives either 
misconceives the role that levels of ethnic diversity play in facilitating or limiting the 
politicization of ethnic boundaries, or simply leaves the issue unaddressed. 
To better understand the structural and institutional conditions that promote ethnic 
exclusion and foment ethnic rebellion, a deeper understanding of how these same 
conditions influence the politicization of ethnicity is required.  Why is this the case?  The 
most recent studies of ethnic rebellion from the PAL school openly acknowledge that the 
politicization of ethnicity is a necessary condition for ethnic exclusion and ethnic 
rebellion.  In fact, one of its central findings is that ethnic diversity is not a predictor of 
ethnic rebellion once ethnic power relations are accounted for (Wimmer et al. 2009).  
Yet, in bypassing the structural and institutional conditions that lead to the politicization 
of ethnicity, the power and legitimacy approach underemphasizes the role ethnic diversity 
plays in both limiting and promoting ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion.  Rather than 
assume away or simply bypass the importance of ethnic diversity, I argue that it is one of 
the central structural conditions faced by states that has played a crucial role in the 
formation and politicization of ethnic boundaries.   
The longue duree studies of the power and legitimacy school set the analytical 
backdrop, if you will, for the forgoing analysis, explaining the rise of the broader nation-
state system of political modernity.  Building on Wimmer’s resource availability 
argument, I propose a structural-configural model that emphasizes the long term interplay 
between a state’s ethnic diversity and its available resources.  Within the processes of 
state formation, state-stabilization and state-building, ruling elites are conceived to be 
constantly balancing the limitations of available resources and the constraints of the 
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territory’s ethnic diversity in their quest to create a widely accepted national identity.  
The constant balancing of these two structural factors, I argue, has channeled states into 
four ideal-typical outcomes—two where ethnicity is less likely to be politicized and two 
where ethnicity is quite likely to be politicized.  The politicization of ethnicity is less 
likely where ruling elites have limited resources coupled with high levels of ethnic 
diversity that prohibitively raise fears of widespread ethnic fractionalization, intolerable 
repression costs, and potential power sharing arrangements (For example, Burkina Faso, 
Papua New Guinea, Swaziland).  Second, politicized ethnicity is also less likely in states 
where abundant resources and low levels of ethnic diversity have made a broadly 
inclusive national cultural compromise, to borrow Wimmer’s (2002) terminology, 
relatively easy to achieve (For example, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark).  I call these 
two structural conditions the populist and national closure scenarios, respectively.  
Alternatively, the politicization of ethnicity is more likely in what I call the ethno-
bureaucratic and multi-culturalist scenarios.  Ethnicized bureaucracies tend to emerge in 
states with limited resources and low levels of ethnic diversity.  The reason for this is that 
the ethnic bases of political support are small enough that they can be included with the 
limited resources available, but large enough to provide a stable and manageable basis of 
political support (For example, Mauritania, Haiti, or Vietnam).  The politicization of 
ethnicity is also high in the multi-culturalist scenario, where abundant resources have 
resulted in a successful nationalist cultural compromise.  In such cases, high levels of 
ethnic diversity result in an increased probability of organized ethnic groups fearing the 
loss of their unique cultural heritage within the broader national whole (For example, 
Canada, France, and the United States).   
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I test the empirical support for these hypothesized scenarios through a quantitative 
analysis of the world’s states from 1946-2005 using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset 
(Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009).  This dataset records whether ethnicity was 
politically relevant within a state based on the extent of access to executive level state 
power possessed by various ethnic groups within a state’s population, as well as the 
presence of systematic discrimination along ethnic lines.  Unlike the Minorities at Risk 
dataset, which only records information on disadvantaged minorities, the EPR codes for 
ethnicity’s political relevance and irrelevance, making it the best available dataset to 
quantitatively probe the formation of ethnic politics within states.  Following Tilly (1999; 
2005) I assume that once a balance is struck between available resources and the ethnic 
diversity of a state, the resulting politicization (or non-politicization) of ethnicity is 
reproduced by actors on both sides of the relevant political divide.  Although shifts from 
politicized to non-politicized ethnicity do happen, they are relative rare, and are seen as 
the outcome of long-term processes.  Politicized and non-politicized ethnicity are thus 
conceptualized as points of relative equilibrium that, if empirically supported, should be 
characterized by distinct configurations of available resources and levels of ethnic 
diversity.  As such, evidence of the long-term structural and institutional channeling 
mechanisms should be observable within the configurations of resources and ethnic 
diversity between states within the modern political era.  Using binomial logit models, I 
test the extent to which the relationship between these two variables aligns with 
theoretical expectations in the modern political era. 
 The results largely support my inclusion of ethnic diversity within the original 
power and legitimacy school perspective. Politicized and non-politicized ethnicity, my 
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findings suggest, emerge from the structural interplay of resources available to the ruling 
elite and ethnic diversity of the state.  That is, my findings show that the effect of 
available resources on the politicization of ethnicity is contingent on the levels of ethnic 
diversity.  First, my results show that less developed states are more likely to be 
characterized by politicized ethnicity if they are also less ethnically diverse.  Second, well 
developed states with higher levels of ethnic diversity are more likely to contain ethnic 
politics than well developed states that have less ethnic diversity.  The effect of ethnic 
diversity on the politicization of ethnicity therefore varies depending on the availability 
resources. Thus, contrary to expectations commonly assumed by neo-romanticist 
positions, my findings suggest that the politicization of ethnicity is not necessarily more 
common in states characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity.  Finally, my analysis 
shows no evidence that colonial legacy or the history of indirect rule—a prominent 
argument from the rational actor approach—play a role in the development of ethnic 
politics.  Taken together, these findings suggest that states are structurally channeled into 
situations of politicized or non-politicized ethnicity depending on the configural 
relationship of ethnic diversity and available resources at moments of emergence, 
solidification, and reproduction within national state level politics.   
In linking the strategic balance of limited resources and the general ethnic 
diversity of the state territory to politicized ethnicity, this chapter further broadens the 
empirical support for a slightly expanded version of the power and legitimacy school’s 
comprehensive explanation of ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion.  Consciously built 
on the case-based theoretical work of prior research, the forgoing analysis follows in the 
footsteps of scholars who embrace a dialog between quantitative and qualitative research 
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(Amenta 2003).  Moreover, it supports the recent trend of closely examining the 
constellation of structural factors that tend to promote the politicization of ethnicity 
within states (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012). 
Moving Beyond the Assumption that Ethnicity is Politically Relevant 
Within the social sciences, the topic of ethnicity has been a robust field of inquiry 
and yet, when it comes to the question of ethnicity’s politicization, it suffers from two 
interrelated problems.  First, why and how ethnic boundaries become the primary 
cleavages around which politics are organized have received remarkably little attention in 
comparison to the topic of ethnicity as a whole.  Second, where the politicization of 
ethnicity is treated, it tends to be as backdrop for analytically separate but connected 
topics, such as the rise of nationalism or ethnic violence.  I first discuss why the 
politicization of ethnicity has received comparatively scant direct attention, linking the 
trend back to ethnicity’s Herderian conceptual roots.  I then turn to the assumptions about 
ethnicity’s politicization that provide the foundations for the neo-romanticist, rational 
actor, modernist and finally, the power and legitimacy schools of thought on ethnic 
violence and civil war.   
As a concept within the social sciences, the scope and importance of ethnicity is 
only rivaled by other foundational concepts such as gender and class.  Indeed, each of 
these concepts has its own legacy within academia.  It is perhaps not surprising that our 
knowledge concerning the processes through which ethnic cleavages develop as the 
organizing principle of state level politics has been hindered by the initial 
conceptualization of ethnicity itself.  As a concept, ethnicity’s Herderian legacy has left a 
pervasive axiomatic lens that tends to treat the triad of ethnic culture, community, and 
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identity as all but accepted truths.   Within ethnic and folklore studies, seminal works 
from assimilation theory, multiculturalism, and an emancipatory left-Herderian paradigm, 
all assume the near universal existence of bounded ethnic communities whose 
interrelationships are fraught with opposition and oppression (Wimmer 2013a, Chapter2; 
see also Loveman 1997).  
Fortunately, over the last decade a small but distinguished literature has begun to 
challenge these assumptions.  Calls admonishing “commonsense groupism” (Brubaker 
2004), “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer 2002), and the unquestioned acceptance 
of ethnic motives as a cause of civil war (Laitin 2007) have created a toehold in the 
literature.  Such work warns against the perils of seeing ethnicity as causally active 
everywhere.  Although the pervasiveness of this axiom has spurred wide-ranging 
research, the literature is dominated by analyses where ethnic categories are explanatory 
variables.  In this regard, research concerning immigration, discrimination and 
assimilation has far outpaced studies examining why ethnicity has dominated the social 
organization of peoples in the modern political era.   For example, the move to 
distinguish ethnic civil wars from non-ethnic civil wars has largely occurred over the last 
decade (Buhaug 2006; Kalyvas 2007; Sambanis 2001).  Wimmer’s (2013a) call to “de-
ethnicize research designs” and look for the ways in which ethnic boundaries are created, 
dissolved and otherwise navigated signal a fundamental shift in how we treat ethnic 
boundaries within the social sciences.  Nevertheless, the amount of empirical work that 
addresses why and how groups develop ethnic descriptors as an outcome of interest is 
relatively small compared to the general body of ethnic scholarship. 
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The work that has been done on the politicization of ethnicity is a case and point. 
The majority of work on ethnicity’s politicization has primarily emerged within 
literatures attempting to explain the rise of nationalism, nationalist violence, and the rise 
of the nation-state system itself.  In dealing with these concerns four general explanations 
of how ethnicity is politicized have emerged.
2
  A rational actor approach maintains that 
ethno-national group identities are seen as politically relevant only when they can be 
mobilized for political support.  Within this vein the emphasis is on determining the 
interest groups that make ethnically based political alliances strategically preferable.  For 
example, Olzak and Nagel (1986) have focused on class fractionalization, while Hechter  
(2000) links the rise of nationalism and ethno-nationalist zeal to the colonial legacy of 
indirect rule.  For the purposes of this analysis, the important feature of the rational actor 
perspective is that while it seems to speak to why ethnicity is politicized, at its core, 
ethnicity is seen as just an interchangeable tool lowering the transaction costs of 
mobilizing political support.  The family resemblance between the hard rational actor 
explanation and David Laitin’s (2007) argument holding that the ethnic components of 
ethnic violence and civil war are merely descriptive is striking.  
Alternatively, Anthony Smith (1991; 1995; 2003) has been the most prolific 
advocate of what can best be described as a neo-romantic perspective.  Here ethnic 
communities are seen as having historically asserted their political autonomy for 
millennia, with the rise of ethno-nationalisms but the most recent example.  Armstrong’s 
(1982) Nations before Nationalism, for example, seeks to explain the emergence of the 
nation-state in the historical origins of national awareness, stretching back into the 
                                                 
2
 These four explanations ultimately provide the theoretical foundations for the three primary schools of 
thought addressing ethnic conflict and violence (discussed at length in Chapter 1). 
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Middle Ages.  To be fair, some versions of work from a neo-romanticist approach are 
softer, emphasizing both the (re)constructed nature and the historical origins of various 
myths of national dignity and predestination.  Gellner (2006) is a great example of this 
balancing act.  Although Gellner argues against the neo-romanticist perspective, when he 
maintains that the trans-historical nature of ethnicity cannot explain the rise of 
nationalism, he ultimately depends on a soft version of this trans-historical existence.  He 
argues that the functionalist requirements of modernity create homogenizing forces which 
are at odds with immemorial ethnic loyalties, and thus create the foundations for ethnic 
conflict and violence.   Hence his explanation fuses neo-romanticist elements with the 
important role of industrialization.  Regarding the harder version of the neo-romanticist 
framework, Wimmer (2002:47) insightfully notes, “the concept of the ethnie is elevated, 
next to that of society, to the status of a fundamental analytical category endowed with 
trans-historical and universal validity.”  The neo-romanticist explanation of why ethnicity 
becomes politicized is, in a phrase, because it is primordial.  As such, the neo-romanticist 
approach has spent more time stressing the near ubiquity of politicized ethnicity than 
analytically breaking down the processes that actually create political boundaries out of 
various marked ethno-cultural diacritics. 
Two further approaches tie the rise of nationalism and the politicization of 
ethnicity directly to the rise of modernity.  The distinction between them is the differing 
weight each gives to political and economic modernity.  Although Gellner’s (2006) 
argument relies on a weak version of trans-historical ethnic ties, his main argument links 
the functional needs of industrialization of a relatively homogeneous labor force to 
nationalist conflict.   For Gellner, the cause of ethno-nationalist conflict is to be found in 
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the threat of the nationalist project to the ethnic ties of pre-modern societies.  On the 
other hand, Donald Horowitz (1985) has argued that the origins of ethnic violence and 
tension are related to unequal development.  Horowitz sees the politicization of ethnicity 
as resulting from an unequal distribution of the benefits of economic modernity along 
ethnic lines.  Gurr and Harff (1994), place greater emphasis political modernity and draw 
from a mixture of rational actor and economic modernity approaches to support their 
ethnic grievance perspective on ethnic violence.  Here, regime type is argued to promote 
compromise or violent escalation in the face of ethnic grievances, though the empirical 
record for the exact relationship is woefully contradictory. Breuilly (1994) emphasizes 
the development of political modernity to an even stronger degree, and cites it as the 
primary cause of ethnicity’s politicization.  This ‘statist’ approach emphasizes two 
historical developments.  First, the transition from the legitimacy of divine right to rule to 
the belief that ‘like should rule over like,’ or popular sovereignty, fundamentally shifted 
the political foundations of support (See also, Bendix 1978).  Second, the emergence of 
the nationalist ideal, which holds that the territorial boundaries of the state should be 
congruent with the ‘state’s nation’ directly challenged the fundamental aim of imperial 
expansion.  While not directly contradictory to the Horowitz hypothesis, Breuilly brings a 
statist approach to the question, arguing that ethnicity has become politicized as a result 
of shifts in the legitimacy of rule and the foundations of political authority that 
characterize political modernity.   
Wimmer (2002) extends the statist perspective by fusing the shift from divine 
right to rule to the idea that like should rule over like, with the emergence of the welfare 
state as having a responsibility to provide for those rightfully included in the national 
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community (See also, Haggard and Kaufman 2008).  For Wimmer, political modernity is 
a process of social closure, through which social boundaries are formed between sets of 
peoples who are increasingly defined by their membership within a state.  In what he 
terms the ‘nationalist cultural compromise,’ people ostensibly trade loyalty, taxes, and 
military service for equality before the law, political participation, and citizenship (i.e., 
rights to draw upon the public goods provided by the state).  The nationalist cultural 
compromise is part of a larger transition where legal, political, and military forms of 
integration and exclusion increasingly become centralized under a singular criterion of 
state membership.  As Wimmer (2002:65) states,  
Under the modern nation-state, these participatory rights are tied to 
nationally defined citizenship, thus establishing a difference between those 
who are privileged and those who are not.  In the eyes of the population, 
the nation-state provides access to a space free of discrimination and 
arbitrary state action. 
In Wimmer’s view, where the nationalist cultural compromise is successful the 
politicization of ethnicity is a far less prominent feature of political modernity.  But 
where elites are unsuccessful in achieving some version of the ideal-typical nationalist 
cultural compromise outlined above, a condition which Wimmer describes as the 
‘ethnicisation of the bureaucracy’ is often the result.  
An ethnicized bureaucracy emerges when one ethnic group claims sole rights to 
the state and its goods and services, to the exclusion of other ethnic groups within the 
state’s territory.  The aims of the nationalizing project are thus fundamentally different in 
the national closure and ethno-bureaucratic scenarios.  The calculus is strategically 
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changed from an effort to bring disparate ethnic groups under a single national umbrella, 
to a more exclusionary approach based on a narrower ethnic definition of the national 
“we.”  Despite conflating ethnic political relevance and ethnic exclusion, Wimmer’s 
(2002) emphasis on the process of nation-state building highlights the need to directly 
examine the conditions  under which the nationalist cultural compromise tends to proceed 
(or not) along ethnic lines.  The politicization of ethnicity tends to occur under two 
structural conditions.  First, when ruling elites do not have sufficient political, legal and 
economic resources to ensure the non-discriminatory inclusion of a state’s whole 
population, nationalist social solidarity cannot take hold.  States across the developing 
world often lack enough resources to generate the public goods necessary for the 
achievement of a successful nationalist cultural compromise.  Second, the world 
community has often granted statehood to states that have not developed robust civil 
societies.  In the absence of strong civil societies, ruling elites must harness whatever 
institutions and structures are in place.  Clans, tribal affiliations, and ethnic ties become 
the frameworks for clientelistic political relationships that bring new importance to pre-
existing but malleable social boundaries.   
Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) extend the argument further in their study of 
France and the Ottoman Empire.  Their results show that successful nation building tends 
to result from strongly centralized states and developed civil societies, while forms of 
ethnic closure emanate from weak state capacity and weak civil societies.  Resonant of 
each the four approaches discussed, Wimmer’s extension of the statist approach to the 
politicization of ethnicity remains a stepping stone in a much broader theoretical 
framework to explain ethno-nationalist violence.  As a result, the theorized relationship 
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between available state resources and the politicization of ethnicity requires elaboration 
and empirical scrutiny.  Nevertheless, as I argue below, of the four approaches only 
Wimmer’s provides an explanation that is well supported empirically, does not treat 
ethnicity as politicized a priori, and provides a strong foundation for future inquiry. 
Bringing Ethnic Diversity into the Power and Legitimacy Explanation of Politicized 
Ethnicity 
The actual ethnic diversity of a state’s territory is notably absent from the major 
approaches to explaining the politicization of ethnicity.  The principle variables which 
Wimmer’s power and legitimacy school have tasked with explaining the politicization of 
ethnicity are the abundance of state resources and civil society development.  Gellner’s 
theory of nationalist conflict also emphasizes the importance of resources through his 
treatment of economic modernity.  Both, however, leave the variability of ethnic diversity 
relatively unexamined.  Gellner treats ethnic boundaries as relatively constant, but at high 
levels, only becoming sources of contention when pressured by the demands of 
modernity.  Wimmer, in turn takes a similar approach, arguing that the marked cultural 
diacritics that form the basic material for ethnic boundaries are ubiquitous.  For Wimmer, 
the conditions under which these marked cultural diacritics become more salient and 
politicized are related to the resources available to ruling elites.  Although they 
emphasize slightly different mechanisms, rational actor approaches depend on similar 
assumptions.  Yet in all three, the actual level of ethnic diversity is treated as relatively 
constant and unaddressed.  In contrast, the neo-romanticist perspective essentially sees 
the existence of ethnic diversity as widely variable, but almost always politically relevant 
because of the primordial quest for ethnic self-determination.  The task is thus (1) to 
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demonstrate that ethnic diversity varies considerably across states, (2) theoretically 
incorporate ethnic diversity into the Wimmer’s extension of the statist approach in a 
manner that avoids the teleological elements of neo-romanticist and rational actor 
arguments and (3) assess the empirical support of this incorporation.    
Contrary to the assumptions of three of the four the primary explanations, levels 
of ethnic diversity across states are actually quite diverse and it seems unlikely that this 
diversity has no influence on the politicization of ethnicity.   To elaborate and illustrate 
this point I cite ethno-linguistic diversity.  With the possible exception of religion, 
language is perhaps the most commonly cited of all marked cultural diacritics (Brubaker 
2004; Calhoun 2007; Enloe 1980; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Landau 1986).  In fact, 
the most commonly used measure of ethnic diversity in the quantitative ethnic conflict 
literature is Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index.  
The ELF index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a 
country are from different ethno-linguistic groups.  Linguistic differences are, thus, a 
common and well accepted indicator of ethnic diversity within the field.  Figure 2.1 
shows the distribution of the ELF index in 2005. 
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As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, aside from the high and low points, the distribution is 
relatively uniform.  Just over 20  percent of the world’s states had between zero and a .10 
ELF score, with just under 2 percent of the world’s states between .9 and 1.  The 
remaining 78 percent of the world’s states range between .1 and .9 with each bin ranging 
between just over 7 percent to around 14 percent.  If measured by ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, in 2005 the world’s states varied substantially in terms of their ethnic 
diversity.
3
 
Within the modern political era, ethno-nationalist claims for self determination 
have been the primary manner in which political movments legitimize their claims of 
independence and the foundation for the nationstate system itself (Laitin 2007; Minahan 
1996; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).  Therefore, from the world polity perspective, 
                                                 
3
 As one would expect the ELF distribution is relatively stable over time, with changes resulting primarily 
from de-colonialization and the breakup of the Soviet Union.  I simply present the 2005 data, as it is the 
most recent in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. 
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Figure 2.1: The Distribution of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization in 2005 
54 
 
the ethno-nationalist foundations of the nationstate creates an affinity toward the 
politicization of ethnicity that forms a macro-level backdrop for this analysis (Meyer, 
Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997).  On a grand historical scale this helps explain why 
states with politicized ethnicity would be so prevalent.  But domestic balance of power 
concerns between ruling elites, counter elites, and the masses are essential to unpacking 
the structural and institutional sorting mechanisms at work underneath such broad 
historical claims. Process is key. The variety of ethnic diversity between the world’s 
states is important to consider when attempting to explain the politicization of ethnicity 
because it should fundamentally affect the calculus ruling elites must make.  Wimmer 
(2002; 2013b) argues that when elites have innsuficient resources to include the entirety 
of a state’s population within the nationalist cultural compromise, they tend to turn to the 
politicization of ethnicity.  They do so by extending a smaller version of the nationalist 
cultural compromise to an ethnically defined subsection of the state’s population, which 
becomes their primary basis of political support.  Additionally, Wimmer (2002) argues 
that this compromise can be negotiatied in such a way that it includes multiple ethnic 
groups while excluding others.  Here the calculus of ruling elites has already been 
theoretically emphasized through case based research on both Mexico and Iraq. Yet, 
while his analysis highlights a central motivation for why elites would pursue the 
politicization of ethnicity he only acknowledges that multiple ethnic categories can be 
involved without fully exploring the theoretical ramifications.  Inclusion of ethnic 
diversity within the ruling elite calculus is thus a logical extension. 
Wimmer’s version of the statist approach is primarily aimed at explaining 
nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict, for which the politicization of ethnicity is a 
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necessary condition.  However, in focusing on this explanation, two fundamental 
oversights emerge in his treatment of ethnic diversity. First, his resource exchange 
perspective fails to take into account the extent to which the risks of ethnic violence and 
unrest must change the decision calculus for ruling elites.   And second, ethnicity can be 
politicized without creating systematic exclusion.  Politicized ethnicity is shift that raises 
the practical importance a social boundary marked by ethnic elements.  Research clearly 
shows that social boundaries define and organize both included and excluded groups 
(Tilly 1996; Tilly 1999; Tilly 2005; Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Wimmer 2008; Wimmer 
2013a).  The emphasis on boundary formation and management shared between the work 
of Tilly and Wimmer suggest that an ethnic organizational frame is no different.   
Where ethnicity is politicized two theoretical outcomes present themselves: non-
exclusionary politicized ethnicity and exclusionary politicized ethnicity.  The seperation 
is an important analytical distinction but the consequences for political factions on either 
side of the divide are raised.  If ethnicity becomes the dominate mobilizational 
framework, the state can quicky become the principal prize political factions are looking 
to monopolize.  Wimmer (2002) describes this outcome as an ethnic race for the state.  
Wimmer Cederman and Min (2009) show that where ethnic exclusion occurs ethnic 
conflict is much more likely.  However, the fear of systematic state based exclusion if a 
rival group gains control over the state apperatus can be enough to motivate unrest.  If the 
ruling elite use an ethnic framework to legitimize and define the boundaries of state 
inclusion, it simultaniously provides a legitimized mobilization framework for opposition 
groups.  If one ethnic group can monoplize the state in the name of their right to self 
determination, competitors must attempt the same lest they risk becoming discriminated 
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second class populaitons or even stateless persons.  Where multiple ethnic groups 
become mobilized, a coalitional structure may yet allow a regime to maintain sufficient 
support to stay in power, but usually at a steep price.  The potentially explosive dynamics 
of including multiple ethnic groups through powersharing arrangements are well 
documented (Elkins and Sides 2007; Elkins and Sides 2011; Hechter 2000; Laitin 2007).   
Where limited resources are a concern for the ruling elite, the decision to pursue a 
less inclusive version of the nationalist cultural compromise is thus far less 
straightforward than Wimmer’s resource exchange theory would suggest.  What is 
required is a calculus by ruling elites that balances their ability to distribute public goods 
against ethnic fragmentation, the potential costs of repressing opposition groups and a 
loss of total state control due to potential powersharing arrangments with ethnic counter 
elites.  Fragmentation of the state and a hold on power are precisely what ruling elites are 
seeking to avoid.  From this perspective, the actual ethnic diversity within a state should, 
therefore, play a decisive role in the politicization of ethnicity because it is practical 
indicator of the possible ethnic fragmentation that could result.  Where ethnic diversity is 
high and resources scarce, ruling elites may opt for some form of what Kroneberg and 
Wimmer (2012) describe as a populist middle ground, to avoid the potential of ethnic 
fragmentation, the high cost of repression, and potential loss of the state through power 
sharing arrangements.  In this case, the joint structural imperatives of limited resources 
and high ethnic diversity should tend to divert states into the non-politicized ethnicity 
category (The Populist Hypothesis).  Papua New Guinea, Swaziland, and Tanzania are 
examples of states with long histories where ethnicity was not politized but also have 
relatively limited resources.  Conversly, states where ethnic diversity is low and resources 
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scarce, politicized ethnicity should be far more common due to the intersection of two 
factors.  In such cases, the politicization of ethnicity should allow elites to draw political 
support from a subsection of the population which is, (1) small enough to allow the 
provision of public goods given the limited available resources, but (2) large enough to 
provide a stable and managable political base (The Ethnicized Bureaucracy Hypothesis).  
Here, notable examples include Haiti, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.  
The inclusion of ethnic diversity within the ruling elite calculus also helps explain 
the existence of politicized ethnicity in states with an abundance of resources, where 
Wimmer’s (2002) formulation falls short.  Where the nationalist cultural compromise has 
been inclusively extended, ethnicity can still become politicized by groups fearing the 
dissapearance of their ‘unique’ cultural heratage within the larger national whole.  
Analytically this is a similar phenomenon to the risk of ethnic fragmentation but the 
existence abundant state resources changes the potential outcomes.  Ethnic cooptation of 
the state is nolonger necessary.  This is also similar to the mechanism posed by Gellner 
(2006) emphasizing the homogenizing forces of modernity, the national project can 
create fear of cultural loss.  Wimmer (2002) cites the Swiss case, arguing that in instances 
of a successful nationalist cultural compromise the ethno-national roots of the nationstate 
manefest as racism and xenophobia.  Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National Party is a clear 
example, in which a small, but organized, group of french citizens have joined together to 
make sure that France stays ‘French’.  To cite a somewhat more extreme ideal typical 
example, consider the powerful movement in Quebec which, at one point, made 
seccession from Canada a remote, but seemingly, plausable possibility when a vote on 
sessession was narrowly defeated in 1995.  These examples suggest that the ethnic 
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diversity of a state remains involved in the calculus that the ruling elite must consider in 
how they mobilize and maintain support.  But when abundant resources exist, rival 
claimants can be suffienciently appeased through language and cultural privelige laws. 
Clearly, the ethno-nationalist roots of the nation-state system legimate ethno-nationalist 
claims even in the most economically developed of states.  Its manifestation is different 
because ruling elites have the resources to maintain the nationalist cultural compromise 
through a combination of public good provision and some form of multi-culturalist 
accomidation (The Mulit-Culturalist Hypothesis).  Conversly, where resources are 
abundant and ethnic diversity is low, there is little structural imperative to politicized 
ethnicity, thus resulting in a structural diversion of these states into the non-politicized 
ethnicity category (The National Closure Hypothesis).  Notable examples here include 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark.  Figure 2.2, summarizes the expected hypothesized 
relationships.   
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the combination of available resources and ethnic diversity 
that are hypothesized to result in higher or lower probabilities of ethnicity’s 
politicization. As can be seen, the expected relationships proposed by Wimmer’s resource 
exchange perspective are altered considerably when levels of ethnic diversity included 
into the theoretical model.  These alterations also run counter to the theoretical 
expectations of the neo-romanticist approach.  The neo-romanticist position suggests that 
more ethnically diverse states should also be more likely to be characterized by the 
politicization of ethnicity because ethnic groups are seen as primordially struggling for 
self-determination (Counter Hypothesis 1).   Wimmer’s extension of the statist position 
maintains that the politicization of ethnicity is more likely in states with lower levels of 
economic development but he also posits mechanisms which politicize ethnicity when 
resources are more readily available.  My modification to Wimmer’s perspective shifts 
the emphasis to how the ethnic diversity of a state influences the politicization of 
ethnicity, and examines the role that available resources has in modifying this influence.  
In other words, the structural sorting effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of 
ethnicity should be seen contingent upon the abundance of resources available to ruling 
elites.      
Data, Measures, and Methods 
 To empirically test these hypotheses I employ the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset 
(2009) (EPR).  The EPR contains data from 1946 through 2005 on the entire population 
of sovereign states that had an estimated population of at least 1 million or a territorial 
area of at least 500,000 square kilometers.  The resulting dataset includes 7,155 country-
year observations for 155 post-independence sovereign states with both a measure of 
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ethnic diversity (as found in the Fearon and Laitin dataset) and a measure of whether 
ethnicity was politically relevant in a given country year.  The political relevance of 
ethnicity is closely connected to its politicization and is thus the dependent variable of 
interest.  An ethnic category was coded as relevant if at least one significant political 
actor claimed to speak on behalf of that particular group, or if those from that particular 
group were systematically discriminated against by the state.
4
   Emerging from the power 
and legitimacy school, it is important to understand the theoretical origin of this measure 
and the view of ethnicity that motivates it.  I follow the Wimmer et al. (2009:325) 
working definition, which holds that ethnicity is, “a subjectively experienced sense of 
commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture.”  Wimmer et al. 
(2009) includes in this definition ethno-linguistic, ethno-somatic and ethno-religious 
groups, while excluding tribes and clans which focus on geneology or region, and do not 
link shared ancestry with commonality.  Within this definitional framework the political 
relevance of ethnicity measure is well constructed.  It does, however, have a few 
imperfections that must be acknowledged.  First, it does not take into account degrees of 
political relevance.  Second, it also does not capture the extent to which members of an 
ethnic category acknowledge the relevance of those claiming to speak on their behalf.  
Finally, it does not measure the breadth or range of positions held by those speaking on 
behalf of an ethnic category or group.  Nevertheless, given its temporal range, analytic 
clarity, and sample coverage, the EPR political relevance of ethnicity measure remains 
the best available quantitative indicator of politicized ethnicity.  
                                                 
4
 The complete documentation on the coding procedures used in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset may 
be found at (http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2009/toc068.html) or 
http://www.princeton.edu/~awimmer/AppendixEthnicPolitics.pdf. 
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In an effort to keep my study as comparable to recent work from the power and 
legitimacy school as possible, I have efforted, where possible to use the same data.  In 
line with this goal, I utilize the version of the ELF index, as provided by Fearon and 
Laitin, as my measure of ethnic diversity.  The ELF index measures the probability of 
randomly selecting two individuals who speak languages from different ethno-linguistic 
categories.  The overlap between ethno-somatic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties 
can be substantial but this is not always the case.  As such, my use of the ELF index will 
make my results less generalizable to those areas where linguistic cultural diacritics are 
not the primary markers of ethnic boundaries.  Still, given the central importance of 
language to ethnicity in general and the absence of multiple indicators, the ELF index 
offers a solid analytical tool to measure the ethnic diversity of a state.   To measure the 
resources available to ruling elites I draw upon the same data utilized by Wimmer et al. 
(2009), and use gross domestic product per capita in 2000 U.S. Dollars.  Since economic 
development and the resources from which states can draw revenues, such as taxes, have 
a strong thoeretical connection with overall GDP per capita, GDP per capita is an obvious 
choice of measure for resource abundance.  Using the GDP data used in the Wimmer et 
al. (2009) grants an overall coverage of 99.6 percent of sample.
5
  Operationally, my four 
principle hypotheses hold that the effect of ELF index is contingent on GDP, and thus I 
include an interaction term in the model for the ELF and GDP measures.   
I also include two substantive control variables.  The first of these deals with 
previous imperial history.  The measure is the proportion of a territory’s existance spent 
                                                 
5
 Data for the GDP per capita measure was drawn primarily from the Penn World Table 6.2 (79 percent), 
World Bank World Development Indicators (3 percent), and the remainder calculated from growth rates 
taken from Fearon and Laitin’s dataset, with values extended back to 1946.  
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in colonial depndency or subject to some form of indirect rule between 1816 and their 
independence (Wimmer and Min 2006).  This variable is included to control for the 
possibility that the central mechanism in Hechter’s (2000) argument linking indirect rule 
to the onset of nationalist violence is at least partially actually active in the politicization 
of ethnicity, rather than simply in the escalation of tensions and violence.  The second 
substantive control variable is population size.  A key theoretical mechanism are the 
resource limitations on elites to provide sufficient public goods.  The more people the 
more goods required.  If my thoeretical model holds, omission of a population size 
measure would artificially inflate the estimates of my explanatory  variables and should 
thus be included.   
  To carry out the actual analysis, I have repurposed the standard modeling 
approach in the literature for civil war onset and employ a binary logit model to regress 
my explanitory variables on a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for in years where 
ethnicity was politically relevant and 0 when it was not.  Although the temporal veriation 
is limited in this analysis, I control for this limited temporal variation by following Beck, 
Katz and Tucker (1998).  As reccomended I include a cubic spline on a non-politicized 
ethnicity year count variable of the number of years since ethnicity was last politically 
relevant.  I also include a previous politicized ethnicity year count total variable to further 
control for inertia effects.  I addition to these temporal variables I finally include a 
calander year variable to control for possible changes in international political climate. 
Like most other statistical models, binary logit has a number of assumptions which many 
datasets routinely violate.  For example, it is well known that the repeated observations of 
the country-year format violate the independence of observations assumption.  To 
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account for many of these possible violations I employ robust standard errors, and cluster 
them by sovereign state to specifically address the non-independence of cases within 
states.  The inclusion of the calendar year dummy variables creates a substantial number 
of nussance parameters, which I suppress in the presentation of results.  The full model 
results, a set of models fit to demonstrate the robustisity of my results, and full 
descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A. 
I present three models which move the analysis along in three steps.  I first test 
the original neo-romantic expectation that as ethnic diversity increases, the probability of 
ethnicity’s politicization should also increase (Counter Hypothesis 1).  I then examine the 
evidence for my four principle hypotheses (the National Closure, Multi-culturalist, 
Ethno-Bureaucratic, and Populist Hypotheses).  These hypotheses all hinge on the 
inclusion of an interaction term between GDP per capita and the ELF index.  Due to the 
dynamics of the binary logit model the meaning of this interaction coeficient must be 
developed through predicted probability plots to determine the extent to which the data 
actually support each hypothesis.  I now present the results. 
Results: Explaining the Politicization of Ethnicity 
Table 2.1 presents results from two models.  Model 1 examines the relationship 
posited by neo-romanticist appraoches. The initial evidence shown in model 1 suggests 
initial support for the argument that ethnicity is more likely to be politicized when ethnic 
diversity is higher (Counter Hypothesis 1).  However, the results from model 1 do not tell 
the whole story.   The neo-romanticist mechanism suggests a constant positive linear 
relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity while the 
theoretical mechanisms for my four principle hypotheses expect a contingent non-linear 
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effect.  The significance of the interaction term in model 2 indicates that the effect of 
ethnic diversity coeficient varies according to GDP per capita.   
Table 2.1. 
Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF 
Interaction and Controls on the Political Relevance of Ethnicity
†
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Politicization Variables
‡
   
     GDP per Capita 
0.207 -0.388 
(0.162) (0.245) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
2.894** 2.566* 
(1.087) (1.021) 
     GDP-ELF 
     Interaction 
 3.279*** 
 (0.771) 
Other Control Variables   
     Imperial Past 
0.363 0.289 
(0.552) (0.565) 
     Population 
0.334* 0.408* 
(0.170) (0.161) 
Time Control Variables Suppressed Suppressed 
Constant 
0.127 
(21.906) 
-0.792 
(1.346) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -86.9915 -84.2645 
Wald χ
2
 
2035.97*** 
(18) 
1156.53*** 
(19) 
N  
(Number of States) 
6935 
(153) 
6935 
(153) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, was used in the analysis. 
‡‡The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to colinearity which suggests only two knots between the 
beginning and end points of the data.  The pre and post knot slopes of splines 1 and 2 are not significantly different 
from one another. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
The positive ethnic diversity estimate in model 1  is thus more likely due to the 
mechanisms motivating the four primary hypotheses of this chapter, explicitly tested in 
model 2.  In all models the measure of indirect rule also not significant.  In models testing 
expectations from the power and legitimacy, neo-romanticist, and rantional actor 
approaches, the results either provide no supporting evidence or directly contradict their 
theoretical expectation.  From the structural-configural perspective argued for in this 
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chapter, however, the results from models 1 are not surprising.   They actually suggest the 
need for further investigation.  
The central argument of this chapter, is that the effect of ethnic diversity on the 
politicization of ethnicity is conditional on the resources svailable to the state.  This 
conditional aspect is captured in the GDP-ELF interaction term, which is added in model 
2.  As the results for model 2 show, the significantly positive interaction coeficient 
provides evidence that the structural sorting effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization 
of ethnicity is indeed contingent on the amount resources the state can access.  To 
examine the extent to which the nature of this contingent relationship follows theoretical 
expectations, it is necessary to probe the model deeper and examine the predicted 
probabilities of politicized ethnicity for the ELF index across a range of GDP per capita 
values. These predicted probability plots are shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
The ethno-bureaucratic and populist hypothesis holds that for the poorest of 
states, as levels of ethnic diversity increase the probability of politicized ethnicity should 
decrease.  Thus, when resources are scarce and ethnic diversity is very low the 
probability of ethnicity’s politicization should be quite high (the Ethno-Bureaucratic 
Scenario), but when ethnic diversity is higher, and resources remain scarce, ruling elites 
tend to pursue more populist themes in an effort to avoid unnecessary ethnic 
fragmentation (the Populist Scenario). Although model results are consistent with this 
hypothesized pattern of relationships, Figure 2.3 demonstrates their substantive 
limitations.  The logic behind the ethno-bureaucratic and populist scenarios only seems to 
hold in the poorest of poor states.  While the hypothesized negative slope of the ELF 
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index in clearly visible when GDP per capita is at its minimum, Figure 2.3 shows that it 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 2.5 percentile of GDP per capita.   
 
 
 
The slope of the ELF index is clearly positive when GDP per capita is set to the 5
th
 
percentile, which indicates that the operational logic motivating the Nationalist Closure 
and Multi-Cultural Scenario hypotheses is active at far lower levels of state resources 
than I had expected.  Nevertheless, as Figure 2.3 illustrates, the number of states that 
have been in lower 2.5
th
 percentile of lnGDP at some point in their histories is 
remarkable.  Actual complete dataset coverage of the logit plane is provided in Figure 
2.5. 
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Probability of Politicized Ethnicity by Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization and Lower Levels of GDP per Capita 
 
Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only.  Although care was taken to 
place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision.  In general, 
the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered 
on their ethno-linguistic score.   Some cases appear in different locations between plots due to economic growth.  
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Although neo-romanticist arguments suggest a positive relationship between 
ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity, my extension of the power and 
legitimacy perspective holds that at higher levels of resources, the effect of ethnic 
diversity on ethnicity’s politicization should become larger as GDP per capita increases.  
Figure 2.3 indicates that states with GDP per capita as low as the 5
th
 percentile are 
characterized by a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of 
ethnicity.  The evidence thus suggests that the structural mechanisms at work in the 
National Closure and Multi-Cultural Scenarios are at work within roughly 97.5 percent of 
the world’s states.  However, the evidence that this relationship is not due to the 
mechanisms argued for by neo-romanticist scholars is found in the fact that the positive 
relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity is not constant at 
all levels of GDP per Capita.  Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probabilities when GDP per 
capita is set to the 25
th
, 50
th
, and 75
th
 percentiles.  As levels of GDP per Capita increase, 
the effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity also increases.  The slope of 
each line depicting the relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of 
ethnicity gets steeper as the resources that the state commands increases. 
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Simply put, the evidence shows that the importance of the state grows as the resources 
which it can command increase.  States with low levels of ethnic diversity and relatively 
abundant resources are shown to be less likely to be characterized by politicized ethnicity 
(the National Closure Scenario) than states with relatively abundant resources and higher 
levels of ethnic diversity (the Multi-Culturalist Scenario).  However, these results 
indicate that as the resources available to the state increase, higher levels of ethnic 
diversity tend to make the politicization of ethnicity increasingly difficult to avoid. 
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Figure 2.4: Predicted Probability of Politicized Ethnicity by Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization and Higher Levels of GDP per Capita 
 
Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only.  Although care was taken to 
place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision.  In general, 
the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered 
on their ethno-linguistic score.   Some cases appear in multiple locations between plots due to economic growth. 
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 Figure 2.5 provides a better illustration of the data coverage over the logit plane.  
Although coverage is far from full, it is sufficient to show that body of the data are 
driving the results.  Support for ethno-bureaucratic scenario is found in the right most 
quadrant, where both resources and ethnic diversity result in higher predicted 
probabilities for politicized ethnicity.  Where ethnic diversity is limited and resources are 
more abundant (top-center quadrant), the nationalist closure scenario plays out, but 
quickly give way to the multi-culturalist scenario as ethnic diversity increases.  The left 
most quadrant is dominated by states with relatively abundant resources and higher levels 
of ethnic diversity.  The predicted probabilities in this area are consistent with theoretical 
the expectations from the multi-cultural scenario.  It is in the lower-center quadrant, 
where we would expect to see states defined as more similar to the populist scenario and 
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it is here where the data are the sparsest.  This thinly populated area of the three 
dimensional scatter plot is understandable, given the difficulty of making populist appeals 
in the face of limited resources.  More importantly, the limited data points that do exist in 
this lower-center region do indeed strongly conform to the theoretical expectations of the 
populist scenario with low to very low predicted probabilities of politicized ethnicity. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter identifies four structural configurations of available resources and 
levels of ethnic diversity that give states a structural affinity towards politicized ethnicity 
or non-politicized ethnicity.  States with the highest probability of politicized ethnicity 
tend to have higher levels of GDP per Capita and higher levels of ethnic diversity, 
consistent with the Multi-Cultural Scenario of state formation, solidification and 
reproduction.  The evidence also suggests that for a small subset of states which are 
extremely poor and have very low levels of ethnic diversity also have a higher probability 
of politicized ethnicity (Ethno-Bureaucratic Scenario).  However, the evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests that the guiding logic of the multi-cultural scenario best 
explains the majority of cases where ethnicity is politicized.  When the state has more 
resources at its command, it becomes an increasingly lucrative target.  While a positive 
relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnicity’s politicization is expected by the 
rational actor and neo-romanticist approaches, neither can explain the curvilinear 
relationship demonstrated in this analysis. Increased ethnic diversity may indeed lower 
the organizing costs associated with political mobilization, and the present analysis is not 
equipped to rule out this explanation.  It may be included in the overall positive effect of 
ethnic diversity on ethnicity’s politicization.  However, the increasing size of the ethnic 
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diversity effect that results from higher levels of resource availability provides 
compelling evidence that as the state becomes a richer target, the various ethnic groups 
are within a state are increasingly motivated to politically organize along ethnic lines.   
Similarly the majority of states where ethnicity is not politically relevant tend to 
track along a National Closure Scenario.  States with at least a modicum of resources and 
low levels of ethnic diversity have a lower probability of politicized ethnicity.  Although 
a very small subset of states that are very poor and highly diverse have a much lower 
likelihood of politicized ethnicity (the Populist Scenario), the absolute size of this 
subsection is objectively small.  The vast majority of states where ethnicity is not 
politicized have followed a path most similar to the ideal-typical national closure 
outcome.  Contrary to the logic of the Multi-Cultural Scenario, the limited ethnic 
diversity of the state tends to depoliticize ethnicity for two reasons.  First, for the ruling 
elite it is easier to extend provision of public goods to the entirety of the population. 
Second, for the potential counter ethnic elites, the limited size of their potential 
constituency makes it more beneficial to assimilate within the super-nationalist whole.  
Neither, traditional rational actor approaches, nor neo-romanticist explanations provide 
explanations for the factors that lead states away from the politicization of ethnicity.  In 
this regard my extension of the power and legitimacy school approach presents a far more 
theoretically robust explanation that also receives strong empirical support. 
The results of this chapter provide empirical support for a substantial refinement 
to the power and legitimacy school, which has emphasized the role of available resources 
without including the role of ethnic diversity.  Overall the Wimmer’s (2002) resource 
exchange approach implies a small negative relationship between available resources and 
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ethnicity’s politicization.  However, this relationship is empirically unsupported and my 
results demonstrate the importance of including ethnic diversity within the theoretical 
calculus.  Although the arguments and findings I have presented here suggests some 
substantial revisions to the original power and legitimacy framework, as a whole the 
foundational logic of the approach remains fundamentally untouched.  Consistent with 
other scholarship from the power and legitimacy school, my structural-configural 
approach identifies the incentive and disincentive structures that must be included within 
the calculus of both ruling and counter elites.  The major results from this chapter extend 
the power and legitimacy school insight that the state has increasingly become the prize 
of political contests and an instrument of power within the modern political era.  Far from 
an historical observation, my results suggest that as the resources available to the state 
increase, the opportunity structures for increased ethnic mobilization created by high 
levels of ethnic diversity also increase as well.  Ethnic diversity may not be directly 
related to the onset of ethnic rebellion, but these results suggest that it is an important 
structural sorting effect that is contingent upon the resources a state can command.  In 
this capacity, the ethnic makeup of the state has historically driven some states to 
politicize ethnicity and some to pursue alternative organizing principles of state level 
politics. 
To be sure, these results do not present the foundation for a linear argument where 
states first politicize ethnicity, commit to ethnic exclusion, and then experience an ethnic 
rebellion. Rather, states from the moment of formation find themselves with politicized 
ethnicity, non-politicized ethnicity, ethnic exclusion, or even ethnic rebellions.  But the 
politicization of ethnicity is undeniably a necessary condition for ethnic exclusion and 
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ethnic rebellion.  For a lucky few ethnicity is not politicized while the majority of states 
exist in a position where the politicization of ethnicity has been institutionalized.  This 
much larger set of states has a structural disadvantage that places them substantially more 
at risk for ethnically based exclusion and ethnic rebellion.  The vicissitudes of history 
have given some states an advantage in avoiding ethnic rebellion and violence.  But an 
important implication of this chapter’s findings is that the vicissitudes of history are 
patterned.  For all the unique qualities of each state’s situation and narrative, there 
nevertheless exist theoretically meaningful and identifiable general patterns.  It is this 
reality that allows for a rich and fruitful dialogue between quantitative and qualitative 
scholars in this area.  Wimmer’s (2002) original theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic 
violence was founded on strong qualitative case based research.  Over the last decade 
scholars have subjected the elements of this theory regarding state formation and the rise 
of the nation-state (Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010) and ethnic 
violence (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009) to quantitative scrutiny.  This 
dissertation follows in this vein.  By systematically harnessing the strengths of 
quantitative techniques within a larger project, the ambitious scope of qualitative research 
can be maintained and empirically strengthened.  Understanding the structural factors that 
both push states into or away from politicization of ethnicity is fundamental to the 
broader project of explaining ethnic rebellion.  In this regard, my results suggest that the 
patterns of ethnicity’s politicization around the world are best explained through the 
empirically supported extensions and refinements I have proposed the broader power and 
legitimacy framework. 
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Chapter 3: The Institutionalization of State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion 
States characterized by politicized ethnicity are an institutional stepping stone 
closer to potential ethnic rebellion than states where political cleavages fall along 
alternative lines.  Given the widespread politicization of ethnicity globally, a substantial 
majority of the world’s states have crossed the threshold rendering ethnic rebellions more 
likely.  Nevertheless, contrary to most theories regarding the politicization of ethnicity 
and ethnic exclusion, the concepts are not interchangeable. Not all states where ethnicity 
has been politicized exclude portions of their populations from state access along ethnic 
lines.  In fact, between 1946 and 2005, the percentage of states where ethnicity was 
politicized but state sanctioned ethnic exclusion did not occur has fluctuated between 13 
and 20 percent.  Hence a sizeable minority of states has managed to largely avoid 
systematic ethnic group exclusion, even as ethnic boundaries remain powerful political 
concerns.  As states with state sanctioned ethnic exclusion are substantially more likely to 
suffer the onset of ethnic rebellion, our understanding of the structural forces that 
promote and propagate the systematic ethnic exclusion of peoples is critical.  When does 
politicized ethnicity transform into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion?  Which structural 
and institutional mechanisms channel states toward categorical ethnic exclusion versus 
more conciliatory ethnic power-sharing solutions?  For example, why have states such as 
Burundi, Haiti, and Switzerland witnessed the politicization of ethnicity without 
excluding an ethnic category?  Yet Uganda, the Dominican Republic, and France all 
exclude at least one ethnic category of their population from access to the state?    
 The lack of answers to these questions within both the quantitative and qualitative 
literatures stems from the  failure of social scientific theories of ethnic exclusion, ethnic 
75 
 
violence, and (more broadly) nationalism, to distinguish between the politicization of 
ethnicity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.  The most recent work from the PAL 
school merges the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion under a unified concept 
of ethnicized bureaucracy.  Here ruling elites are argued to politicize ethnicity and 
exclude a portion of the population along ethnic lines in two basic circumstances: they 
either have insufficient resources to provide public goods to the whole of a state’s 
population; or civil society organization remains inadequate for ruling elites to move 
away from clientelistic ties of state patronage.  Alternative and less direct explanations 
vary.  A DBC approach takes the nationalist exclusion of ethnic minorities as a given and 
seeks to explain the escalation of their complaints into rebellion. Rational actor 
approaches, in contrast, tend to examine the formation of the nation through both 
inclusive and exclusive practices linked to indirect rule. Here state formation is linked to 
a titular nation within the modern political era by theoretical fiat.  The definition of the 
nation is then expanded or contracted depending on the type of state building strategies 
being pursued in a given case.  As a result, within the ethnic rebellion literature, the 
question of ethnic exclusion is either obliquely addressed by treating it as one of many 
different nationalist state-building strategies, or simply bracketed from the discussion as a 
grievance, the existence of which is assumed a priori.   When it has been addressed 
directly, ethnic exclusion and the politicization of ethnicity have been conceptually 
conflated.  In contrast to these approaches, I argue that the relationship between state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion and the politicization of ethnicity requires an analysis that 
allows each a unique logic of escalation. I will unpack this argument below.   
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 Two issues arise from treating the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion 
as two facets of the ethnicization of state bureaucracies.  First, such a move depends on 
the unrealistic assumption that both follow the same escalatory logic.  Second, doing so 
obscures the role ethnic diversity plays in altering the fundamental calculus faced by 
ruling elites.  Why are these assumptions problematic?  Simply put, they assume that 
members of the ruling elite who enter a governing role do so in a situation where 
ethnicity is not politicized.  Such a premise is clearly not tenable within the modern 
political era.   
 Chapter 2 addresses the fact that state formation and changes in regime occur 
within traditions of both non-politicized and politicized ethnicity.  Here 
I narrow the investigation to those states where ethnicity has been politicized and 
examine the conditions that promote its escalation from non-exclusionary politicized 
ethnicity to politicized ethnicity with ethnic exclusion.  For new states, the power players 
at the moment of state formation have already constructed the foundations of political 
support to varying degrees, either ethnic or otherwise.  Similarly, for well established 
states, the rise to power of a new regime occurs with a comparable foundation of political 
support.  For those presented with situations where ethnicity is not politicized, the risks 
and gains of ethnicity’s politicization must be assessed.  A similar dilemma for leaders 
exists where ethnicity is already politicized in the weighing of continued non-exclusory 
politicized ethnicity or escalation into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.   
 The entrenchment of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion presents ruling elites with a 
somewhat graver calculus, as their decisions could directly result in ethnic rebellion. (I 
address this escalation in chapter 4.)  However, conflating the politicization of ethnicity 
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and ethnic exclusion into a single process, the PAL school assumes that neither 
ethnicity’s politicization nor the ethnic diversity confronted by the state alter the basic 
escalatory logic utilized by elites.  Since ethnic exclusion cannot occur unless ethnicity 
has been politicized, but not all states where ethnicity is politicized commit to state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion, the extent to which the same escalatory logic and structural 
factors pattern both developments should be an empirical question, not a theoretical 
presumption.  Forcing their theoretical conflation leaves no room for consideration of 
how a state’s ethnic diversity alters the strategic logic of the decision facing ruling elites 
and thus fails to explain the sizable minority of states where ethnicity is politicized but 
state sanctioned ethnic exclusion has been avoided.  
 Continuing the line of inquiry presented in chapter 2, I propose an extended and 
modified version of PAL’s foundation theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict 
that makes explicit the analytical distinction between the politicization of ethnicity and 
the emergence of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.  Building on the insight that state 
sanctioned exclusion is not possible without politicized ethnicity, I identify two scenarios 
in which the probability of ethnic exclusion is increased and two in which it is decreased.  
In states where ethnicity has already been politicized, state sanctioned exclusion is more 
likely when resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is low. This occurs as state elites 
attempt to limit the extension of citizenship and national privileges to the established 
members of the nation.  I label this outcome xenophobic nationalist exclusion.   
 State sanctioned ethnic exclusion is also more likely when resources are limited 
and ethnic diversity is high.  In this scenario elites hope that overwhelming support of a 
single ethnic minority will provide a sufficient base of political power if (1) untrusting 
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opposition groups that can be played against one another can be created; and (2) drawing 
support from this ethnic minority can free up sufficient resources to oppress this 
fragmented opposition.  I labeled this scenario divisive exclusion because of the emphasis 
on divide and rule.   
 State sanctioned ethnic exclusion is less likely where resources are abundant and 
ethnic diversity is high.  In this scenario it is difficult for one ethnicity to gain a 
monopoly on the state.  The abundance of resources in these cases makes, what I term, 
multi-cultural nationalist inclusion both plausible and more appealing to all involved.  
On the other hand, state sanctioned exclusion is also less likely when ethnic diversity is 
low and resources are limited.  In this setting the exclusion of a tiny minority does little to 
solidify the regime. Such a move tends to create higher repression costs than the 
resources it creates and does not notably increase the public goods provided to the 
national majority.  I term this outcome formal inclusion since inclusion within these 
states has little more than token importance for most citizens since the state is relatively 
weak and the limitation of resources substantially reduces the benefits of state 
membership.   
 The hypotheses supporting these four different outcomes receive empirical 
support from an analysis using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR) (Cederman, 
Min, and Wimmer 2009).  These results continue the trend of empirical support for my 
extensions and refinements to Wimmer’s (2002) theory of nationalist exclusion and 
ethnic conflict begun in chapter 2.  I also continue the trend of using quantitative 
techniques to disaggregate and distinguish between various structural elements linked to 
the escalation of ethnic tensions (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, 
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Cederman, and Min 2009).  Additionally, by drawing heavily on previous case based and 
comparative research to highlight hypothesized mechanisms, I heed Amenta’s (2003) call 
for a closer dialogue between qualitative and quantitative research. 
Ethnic Diversity and State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion 
The three major schools of thought on ethnic violence have three pronounced 
weaknesses when comes to their explanations of ethnic exclusion.  First, the GAO school 
sees the motivation for rebellion, including ethnic exclusion, as negligible to explaining 
the onset of ethnic violence.  Second, DBC scholars tend to overlook ethnic exclusion for 
two reasons.  It either premises that ethnic groups have an all but primordial urge toward 
self determination, making ethnic diversity (regardless of exclusion) a motivation for 
rebellion (formerly the predominant view in the school); or it emphasizes the reduced 
collective action costs provided by ethnic ties.  Finally, PAL, while being the only school 
to directly address the role of ethnic exclusion, conflates it with the politicization of 
ethnicity, thus assuming that identical mechanisms drive both outcomes.  
For their part, the GAO approach treats ethnic exclusion as non-essential to the 
goal of explaining rebellions in general.  Instead, to the extent that they acknowledge 
ethnic exclusion, it is simply treated as one of the many types of potential grievances 
motivating rebellion and insurgency (Laitin 2007).  Ironically, GAO scholars take 
grievances deemed worthy of rebellion, ethnic or not, as nearly ubiquitous across the 
globe.  For them the central explanatory component in the onset of rebellion is feasibility.  
Thus, Fearon and Laitin (2003; 2004) emphasize the role of opportunity structures such 
as mountainous terrain and weak states, while others stress the role of lootable resources 
such as oil (Collier and Hoeffler 2004;  see also, Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007).  This 
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emphasis on opportunity structures requires at least two critical theoretical assumptions.  
First, potential grievances that could inspire armed revolt and insurgency are treated as 
existing in nearly every state across the globe.  Second, the intensity of the grievance is 
assumed to be equal in every state in which a grievance exists.  Under these two 
assumptions, the world is treated as a veritable cluster of grenades; the pin of each, to 
continue the metaphor, keeps the grenade from exploding only so long as the opportunity 
structures that allow it to be pulled do not arise.  As can be seen, the emphasis on 
opportunity structures—in conjunction with their lack of emphasis on grievances—does 
not allow for the possibility that stronger grievances may lower the feasibility threshold.  
Similarly, if oppressive grievances are not as widespread as assumed, then the sweeping 
inclusion of nearly all cases becomes increasingly problematic.  As the number of cases 
with sufficient grievances and opportunity structures to warrant revolt increases, the 
effect size of any solid measure of the requisite opportunity structures would be 
artificially reduced.  In short, non-findings regarding ethnicity are more prominent 
because the scope conditions have been incorrectly specified. 
The disregard for grievances, including ethnic exclusion, also raises issues about 
the interpretation of variables meant to measure opportunity structures.  This is most 
obvious in regard to mountainous terrain.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that while 
mountainous terrain is a predictor of violent onset, ethnic diversity is not.  If mountainous 
terrain is only measuring an opportunity structure, their interpretation is straightforward 
and unobjectionable.  However, it is possible that mountainous terrain is not measuring 
the intended opportunity structure.  Rather (to give one possible alternative) there may be 
structural proclivity toward the ethnic exclusion of mountain dwelling peoples from the 
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ruling majority.   That is, the mechanism of exclusion may be due to both cultural or 
political differences between regional mountain peoples and the national majority, the 
difficulty of distributing the public goods of the state to remote areas, or a combination of 
the two (consider, for example, the Hmong of Vietnam).  However, the failure to treat 
grievance with its due importance omits this simple consideration.  Once the assumption 
that ethnic rebellions are no different than other types of rebellions is dropped, it becomes 
clear that ethnic exclusion is a clear cause of ethnic rebellions but not other types of 
rebellions (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009).   
I argue that the Fearon and Laitin interpretation of the mountainous terrain 
measure requires two tests to receive support.  The mountainous terrain coefficient 
should be statistically significant in the ethnic rebellion onset models results presented in 
chapter 4 (since opportunity structures should be important for both ethnic and non-ethnic 
rebellions). However, if mountainous terrain is measuring an opportunity structure that 
allows insurgents to better avoid government forces, it should not be statistically 
significant in the exclusion models presented in the present analysis.  As this is a 
secondary result, only speaking to the limitations of the GAO approach, allow me to 
anticipate this particular result.  Mountainous terrain is a statistically significant predictor 
of ethnic exclusion (p≤.05), but not ethnic rebellion, once ethnic exclusion has been 
accounted for.   The mountainous terrain result thus provides far more plausible evidence 
of the ethno-political/cultural exclusion argument than the opportunity structure 
interpretation.   
Regardless of the damaging nature of these results to the GAO perspective, a 
broader point is clear.  Fundamental understandings of both ethnic exclusion and the 
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politicization of ethnicity are essential to a comprehensive explanation of ethnic rebellion 
onset.  The basic assumptions of GAO undercut its capacity to take the role grievances 
seriously in the onset of rebellions, thus precluding the possibility of explaining state 
sanctioned exclusion, ethnic or otherwise. 
Alternatively, DBC scholars see ethnic diversity as a fundamental impetus for 
ethnic rebellion and civil war.  From this point of view, ethnic exclusion is also seen as a 
widespread and in some ways a natural result of ethno-nationalist drives for self-
determination.  Exclusion is seen as only exacerbating already raised ethnic tensions due 
to the very existence of multiple ethnic groups existing in close proximity.  This harder 
version of the DBC argument maintains that ethnic diversity is central to understanding 
ethnic violence because ethnic ties are a central feature in the primordial fight for self 
determination (Smith 1987; Smith 1995; Smith 2003).  The work of Ernest Gellner 
(2006) offers a softer version in which ethnic diversity is seen as incompatible with 
processes of industrialization, and thus a source of tension as nation-building projects 
seek to assimilate their various ethnic categories into the national whole.  Ethnic diversity 
is seen as a critical issue as some groups offered inclusion resist incorporation, while 
those who experience exclusion tend to organize and rebel as a result.  A major 
contribution of GAO is its cogent emphasis on diverse mechanisms for lowering ethnic 
tensions in situations of high ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin 1996).  In this vein, 
recent work by Roger’s Brubaker (2006) has shown that local politics can be ethnically 
divisive even as national level politics strive to create inclusion.   
There are two weaker versions of DBC scholarship that merit comment. First, 
Sambanis (2001) argues that ethnic ties reduce the organizational costs of collective 
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action that can lead to both secessionist rebellions as well as revolts aimed at establishing 
broader inclusion.  The logic of Sambanis’ argument shares a rational actor foundation 
similar to Hechter’s (2000) work on the rise and spread of nationalism.  Ethnic diversity 
is important for Sambanis, however, since he explains conflict with or without an 
exclusionary grievance.  Second, Donald Horowitz (1985; 2001) maintains that economic 
grievances are fundamental to explaining ethnic violence.  In his view, only when the 
benefits of modernity are shared by the entirety of a state’s population can ethnic 
violence be overcome.  Though resonant with PAL conclusions, Horowitz’s stress on 
unequal development offers a major refinement to Gellner’s argument.  It is uneven 
development that produces ethnic tensions, rather than blind ethnic resistance to the state 
nationalizing project.  
As a whole, the DBC school fails to even attempt an explanation of ethnic 
exclusion since its origins are treated as largely self evident byproducts of ethnically 
diverse states.  Even Horowitz’s approach falls short of explaining exclusion, as it 
focuses narrowly on how unequal economic access along ethnic lines is a central factor in 
unrest.   Exclusion or economic inequality along ethnic lines are taken a priori, which 
offers the analytical advantage of  hypotheses that are clean and clear at the expense of a 
comprehensive explanation concerning the mechanisms and escalation (Wimmer 2002). 
The Power and Legitimacy School and Ethnic Exclusion 
Unlike the other two major schools discussed thus far, the PAL approach situates 
the processes leading to ethnic rebellion within the broader historical rise of the nation-
state system.  Building on notable scholars, such as John Breuilly (1994), Reinhard 
Bendix (1978), Charles Tilly (1992; 2003), and Barrington Moore (1993 [1963]), the 
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perspective emphasizes the power relations between categories of ethnic peoples and the 
state, as well as the shift from divine right to rule in the name of a sovereign people.  As 
the dominant state form shifted from agrarian empire to the nation state, the shift in the 
legitimacy of rule from divine right to rule in the name of a sovereign population resulted 
in a need to define who exactly composed the body politic.  Within the fully developed 
nation-state, the argument goes, ruling elites both submitted to and worked to develop a 
nationalist cultural compromise where they traded political participation for the right to 
collect taxes; extended the benefits of the welfare state to raise armies; and  accepted the 
rule of law for political loyalty (Wimmer 2002).   Wimmer’s foundational theory of 
nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence posits two criteria for achieving a successful 
nationalist cultural compromise. First, ruling elites have to command the means to 
provide and distribute public goods to the whole of a state’s population.  And second, 
civil society has to be developed enough to make interest group politics a viable 
alternative to ethnic clientelist approaches to garnering political support.  Where these 
elements are missing, the ethnicization of the bureaucracy ensues as ruling elites turn to 
their particular ethnic group for political support and instead limit the ‘national we’ to 
this specific group (Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013b).   
Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) extend the dichotomous outcome of successful 
nation-state formation and ethnicized bureaucracy with a third category they call 
“populism.”  In this category, the ruling elite focus on excluding counter elites, 
attempting to draw on broad popular support of the masses in the process.  States where 
ethnicity has been politicized and ethnic exclusion has become a reality are argued to be 
far more prone to ethnic rebellion because multiple ethnically organized political groups 
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race for control of the state.   This process can often prove violent as ethnic groups may 
already suffer from state sanctioned exclusion, or the prospect thereof, should they fail 
(Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009). 
The body of scholarship which has emerged from the PAL school provides the 
single most comprehensive explanation of ethnic violence in the field.  Nevertheless, it is 
not without its weaknesses.  The concepts of politicized ethnicity, national closure along 
ethnic lines (i.e., ethnic exclusion), and ethnicized bureaucracy do a tremendous amount 
of theoretical heavy lifting in explaining ethnic rebellion.  However, the fuzzy conceptual 
relationship between ethnicity’s politicization and ethnic exclusion demands further 
refinement for two interrelated reasons.  First, the role the ethnic makeup of a state plays 
in the rise of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is not included in the framework.  Second, 
by treating the politicization of ethnicity and the rise of ethnic exclusion as simultaneous 
processes that tend to promote the ethnicization of the bureaucracy, Wimmer relies on the 
assumption that the escalatory logics of each are identical.  From this standpoint, ruling 
elites politicize ethnicity because of the need to reduce the size of the population which 
can make “legitimate” claims on public goods.  This ethnic exclusion provides a source 
of political support for counter elites along ethnic lines, which further entrenches the 
politicization of ethnicity.  Thus, for Wimmer, when resources are limited, it is the 
practical need to exclude a portion of the population that operates as the primary driving 
force of ethnicity’s politicization.   
The inability to deliver public goods to the entire population is rarely the only 
concern facing elites, even if it is central.  As Karl Marx (2005:1) famously wrote, “Man 
makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make 
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it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand.”   The 
ruling elite must confront their economic situation, as well as the ethnic diversity of their 
state, in determining their course of action.  Moreover, they must confront the extent to 
which ethnicity is already politicized within the political system.  In treating the 
politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion as parts of the same phenomenon, 
Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence overlooks how the state of 
ethnic tensions and ethnic diversity alter the calculus facing ruling elites depending on 
the abundance or paucity of resources.  Thus, while Wimmer is right to emphasize the 
role of resources available to elites, the omission of ethnic diversity and the extent to 
which ethnicity has already been politicized obscures the structural mechanisms that 
contribute to the formation of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. 
The Disparate Escalatory Logics of State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion and Politicized 
Ethnicity When Resources are Limited 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the central relationships expected by Wimmer’s 
theoretical perspective, the revisions presented in chapter 2, and the further extensions I 
propose in the current chapter.  As the tables indicate, the same configurations of 
resources and diversity that promote the politicization of ethnicity by elites should also 
promote ethnic inclusion when the politicization of ethnicity is already well established.  
Conversely, conditions associated with lower levels of politicization should actually 
promote ethnic exclusion by elites if the politicization of ethnicity has already been 
institutionalized.  To demonstrate why this is the case for states with limited resources, I 
briefly review the escalatory logics presented in chapter 2, and discusses the expectations 
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in regard to state sanctioned exclusion.  I will then highlight the importance of such 
distinctions in the circumstances currently facing Syria and Southern Sudan.   
As Table 3.1 shows, the ethno-bureaucratic scenario for politicizing ethnicity and 
Wimmer’s ethnicized bureaucracy configuration are the most similar.  Wimmer argues 
that states with limited resources politicize ethnicity with the aim of excluding an ethnic 
element of the population.  However, the results presented in chapter 2 suggest that only 
very poor states with low diversity actually have a structural affinity toward politicizing 
ethnicity.  Ruling elites attempt to avoid the loss of power that could result from 
politicizing ethnicity due to potential ethnic fragmentation.  The inclusion of ethnic 
diversity within the decision calculus suggests that very poor states with high diversity 
are incentivized to pursue more populist approaches to building political support, since 
politicizing ethnicity could unleash a torrent of competing ethnic claims to the state. 
Multiple competing claims are precisely what elites would rather avoid.  Plainly, the 
essential question is, Do they have the choice?  Where the institutionalization of ethnic 
politics is not complete it is more likely that ruling elites will indeed be able to steer the 
state down a populist path.  But where ethnicity is firmly politicized, the options available 
to elites are far more limited.  
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Table 3.1  
Theoretical Expectations from the Power and Legitimacy School: 
Both Original and Refined When Resources are Limited 
 Relevant Structural Conditions Expected Outcomes 
 State of 
Ethnicity’s 
Politicization 
Resources 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
Likelihood of 
 Politicized 
Ethnicity 
Likelihood of 
Ethnic 
Exclusion 
Wimmer’s Original Theoretical Expectations 
Ethnicized 
Bureaucracy 
Uncertain Limited --- Higher Higher 
Chapter 2: Empirically Supported Revisions 
Ethno-
Bureaucratic 
Scenario 
Uncertain Limited Low Higher --- 
Populist 
Scenario 
Uncertain Limited High Lower --- 
Chapter 3: Hypothesized Revisions Regarding Exclusion 
Formal 
Inclusion  
Politicized Limited Low --- Lower 
Divisive 
Exclusion 
Politicized Limited High --- Higher 
 
As Table 3.1 reveals, elites in states where the politicization of ethnicity is firmly 
entrenched face a fundamentally different decision calculus than elites in states where the 
institutionalization of politicized ethnicity is uncertain.  Here Wimmer’s original 
framework best describes what I call divisive exclusion.  Divisive exclusion occurs when 
a regime gives preferential treatment and state access to their ethnic kin and excludes 
multiple ethnic groups from state access in an effort to play them off each other.  Elites 
that have gained power within the context of politicized ethnicity owe some allegiance to 
the ethnic group from which they garner political support.  This limits the options they 
can viably pursue to the extent that they lack the resources to provide equal access to the 
rest of the state’s population without reducing those reserved for their ethnic kin.  Where 
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regimes have had the choice of politicizing ethnicity or not, the analysis presented in 
chapter 2 suggests that when diversity is high and resources are very limited the populist 
outcome tends to be preferred.  However, when ethnicity becomes politicized in states 
with limited resources and high diversity, elites face a critical but difficult decision with 
limited options—one that often traps them into the further escalation of ethnic tensions.  
These ruling elites do not have the resources to distribute public goods to the whole 
population.  Neither can they simply abandon their political base in favor of broader 
populist appeal, since internal competitors would take political advantage.  In the absence 
of immense political skill and highly fortuitous circumstances, ruling elites are often left 
with little choice but to essentially double down and escalate the politicization of 
ethnicity into full state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. 
 Two examples from current world events offer useful illustrations of these two 
divergent escalatory logics.  For divisive exclusion, we turn to Syria; and for a teetering 
populist scenario, let’s consider Southern Sudan.  In Syria, a minority Alawite sect, 
composing less than 10 percent of the population, has held power for four decades.  The 
transition that brought the Assad regime to power institutionalized the politicization of 
ethnicity along ethno-religious lines.  A small Numailatiyya clan of the Matawira tribe 
has overwhelmingly given preferential state access to the Alawite minority, 
systematically playing rival ethno-religious factions off one another in an effort to 
maintain power.  Over the last forty years the regime has continually ‘doubled down’ on 
its Alawite foundation of political support, brutally oppressing any form of dissent.  Yet 
the regime has always done so while legitimating its rule with the populist overtones of a 
pan-Arab Syrian Nationalism (Batatu 1981).   
90 
 
 The strategy of divisive exclusion gives a veneer of stability until it can no longer 
be maintained.  The present Syrian civil war is thus indicative of the tenuous nature of 
divisive exclusion.  Within the context of the Arab Spring, the Assad regime proved 
unable to keep the opposition sufficiently fragmented so as to avoid a violent rebellion.  
Nevertheless, the legacy of divisive exclusion remains does not disappear.  The fruits of 
the Syrian regime’s seeds of distrust among the opposition remain visible in its complex 
amalgam of competing religious sects and peoples.  The legacy of fragmentation has 
made it difficult for the opposition to maintain a unified resistance against an Assad 
regime empowered by assistance from Hezbollah, Russia and Iran.  With the 
politicization of ethnicity institutionalized, the limited resources and high ethnic diversity 
facing the Alawite dominated Syrian regime channeled the Syrian state into a pattern of 
divisive exclusion, the consequences of which are playing out in a bloody and devastating 
civil war. 
Southern Sudan, in contrast, illustrates a case where ethnic diversity is high, 
resources are extremely limited, but politicization of ethnicity is not completely 
institutionalized.  As such, state sanctioned ethnic exclusion by the government remains a 
potential course of action, but one that has not yet been totally embraced.  The most 
recent turmoil developed when President Kiir removed from office Dr. Machar, his 
primary deputy and political rival (as well as 15 others), amid accusations that Machar 
was planning a coup.  Although political pundits have played up the fact that Machar is 
from the Nuer ethnic group, while Kiir is from the Dinkha, President Kiir has been 
publically downplaying the ethnic argument in an attempt to build a populist Southern 
Sudanese Nationalism around his regime. It is too early to tell if President Kiir’s 
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exclusion of rival counter elites on the back of calls for multi-ethnic populist support will 
ultimately win the day.   
There is no doubt that ethnicity is highly politicized and charged in Southern 
Sudan.  The appointment of Dr. Machar, who hails from Southern Sudan’s second largest 
Nuer ethnic group, as the primary deputy in the government was a critical compromise 
that allowed the formation of the Southern Sudanese government.  The move expanded 
an already broad base of multi-ethnic support for President Kiir.  Dr. Machar, a well 
know political figure in his own right, has a political following that responded violently 
to his removal, but unlike the Syrian case, the conflict in Southern Sudan is more akin to 
political infighting.  President Kiir and Dr. Machar have each taken different paths to 
political prominence that have exacerbated differences in their leadership styles as well as 
their political perspectives.  In line with results presented in chapter 2, Southern Sudan’s 
limited resources and high ethnic diversity seem to be motivating President Kiir to pursue 
a version of the populist scenario.  As Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) point out, excluded 
counter elites have an incentive to further politicize ethnicity in order to build political 
support for an opposition.  In the Sudanese case, should Dr. Machar or others succeed, 
President Kiir would no doubt attempt to gain political support almost solely from the 
Dinkha ethnic group.  Such a move would necessitate a formal governmental power 
sharing situation or an expansion of the current hostilities into outright civil war.  
The human toll in each of these example cases is alarming.  But the brief 
comparison serves to highlight the importance of distinguishing between the 
politicization of ethnicity and the onset of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.  When 
resources are limited, ethnic diversity is high, and politicized ethnicity has been 
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institutionalized, regimes are often trapped into a cycle of divide and rule through 
divisive exclusion. As the previous discussion of the Syrian case highlights, when ethnic 
distinctions are already institutionalized as the principal bases of political mobilization, 
the configuration of limited resources and high ethnic diversity should result in higher 
levels of state sanctioned exclusion (i.e., the divisive exclusion hypothesis).  Yet this 
pattern should only hold when the politicization of ethnicity is firmly institutionalized.   
As the Southern Sudanese case suggests, the distinction between the institutionalization 
of ethnicity as the principal source of political mobilization and alternative modes of 
political mobilization is of critical importance to understanding the onset of ethnic 
exclusion.  Chapter 2 showed that when resources are limited and ethnic diversity is high, 
a populist outcome where counter elites are excluded and the government aims to build a 
multi-ethnic base of support is common.  Southern Sudan thus stands at a crossroads.  
Even as President Kiir aims to build a broad populist base, the strong support his counter-
elite (Dr. Machar) enjoys from the Nuer ethnic group could politicize ethnicity to such an 
extent that Kiir would have to rely more upon Dinkha support.  If Southern Sudan can 
achieve a populist outcome, it may be able to limit the current conflict to a rebellion, 
preventing expansion into a full blown civil war.  Although, such a result would require a 
move preventing the already politicized ethnic boundaries from becoming 
institutionalized.  This may simply be too difficult task in the current political climate.   
Contrary to the expectations of Wimmer’s theory, not all states with limited 
resources and politicized ethnicity are beset by ethnic exclusion.  While extremely 
limited resources and low ethnic diversity are linked to ethnicity’s politicization (as 
shown in chapter 2), states where ethnicity is already politicized, resources are limited, 
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and ethnic diversity is low, should be far less likely to exclude populations along ethnic 
lines (i.e., the formal inclusion hypothesis).  In such cases the excluded minority would 
be quite small and the costs of the additional unrest would tend to be outweighed by the 
benefits.  The amount of resources freed up by excluding a small minority is often 
insufficient to create a noticeable increase in political support from the national majority 
when redistributed across the nation.  Here, small minorities are encouraged to assimilate 
into the primary national culture.  Although racism and discrimination are still all too 
common in these states, they are not a formally institutionalized part of the state itself 
(for example Haiti or Madagascar from 1973-1992).  The extremely limited resources 
available to these states further requires the label of  ‘formal inclusion’ since the extreme 
scarcity makes it difficult for ruling elites to develop any real loyalty to the centralized 
state.  Thus, although states in this situation attempt to build a foundation upon a formally 
inclusive nationalism, their limited resources severely limit the overall capacity of these 
states.  The result, plainly, can be a failed state, such as in Somalia, where ruling elites 
were unable to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force were overrun by 
competing warlords.  The failed state’s former territory is then regionally fragmented in a 
small example of what Theda Skocpol (1979) coined ‘a balance of weakness.’ 
The Disparate Escalatory Logics of State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion and Politicized 
Ethnicity When Resources are Relatively Abundant 
Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic rebellion does not fully 
address the ethnic exclusion that remains quite common in both economically advanced 
and moderately developed states.  The oversight occurs for two reasons.  First, exclusion 
and discrimination is often more subtle and less draconian in more economically 
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developed states.  Although not ethnic in character, consider the following example.  The 
conservative legislature in Arizona recently sent a bill to the governor of Arizona’s desk 
that would allow businesses to refuse service to the gay and lesbian community on 
religious grounds.  In Uganda, by comparison, a law was recently enacted that makes 
homosexuality a crime punishable by life in prison.  Although both of these pieces of 
legislation represent fundamental encroachments on individual human rights, the Uganda 
law is by far more extreme.  As Wimmer (2002) points out, within well developed 
nation-states ethno-nationalist ideologies find their voice in racist and xenophobic 
attitudes that gain more salience in times of economic difficulty.  However, where protest 
and demonstrations emerge ruling elites are often able to incorporate the upper elements 
of these movements by extending inclusion in the social system rather than facing 
fundamental reform.  His emphasis on ethnic conflict and violence thus steers the project 
away from a deeper treatment of ethnic exclusion in well developed societies.  Thus, as 
Table 3.2 illustrates, Wimmer argues that ethnicity largely remains politicized in most 
developed states, but that state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is much less likely.  The 
second reason this conclusion is reached, can be found in the fact that his paradigmatic 
case, upon which the broad theoretical hypothesis is constructed is, Switzerland.  Here 
ethnicity is certainly politicized, but exclusion is, indeed, notably absent.  However, as a 
result of fusing the politicization of ethnicity with state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, 
Wimmer overlooks the role that high levels of ethnic diversity can play in pushing well 
developed states away from ethnic exclusion.  In fact, Switzerland is quite ethnically 
diverse, and fits well within the revised theoretical framework I propose.  
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Table 3.2  
Theoretical Expectations from the Power and Legitimacy School: 
Original and Refined When Resources are Abundant 
 Relevant Structural Conditions Expected Outcomes 
 State of 
Ethnicity’s 
Politicization 
Resources 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
Likelihood of 
 Politicized 
Ethnicity 
Likelihood of 
Ethnic 
Exclusion 
Wimmer’s Original Theoretical Expectations 
Nationalist 
Cultural 
Compromise 
Uncertain Abundant --- Higher Lower 
Chapter 2: Empirically Supported Revisions 
National 
Closure 
Scenario 
Uncertain Abundant Low Lower --- 
Multi-
Culturalist 
Scenario 
Uncertain Abundant High Higher --- 
Chapter 3: Hypothesized Revisions Regarding Exclusion 
Xenophobic 
Exclusion  
Politicized Abundant Low --- Higher 
Multi-Ethnic 
Nationalist 
Inclusion 
Politicized Abundant High --- Lower 
 
The Swiss case is actually an excellent example of what I call multi-ethnic 
inclusion.  States characterized by multi-ethnic inclusion are also characterized by the 
institutionalization of politicized ethnicity.  Their high ethnic diversity, to a large extent, 
makes the avoidance of politicized ethnicity quite difficult.  On the other hand, the state 
can still strike a grand multi-ethnic nationalist bargain because the state has sufficient 
resources to include the whole of a state’s population.  Each included ethnic group makes 
exclusion in this context much more difficult.  If a group were excluded along ethnic 
lines, the grounds for their exclusion would challenge the very foundation upon which the 
state exists.  In this regard, post-Apartheid South Africa and Switzerland are quite 
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similar.  Both have a GDP per capita above the international mean, and both states 
contain well above average ethnic diversity, as measured by the Ethno-Fractionalization 
Index (ELF).
6
  If empirically supported on a broader level, states with higher levels of 
ethnic diversity and relatively abundant resources should prove less likely to carryout 
state sanctioned ethnic exclusion (the Multi-Ethnic Inclusion Hypothesis).  
A close reading of Wimmer’s (2002) theoretical framework illustrates that the 
multi-ethnic inclusive outcome is quite close to the scenario he outlines.  The multi-
ethnic inclusion hypothesis is thus a straightforward extension of his theoretical logic, 
once the ethnic diversity of the state is allowed to contribute in a meaningful manner.  
States with abundant resources and high levels of ethnic diversity are expected to be 
characterized by politicized ethnicity but low levels of exclusion in both the Wimmer’s 
original framework and my own extension of his theoretical framework.  The logic of the 
historical-comparative tradition suggests that any theoretical revision must explain what 
the previous version addressed, while adding insight to new cases.  In this regard, the 
larger contribution of my revision to his framework is that it also allows for an 
explanation of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in well-developed states.  As Table 3.2 
indicates, the original Wimmer theoretical framework does not explain the existence of 
states with relatively abundant resources that systematically exclude a portion of their 
population along ethnic lines.  In this regard, Wimmer’s version of a successful 
nationalist cultural compromise is somewhat optimistic regarding the extent to which 
economically developed states have achieved a full nationalist cultural compromise.  For 
Wimmer, the fully realized nation-state includes the whole of their territory’s permanent 
                                                 
6
 The data supporting this claim are drawn from Cederman, L. E., B. Min, and A. Wimmer. 2009. "Ethnic 
Power Relations Dataset." Dataverse Network, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796  
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population while excluding those who are citizens of another state on the grounds that 
that they have rights and representation elsewhere.  The fully realized nation-state thus 
provides a setting of formal equality for those included in the national “we.”  In 
Switzerland this has come to fruition.  In other cases, such as France and the United 
States, this is less the case.   
The multi-ethnic inclusion scenario is by no means assured.  The French and 
United States cases are illustrative in demonstrating the merits of extending Wimmer’s 
perspective.  France is a nation-state that is economically well developed, where ethnicity 
is politicized and certain ethnic segments of society are excluded from full state access.  
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National Party is a clear example, where racist and 
xenophobic viewpoints have coalesed into a political movement to make sure that France 
stays ‘French.’   In the United States, the Civil Rights movement struggled against similar 
conservative, racist, and xenophobic political movements (Blee 1991; Santa Ana 2002) 
and the current opposition in Congress to immigration reform is rife with xenophobic 
undertones.  Ruling elites do indeed wish to dispense the public goods associated with 
political modernity, but these dispensations do not occur due to simple benevolence.  A 
vast and rich literature has repeatedly shown that these are concessions from ruling elites, 
achieved via struggle in a host of various socio-political arenas of society.  Consider, for 
example, the seminal work of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) regarding 
the role of working class movements in the rise of capitalist democracy, or Kurzman’s 
(2008) work showing the shortcomings democratic movements headed by emerging 
middle class intelligentsias.  Haggard and Kaufman’s  (2008) work on nation-building 
and democratization through extension of the welfare state in South America is yet 
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another example.  These few examples come from a literature that clearly demonstrate a 
utilitarian bend in the offering of political participation for the right to collect taxes, 
extension of the welfare state to raise armies, and acceptance of the rule of law for 
political loyalty.  The logic of the argument is not that ruling elites are overtly greedy, but 
rather, like all social actors, if I may draw from Bourdieu, deeply immersed in their 
particular habitus, with all the requisite resistances to change.   
Wimmer (2002:69) incisively demonstrates  that racism and xenophobia are, as he 
states, “enfants naturels of the world order of nation-states, an extreme form of 
nationalism revealing in its exaggeration the very principles of communal solidarity on 
which modern societies are based.”  Wimmer then links this reality to states, such as 
Switzerland, where politicized ethnicity is seen as a byproduct of the nation-state system, 
in which modern states exist.  However, by largely conflating the politicization of 
ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, as well omitting consideration of ethnic diversity, 
Wimmer simply does not extend this position far enough.  Thus, while his approach does 
offer an account for the existence of states, such as Switzerland, where ethnicity is 
politicized but state sanctioned ethnic exclusion has been avoided, it does not offer an 
equally compelling explanation for cases, such as France, and the United States, which 
are economically developed and quite ethnically diverse but also have a history of 
exclusion.  Yes, high levels of ethnic diversity and abundant resources should press states 
toward the multi-cultural inclusive scenario, but empirically there remains variation.  To 
understand this variation it is necessary to consider the xenophobic exclusion scenario 
which tends to emerge within states with abundant resources but far less ethnic diversity. 
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The inclusion of ethnic diversity within the theoretical framework allows for just 
these types of cases.  Chapter 2 showed that states with abundant resources and low 
levels of ethnic diversity are more likely to not politicize ethnicity than states where 
resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is high.  However, for those states that, 
thanks to the vicissitudes of history, have firmly politicized ethnicity in spite of this 
structural affinity, the probability of ethnically based exclusion is expected to be quite 
high.  The national, “we the people,” is firmly established, and yet the nationalist cultural 
compromise does not extend to the complete permanent territorial population of the state.  
To use Wimmer’s terminology, ruling elites do not extend the rights and freedoms of 
political modernity simply because they can.  They do so within the context of 
historically situated and contested struggles.  As such, it is expected that when ethnicity 
has already been politicized, ethnic diversity is relatively low and resources relatively 
abundant, ceteris paribus ruling elites will still continue to exclude at least as much of the 
population as is permitted by the socially normative status quo (the Xenophobic 
Exclusion Hypothesis).  The march for full formal civil equality may ultimately be 
achieved in any given state, but from a structural and institutional perspective, within the 
boundaries of any given state, where ethnicity is politicized, ethnic diversity is low, and 
resources abundant, the nation-state form tends to mean formal inclusion for most, not all.  
Here the Netherlands and Poland are the paradigmatic cases.  France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States have less ethnic diversity than Switzerland, but far more 
than either the Netherlands or Poland.  As such, they occupy a kind of theoretical 
transitional space between the multi-cultural inclusivity scenario and the xenophobic 
exclusivity scenario.  If Wimmer’s original framework were sufficient, ethnic exclusion 
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in Poland and the Netherlands would not exist.  Nor would it exist in the United States, 
France and the United Kingdom.  If, empirically supported, my refinements to Wimmer’s 
original framework, through the inclusion of ethnic diversity, would allow the basic 
framework to explain these important anomalous cases 
Data, Measures, and Methods 
To empirically test these hypotheses I employ the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset 
(Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009) (EPR).  The EPR contains data from 1946 through 
2005 on the entire population of sovereign states that had an estimated population of at 
least 1 million people or a territorial area of at least 500,000 square kilometers.  The 
resulting dataset includes 7,155 country-year observations for 155 post-independence 
sovereign states.  The present analysis is concerned with the onset of ethnic exclusion 
within states where ethnicity has already been politicized.  In this regard, the EPR 
provides two critical measures.  First, it provides a measure of state sanctioned ethnic 
group exclusion.  Ethnic group exclusion was coded as 1 if at least one ethnic group was 
categorically excluded from the executive branch of the state along ethnic lines.  
Although this measure is only one type of state based exclusion it remains the best 
available measure in the field.  Second, I also use dataset’s measure of the political 
relevance of ethnicity to restrict the cases analysed to those which have politicized 
ethnicity.  Extending the insight, highlighted by Wimmer et al. (2009), that ethnic 
rebellions cannot occur in states where ethnicicty has not become politicized, my 
perspective regarding the institutional escalation of ethnic tensions holds that ethnic 
exclusion cannot occur without the prior politicization of ethnicity.  Restricting the 
sample of cases to those where ethnicity has been coded politically relevant leaves an 
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eligible 5,861 country years for 129 post-independence states.  An ethnic category was 
coded as relevant if at least one significant political actor claimed to speak on behalf of 
that particular group, or if those from that particular group were systematically 
discriminated against by the state.
7
   
As with chapter 2, the present analysis draws heavily from the power and 
legitimacy school, I follow the Wimmer et al. (2009:325) working definition, which 
holds that ethnicity is, “a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a 
belief in common ancestry and shared culture.”  Wimmer et al. (2009) includes in this 
definition ethno-linguistic, ethno-somatic and ethno-religious groups, while excluding 
tribes and clans which focus on geneology or region, and do not link shared ancestry with 
commonality.  Within this definitional framework the political relevance of ethnicity, as 
well as the measure of state exclusion, are theoretically sound. They do, however, have at 
least a few imperfections that must be acknowledged.  First, the measure of ethnicity’s 
political relevance does not take into account degrees of ethnicity’s politicization.  
Second, the relevance measure also does not capture the extent to which members of an 
ethnic category actually support those claiming to speak on their behalf.  For its part, 
limiting the measure of exclusion to a coding of access to the executive branch of 
government, including the cabinet, potentially misses forms of discrimination and 
exclusion that exist even after access to the executive branch has been gained.  For 
example, it is unrealisistic to think that when Nelson Mandela became president in South 
Africa, the legacies of state sponored exclusion simply dissapeared.  Nevertheless, given 
its temporal range, analytic clarity, and sample coverage, the EPR’s measures of 
                                                 
7
 The complete documentation on the coding procedures used in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset may 
be found at (http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2009/toc068.html) or 
http://www.princeton.edu/~awimmer/AppendixEthnicPolitics.pdf. 
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ethnicity’s political relevance and ethnic group exclusion it the best available source of 
data for quantitative analysis on the subject. 
Explanatory Variables of Interest 
The two concepts of interest in this chapter are the resources available to ruling 
elites and the ethnic diversity of the state.  In an effort to keep my study as comparable to 
recent work from the power and legitimacy school as possible, I have efforted, where 
possible to use the same data.  In line with this goal, I utilize the version of the ELF 
index, as provided by Fearon and Laitin, as my measure of ethnic diversity.  The ELF 
index measures the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who speak 
languages from different ethno-linguistic categories.  The overlap between ethno-
somatic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties is often substantial but this is not always 
the case.  As such, my use of the ELF index will make my results less generalizable to 
those areas where linguistic cultural diacritics are not the primary markers of ethnic 
boundaries.  Still, given the central importance of language to ethnicity in general and the 
absence of multiple indicators, the ELF index offers a solid analytical tool to measure the 
ethnic diversity of a state.   To measure the resources available to ruling elites I draw 
upon the same data utilized by Wimmer et al. (2009), and use gross domestic product per 
capita in 2000 U.S. Dollars.  Since economic development and the resources from which 
states can draw revenues, such as taxes, have a strong thoeretical connection with overall 
GDP per capita, the measure is an obvious choice for the relative abundance or scarcity 
of resources available to elites.  Using the GDP data used in the Wimmer et al. (2009) 
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study grants an overall coverage of 99.6 percent of sample.
8
  Operationally, my four 
principle hypotheses hold that the effect of the ELF index is contingent on the GDP per 
capita, and thus I include an interaction term in the model for the ELF and GDP 
measures.  I discuss the role of the interaction term in testing my hypotheses in more 
detail in the modeling section.  Full descriptive statistics are provided for all variables in 
Appendix B. 
Control Variables 
I also include a number of substantive control variables.  The first of these deals 
with previous imperial history.  The measure is the proportion of a territory’s existance 
spent in colonial depndency or subject to some form of indirect rule between 1816 and 
their independence (Wimmer and Min 2006).  This variable is included to control for the 
possibility that the central mechanism in Hechter’s (2000) argument linking indirect rule 
to the onset of nationalist violence is at least partially active in the formation of state 
santioned ethnic exclusion.  The second substantive control variable is population size.  A 
key theoretical mechanism stems from the resource limitations elites face in their efforts 
to provide sufficient public goods.  It logically follows that the more people the more 
goods required by the state.  If my thoeretical model holds, omission of a population size 
measure would artificially inflate the estimates of my explanatory  variables and should 
thus be included.  Wimmer (2002) also argues that the breakdown of new democracies 
can provide the impetus for ethnic exclusion if a party, once voted into power, realizes 
they can maintain power along narrower ethnic lines.  Harff and Gurr (2004) also argue 
                                                 
8
 Data for the GDP per capita measure was drawn primarily from the Penn World Table 6.2 (79 percent), 
World Bank World Development Indicators (3 percent), and the remainder calculated from growth rates 
taken from Fearon and Laitin’s dataset, with values extended back to 1946.  
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that government form can exacerbate ethnic tensions or play a role in allieviating them.  
Although there are conflicting results in the literature regarding regime form, as part of 
the process of unpacking the relationships between common explanatory variables of 
ethnic rebellion and their effect on ethnic exclusion, I include a dummy variable for 
democracy and another for anocracy derived from the Polity IV dataset.  Following 
Wimmer et al. (2009), I also use the +6 and -6 cut points to distinguish between 
democracies, anocracies, and autocracies. 
The final two control variables I include are proportion mountainous terrain and 
barrels of oil per capita. As disscussed early in the paper, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)  
insurgency model  posits that opportunity structures are the trigers of civil war, as 
opposed to grievances, and that ethnicity is simply a descriptive quality regarding a 
subset of these conflicts.  Since, studies in this area have not taken ethnic power relations 
into account in their models, it is possible that their measure of mountainous terrain was 
capturing some element of the ethnic variance.  Although Fearon and Laitin do not expect 
that ethnicity plays a role in the onset of such conflicts, it is a central part of their 
theoretical perspective that both ethnic and non-ethnic rebellions are brought about 
through similar opportunity structures.  If their hypothesis is supported, there is thus no 
reason that mountainous terrain should not demonstrate the expected positve relationship.  
However, if proportion of mountainous terrain does not receive empirical support as a 
predictor of ethnic rebellion and is a statistically significant predictor of ethnic group 
exclusion, then the finding and theoretical interpretation of the proportion of mountainous 
terrain measure  requires substantial reconsideration.  Following a similar line of 
argument, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posit a second type of opportunity structure in the 
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form of lootable resources.  Buhaug (2006) has also argued that oil production is a critical 
resource because it is commonly controled by the state.  In these situations the control of 
the state becomes an even larger prize and is thus worth greater risk to monopolize.  It is 
more than plausible that competition over such resources could also raise ethnic tensions 
and provide grounds for ethnic exclusion (for a possible example see pre-2011 Sudan, as 
well as the current conflict in Souther Sudan).  To control for this possibility I use the 
EPR’s oil production per capita variable, which is computed from data analyzed by 
Wimmer and Min (2006). 
Modeling Approach 
  To carry out the actual analysis, I have repurposed the standard modeling 
approach in the literature for civil war onset and employ a binary logit model to regress 
my explanitory variables on a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for country-years in 
which a state excluded at least one ethnic group from executive power along ethnic lines. 
I control for the limited temporal variation by following Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998).  
As reccomended, I include a cubic spline on a non-exclusionary year count variable 
indicating the number of years since an ethnic group was last excluded from state access.  
I also include a previous exclusion-year count total variable to further control for inertia 
effects.  I addition to these temporal variables I also include a calander year variable to 
control for possible changes in international political climate.  Like most other statistical 
models, binary logit has a number of assumptions which many datasets routinely violate.  
For example, it is well known that the repeated observations of the country-year format 
violate the independence of observations assumption.  To account for many of these 
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possible violations I employ robust standard errors, and cluster them by sovereign state to 
specifically address the non-independence of cases within states.   
The statistical tests of my hypotheses require the inclusion of an interaction term 
between the ELF index and GDP per capita.  The inclusion of this term in the model has 
the effect of making the influence of ELF on ethnic group exclusion contingent on the 
value of GDP per capita. Within this methodological framework I present three models 
which move the analysis along in three steps.  I first test the original power and 
legitimacy expectation that as GDP per capita increases, the probability of ethnic 
exclusion decreases (Counter Hypothesis 1).  I then test the neo-romantic expectation that 
as ethnic diversity increases, the probability of ethnic exclusion should also increase 
(Counter Hypothesis 2).  Finally, I examine the evidence for my four principle 
hypotheses (the Formal Inclusion, Divisive Exclusion, Xenophobic Nationalist 
Exclusion, and Multi-Ethnic Nationalist Inclusion Hypotheses).  These hypotheses all 
hinge on the inclusion of an interaction term between GDP per capita and the ELF index.  
Due to the dynamics of the binary logit model the meaning of this interaction coeficient 
must be developed through predicted probability plots to determine the extent to which 
the data actually support each hypothesis.  In Appendix B, I also present results from two 
alternative model specificiations that confirm the findings presented in the main results 
section, but have been conducted and provided as a robustness check of the principal 
results. 
Results: Explaining Ethnic Exclusion 
As the results reported in Table 3.3, for model 1, indicate, counter hypothesis 1, 
which expected ethnic group exclusion to become less likely as GDP per capita increased 
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is not supported.  In fact, the logit coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and 
significant which is opposite of the expectation suggested by Wimmer (2002).  The initial 
result for counter hypothesis 2, suggested by the neo-romanticist wing of the diversity-
breeds-conflict school, does not fair much better.  Inclusion of the ELF index in model 2 
shows that the ethnic diversity measure is not statistically significant.  However, these 
models do not tell the whole story.  The four principal hypotheses offered in this analysis 
suggest that the effect of ethnic diversity is contingent on available resources.  
Operationally this means that the effect of the ELF index should vary depending on the 
value of GDP per capita.  To test this expectation I thus include an interaction term to the 
model, as shown in model 3.  The negative statistically significant GDP-ELF interaction 
coefficient provides initial evidence that my four principal hypotheses are empirically 
supported.  The extent of this support must be ascertained by probing the results 
presented in model 3 through predicted probability plots.  
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Table 3.3. 
Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguisitic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF 
Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Group Exclusion
†
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Politicization Variables
‡
    
     GDP per Capita 
0.488** 0.488* 1.467*** 
(0.183) (0.195) (0.436) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
 -0.113 1.172 
 (0.657) (0.670) 
     GDP-ELF 
     Interaction 
  -2.052** 
  (0.750) 
Other Control Variables    
     Imperial Past 
0.303 0.291 0.846 
(0.505) (0.521) (0.539) 
     Oil Production per Capita 
0.002 0.002 -0.000 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) 
     Form of Government 
     Reference: Autocracy 
   
          Anocracy 
-0.292 -0.296 -0.312 
(0.308) (0.305) (0.322) 
          Democracy 
-0.584 -0.591 -0.767* 
(0.343) (0.342) (0.347) 
     Population 
0.189 0.188 0.165 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.117) 
     Percentage of Mountainous 
     Terrain 
0.318** 0.315** 0.405** 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.119) 
Time Control Variables Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed 
Constant 
-0.221 0.116 -0.561 
(1.169) (1.154) (1.012) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -377.3892 --377.3527 -367.7335 
Wald χ
2
 
(d.f.) 
104360.02*** 
(68) 
113783.40*** 
(69) 
121978.93*** 
(70) 
N  
(Number of States) 
5632 
(128) 
5632 
(128) 
5632 
(128) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, and Percent of Mountianous Terrain were used in the analysis. 
‡‡The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to colinearity which suggests only two knots between the 
beginning and end points of the data.   
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
The Practical Inclusion and Divisive Exclusion Hypotheses 
 In categorical terms, the practical inclusion and divisive exclusion hypothesis can 
be stated as follows.  When resources are low and ethnic diversity is low, the probability 
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of ethnic exclusion should also be low.  Conversely, when resources are limited and 
ethnic diversity is high the probability of ethnic exclusion should also be high.  However, 
since both resources and ethnic diversity are both continuous attributes the hypotheses 
can be combined into one.  When resources are limited the effect of ethnic diversity on 
the probability of ethnic exclusion should be positive.  The two categorical hypotheses 
are fused because practical inclusive outcomes are expected to dominate the lower levels 
of ethnic diversity and divisive exclusionary outcome in the cases with higher levels of 
ethnic diversity.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the predicted probabilities of ethnic exclusion for 
lower levels of GDP per capita across the range of values for ethnic diversity.  As Figure 
3.1 demonstrates, the effect of the ELF index on ethnic exclusion is most positive at the 
lowest levels of GDP per capita and becomes less so as GDP per capita increases to mean 
levels.  The overall pattern clearly supports both the formal inclusion and divisive 
exclusion hypotheses.  In the poorest of states, with low levels of ethnic diversity, the 
probability of ethnic exclusion is lower than in states with higher levels of ethnic 
diversity. 
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Those poorest states with higher levels of ethnic diversity have a much higher probability 
of ethnic exclusion.  These results suggest that the original Wimmer hypothesis regarding 
the effect of available resources is only empirically supported when ethnic diversity is 
high and the mechanism of divide and rule can drive the divisive exclusion outcome.  But 
in cases of limited resources and little ethnic diversity, ethnic exclusion is a much less 
certain prospect.  Moreover, the effect of resource abundance simply does not play the 
simple role expected by Wimmer’s (2002) theory.  For each level of increased GDP per 
capita the baseline probability of ethnic exclusion substantially increases.  As noted 
earlier, this is contrary to the expectations of the Wimmer theoretical perspective.   
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Figure 3.1, Predicted Probability of Ethnic Exclusion by Lower Levels of GDP 
per Capita across the Range of Values for Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 
 
Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only.  Although care was taken to 
place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision.  In general, 
the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on 
their ethno-linguistic score.   Some cases appear in different locations between plots due to economic growth.  
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 Substantively, these results suggest strong empirical evidence for the mechanisms 
argued to channel resource starved states into either the formal inclusion or divisive 
exclusion outcome.  These results also indicate that cases of formal inclusion are quite 
rare.  This should not be surprising for two reasons.  First, states with politicized ethnicity 
but not ethnic group exclusion are a minority of the world’s states.  The formal inclusion 
scenario is one of two structural tracks that tend to result in this outcome.  Second, states 
with extremely limited resources have limited capacities and often enjoy a perilous and 
uncertain existence.  One need only think about the unfortunate events that led to the 
failed state in Somalia.  On the other hand, these results foreshadow the finding that 
xenophobic nationalist exclusion is the predominant outcome around the globe.   The 
slightly negative slope for the line set at the mean level of GDP per capita indicates that 
ethnic diversity has little to no effect on the probability of ethnic exclusion for states with 
that level of resource availability.  The relativistic nature of terms, such as high and low 
resource abundance must be kept in mind.  Although the slope is still positive for the line 
set at -1 standard deviation from mean GDP per capita, at its lowest level of ethnic 
diversity it is still above .75.  At -2 standard deviations from mean GDP per capita at the 
lowest levels of ethnic diversity, the probability of ethnic exclusion is a fifty-fifty 
proposition.  As an outcome, formal inclusion should thus be reserved for only the 
poorest of states with lower levels of ethnic diversity.  Divisive exclusion, on the other 
hand, is largely at play for states roughly 1 standard deviation below mean GDP per 
capita, and lower, but with higher levels of ethnic diversity.  Descriptively these criteria 
include a much larger proportion of the world states relative to those poorest of states that 
also have low levels of ethnic diversity.  The vast majority of states that exclude along at 
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least one population along ethnic lines do in a manner that is more in line with 
xenophobic nationalist exclusion, followed by a divisive exclusion approach. 
The Xenophobic Nationalist Exclusion and Multi-Ethnic Nationalist Inclusion 
Hypotheses 
Both the xenophobic nationalist exclusion and multi-ethnic nationalist inclusion 
hypotheses concern the probability of ethnic exclusion when resources are relatively 
abundant.  In categorical form the xenophobic nationalist exclusion hypothesis holds that 
when resources are relatively abundant and ethnic diversity is low, the probability of 
ethnic exclusion should be high.  Conversely, when resources are relatively abundant and 
ethnic diversity is high the probability of ethnic exclusion should be lower.  When these 
two expectations are described in terms that allow resources and diversity to vary along 
their continuous range of values they can be combined by stating that the effect of 
diversity on the probability of ethnic exclusion should be negative when resources are 
relatively abundant.  The extent which the data support this hypothesis is shown in Figure 
3.2.   When GDP per capita is at the mean value, the line over the range of ELF index 
values is slightly negative with the predicted probability ranging between .975 and .925.  
This extremely high probability of exclusion is indicative of both the xenophobic 
nationalist and divisive exclusionary outcomes.  States with mean levels of GDP per 
capita and higher, as well as levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization around .7 and 
lower are almost exclusively characterized by ethnic exclusion consistent with the 
structural conditions argued to result in xenophobic nationalist exclusion.   At mean 
levels of GDP per capita the mechanism of divisive exclusion is still in effect, as 
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evidenced by the location of South Africa on the plot which has only emerged from the 
divisive exclusion of Apartheid over the last two decades.   
The empirical support for the multi-culturalist scenario is far less compelling and 
actually quite weak. 
 
 
 
Although the predicted probability plots show a certain drift in the direction of the multi-
culturalist scenario, the evidence actually suggests that states achieving a multi-culturally 
inclusive result are in the extreme minority.  For example, my theoretical framework fits 
the case of Switzerland well, but the predicted probability plots indicate that the data 
drive the model to clearly expect Switzerland to be an ethnic exclusionary state.  
Although results for an ELF index value of one are provided for a certain aesthetic 
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portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their 
ethno-linguistic score.   Some cases appear in different locations between plots due to economic growth.  
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appeal, the maximum score of the ELF index is .923.  While the evidence shows that 
while lower levels of GDP per Capita modify the effect of ethnic diversity, this 
moderation effect almost ceases once GDP per Capita has climbed to mean levels. 
 
 
 The three dimensional scatter plot provided in Figure 3.3 illustrates where and 
how the distribution of the data is driving the results.  Nearly all the observed cases at the 
low end of the Ln GDP per capita spectrum also have low levels of ethnic diversity.  At 
higher levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization the curvature witnessed at lower levels 
almost completely ceases.  Although there is some minor curvature within the left most 
quadrant, which is in the direction expected by the multi-culturalist inclusion scenario, it 
is nevertheless negligible.  From Figure 3.3 it is clear that the data clearly support the 
formal inclusion, xenophobic exclusion, and divisive exclusion scenarios but provide 
Figure 3.3, Predicted Probability Scatter Plot of Ethnic Exclusion by Ln 
GDP per Capita and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 
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little to no evidence supporting the multi-cultural inclusion outcome.  The case of 
Switzerland is truly a rare case which does fit the proposed theoretical revisions to 
Wimmer’s foundational framework.  Yet, the evidence for generalizing the multi-cultural 
inclusion argument refinement is weak at best.  
Taken together, the results presented in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 demonstrate that 
both GDP and ethnic diversity must be taken into account when attempting to explain 
ethnic exclusion.  States where ethnicity was politicized and ethnic exclusion did not 
emerge represented only 15.45 percent, or 19 states, of the total 123 states in the 2005 
eligible population. The evidence I present here strongly suggests that this minority of 
states have managed to avoid ethnic exclusion due to single structural channeling 
mechanisms.  For the most part, the population of states where ethnicity is politicized and 
ethnic exclusion has been avoided tend to fall into the formal inclusion category.  They 
tend to have very low levels of resources per capita and are quite ethnically homogenous. 
The results also demonstrate the true rarity of cases such as Switzerland.  Contrary to 
expectations from the power and legitimacy school higher levels of resources availability 
do not substantially reduce the risk of ethnic exclusion.  Rather, my results suggest that as 
resources increase the probability of ethnic exclusion increases dramatically.  Clearly, 
there has been, and continues to be, an overwhelming trend of ethnic group exclusion 
across the globe (Harff and Gurr 2004; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).  But contrary 
to commonly held assumptions, ethnic exclusion is not the domain of the world’s poorest 
states.  It is, rather, the domain of those in economic middle and higher end of the 
spectrum that drive exclusion.   
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Ethnic group exclusion comes in two forms.  When ethnic diversity is low or at 
moderate levels and GDP is just below the mean or higher, xenophobic nationalist 
exclusion is the order of the day.  However, when ethnic diversity is high and resources 
are very scarce to moderately available divisive exclusion is the dominant outcome.   
Contrary to the expectations of the neo-romanticist wing of the diversity-breeds-conflict 
school, increased ethnic diversity is not always associated with ethnic exclusion.  When 
resources are extremely limited to moderately available, high levels of ethnic diversity do 
indeed seem to push states into ethnic exclusion.  However, when resources very 
abundant and ethnic diversity is very high the evidence indicates a structural pull toward 
multi-ethnic nationalist inclusion.  My modification of the original power and legitimacy 
perspective, through the inclusion of ethnic diversity, thus out performs the original 
power and legitimacy approach, as well as the diversity-breeds-conflict school.  Finally, 
the fact that percentage of mountainous terrain is significant in the presented models of 
ethnic exclusion suggests the need for deeper scrutiny regarding the interpretation of this 
measure as an indicator of opportunity structure. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
In the population of states where ethnicity is politicized the vast majority of them 
are also characterized by ethnic exclusion.  The structural mechanisms that have 
channeled states in this direction do not conform to present theoretical expectations.  
Contrary to the expectation of the power and legitimacy school, which expects that richer 
states should be less likely to exclude along ethnic lines than poorer states, richer states 
are more likely to commit ethnic exclusion.  The diversity-breeds-conflict school fairs no 
better.  Neo-romanticist scholars have long claimed that increased ethnic diversity was 
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associated with higher levels of ethnic exclusion as the world’s ethnic categories of 
peoples fought for their right to self-determination.  Although there are a larger number 
of cases where increased ethnic diversity is indeed linked to ethnic exclusion, the 
relationship is far more contingent than previous scholars have emphasized.  My 
structural explanation of both ethnic exclusion and inclusion highlights a set of 
theoretically grounded expectations regarding systematic patterns in the wide variety of 
economic conditions and ranges of ethnic diversity confronted by the world’s states.  The 
configurations of these patterns are theoretically argued to create structural pressures that 
push some states toward ethnic exclusion, while other patterns push states toward ethnic 
inclusion.   
My results suggest that three of my four ideal-typical outcomes receive 
generalized empirical support.  States where ethnicity is politicized and escalated into 
ethnic group exclusion tend to (1) develop along a path or xenophobic nationalist 
exclusion or (2) along a separate trajectory best described as divisive exclusion.  
Xenophobic nationalist states tend to have moderately to relatively abundant levels of 
economic development with lower levels of ethnic diversity.   In this scenario ruling 
elites are able to establish a nationalist cultural compromise without the need to draw 
support from the state’s ethnic minorities.  Ruling elites believe that the state is 
sufficiently strong and has the requisite resources to repress any potential unrest from the 
excluded population and there is thus little incentive to completely include the entirety of 
the state’s population within a full nationalist cultural compromise.  Alternatively, a 
strategy of divisive exclusion is often pursued in poor to moderately poor states where 
ethnic diversity is moderate to very high.  In this divisive exclusionary scenario ruling 
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elites draw support from an ethnic minority of the population while they use the non-
distributed resources to harshly repress dissent, play multiple excluded ethnic categories 
of peoples against one another, and broadly pursue a strategy of divide and rule.   
Conversely, my results demonstrate that states where ethnicity is politicized but 
not escalated to ethnic exclusion tend to be characterized by low levels of both ethnic 
diversity and access to economic resources.  Contrary to expectations, a second scenario 
defined by an abundance of economic resources and higher levels of ethnic diversity shoe 
little to no trend toward non-exclusionary politicized ethnicity.  I have labeled the 
inclusive scenario receiving empirical support formal inclusion because the material 
constraints faced by state largely preclude the exclusion of an ethnic minority.  Simply 
put, the resource drain required for the requisite repression in these states is not actually 
viable.  I also deem such inclusion as “formal,” since the extreme deprivation faced by 
the state precludes the possibility of distributing enough public goods to ensure real 
loyalty.  These states are precariously perched on the edge of state failure should the 
vicissitudes of history be unkind.   
As previously noted, a multi-ethnic nationalist scenario did not receive 
generalized empirical support.  Although cases do exist where the high ethnic diversity of 
the state nearly ensures that ethnicity will be politically relevant, while at the same time 
lowering the probability of ethnic group exclusion, these cases are shown to be 
empirically rare.  States, such as Switzerland have indeed defied the odds, and achieved a 
balance of power between included ethnic groups that limits the drive for ethnic 
exclusion, since doing so would delegitimize the very ideological foundation of the state 
itself.  In these few successful cases, there is no ethnic majority large enough to claim 
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sole possession of the title staatsvolk and so each ethnic category of people is mutually 
dependent upon the multi-ethnic nationalist framework to legitimate their membership. 
Nevertheless, the lack of generalizable findings regarding this trend only speaks to the 
difficulty in arriving at such equilibriums.   
Overall, my results largely support my extension of the power and legitimacy 
school and its proposed contingent relationship of resources and ethnic diversity.  Should 
the results presented in this chapter withstand further empirical scrutiny the findings have 
strong implications from a policy perspective.  The decision where to send foreign aid to 
stabilize regions is a constant and evolving concern.  Although policy goals may be clear, 
the means to reach them all too often remain shrouded.  In this regard, these finding 
suggest two important considerations.  First, although those states where ethnicity is 
politicized, resources limited and quite ethnically homogenous would seem at little risk 
for ethnic violence, added care should be taken to help promote even development.  Here, 
my findings dovetail nicely with Horowitz’s (1985; 2001; 2005) research.  A tertiary 
finding of my results suggests that for those states where ethnicity has been politicized, 
development may increase the probability of ethnic exclusion.  As states become more 
developed, they also tend to become more powerful and increasingly more attractive 
prizes for those who are disenfranchised.  Thus, care should be given to provide 
development assistance to those poorest of states which does not have the effect of 
creating ethnic inequality.  Unfortunately, on this point, the Western powers have a 
woefully horrendous track record.   
Second, much has been made about the imperfections and instability of power 
sharing, as well as consociational democracy (Elkins and Sides 2007; 2011; Hechter 
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2000; Laitin 2007).  My findings suggest that within the current nation-state system, 
substantial economic resources and very high ethnic diversity are required to make such 
multi-ethnic nationalist cultural compromises viable.  This finding emerges indirectly, 
since states that have multiple power sharing partners and very limited resources are all 
but non-existent.  As Wimmer et al. (2009) demonstrates, when these power sharing 
arrangements hit difficulties, ethnic infighting is often the result.  The logic underpinning 
my results helps explain why.  The un-solidified multi-ethnic state with only moderate 
resources at its disposal is but one successful attempt at monopolizing state power by one 
of the minority partners, from becoming an entrenched case of divisive exclusion.  
Moreover, the fear that another minority partner may make such a move, leaving one’s 
own ethnic group on the wrong side of the exclusionary divide only serves to make the 
multi-ethnic nationalist inclusion scenario that much more difficult to achieve when truly 
abundant resources are lacking.  The lack of support for my multi-cultural inclusion 
scenario suggests that these types of power sharing states are difficult to achieve when 
resources are plentiful. 
As a field of study, the origins of ethno-nationalist exclusion and, just as 
importantly, inclusion are in their infancy and require a great deal more work.  The 
present analysis is but one small contribution to a discussion which requires both more 
voices and more data.  Many more questions remain.  Together, chapters 2 and 3 have 
shown empirical evidence that the logics of escalation regarding the politicization of 
ethnicity and ethnic group exclusion follow opposite paths.  The very structural 
conditions that make the politicization of ethnicity less likely are the same as those that 
encourage ethnic group exclusion and vice versa.  As such, the foundational assumptions 
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justifying the treatment of ethnicity’s politicization and ethnic exclusion as a singular 
phenomenon within the power and legitimacy school do not hold.  The present analysis 
has also shown that the assumed negative relationship between development and ethnic 
exclusion is not empirically supported.  The present analysis is but one corrective.  The 
field requires more data gathering projects like the one embodied in the EPR.  
Specifically it requires data on civil society development, which I have had to necessarily 
exclude from this analysis.  Given the profusion of ethno-religious exclusion, the 
politicization of ethno-religious boundaries through political Islam, and the significant 
prima facie evidence that ethno-religious conflicts and political boundaries follow similar 
logics to their strictly ethnic cousins, the need for a better understanding regarding the 
origins of categorical exclusion is obvious.  In chapters 2 and 3 I have highlighted the 
contingent and contradictory logics concerning how resource availability and ethnic 
diversity promote and discourage the politicization of ethnicity and state sanctioned 
ethnic exclusion.  I now turn to extending the divide and rule logic motivating divisive 
exclusion to the onset of ethnic rebellion. 
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Chapter 4: The Institutionalization of Ethnic Conflict as a Bulwark against Ethnic 
Rebellion 
Within the modern political era ethno-nationalist violence has become the most 
common form of interstate and intrastate organized violence.  Where ethno-nationalist 
violence accounted for only 20 percent of the wars fought between the Congress of 
Vienna (1814) and the Treaty of Versailles (1919), between 1919 and 2001, ethno-
nationalist wars made up 45 percent of total wars fought.  Between the end of the  Cold 
War and 2005 that figure increased still, to 75 percent (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 
2009).   
 The most common forms of ethno-nationalist violence are ethnic rebellions and 
civil wars.  Given that 68 percent of the world’s states were characterized by some form 
of xenophobic or divisive ethnic exclusion from 1946 and 2005, the recent increase in 
ethnonationalist violence seems understandable.  Several recent studies by PAL have 
compellingly linked ethnic group exclusion from the state to the onset ethnic rebellion 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).  In fact, the 
proportion of the population excluded from state access along ethnic lines has been 
shown to be the predominant predictor of ethnic rebellion.   
 While these recent findings help explain why ethnic rebellions have made up an 
increasing proportion of organized intrastate violence around the globe, they fail to 
account for why ethnic rebellions are so rare despite the prevalence of ethnic exclusion.  
Through the modern era more than half of the world’s states excluded at least one ethnic 
group from full access to the state.  Yet only about 2.5 percent of this population 
experienced the onset of a new ethnic rebellion.  As a result of ever-deepening 
encroachment by the modern state, ethno-nationalist exclusion places increasingly severe 
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limitations on the life chances of those barred from access to its presumptively public 
goods.  Plainly, the puzzle remains: Why are ethnic rebellions so rare?  Which 
institutional factors press so many ethnic populations around the world to accept, even if 
begrudgingly, the detrimental effects of state sanctioned exclusion? 
 The rarity of ethnic rebellions remains an open question within the quantitative 
literature on ethno-nationalist violence.  Initial attempts at explaining the onset of ethnic 
rebellions focused on the presence of ethnic diversity. Drawing on a fundamentally 
Herderian concept of ethnicity, DBC held that the housing of multiple ethnic groups 
under one state increased the threat of ethnic tensions due to the primordial drive for 
ethnic self-determination.   
 A minority-mobilization school developed in response, arguing that it was not 
ethnic diversity per se that led to increased ethnic tensions, but rather a mix of political, 
cultural, and economic grievances of disadvantaged ethnic minorities.  GAO then 
emerged to challenge the underlying claim that ethnic conflicts were distinct from non-
ethnic forms of organized anti-state violence.  GAO scholars argue that ethnic grievances 
are far too widespread to explain the relatively rare incidence of ethnic rebellion.  Instead, 
as their name aptly describes, they argue that opportunity structures are the decisive 
factors—that is, social structures that either welcome or inhibit rebellion depending on 
institutional context and feasibility.  From this standpoint, neither grievances nor even the 
category of ethnic identity are particularly helpful as explanatory factors in ethnic 
violence.  
 PAL, of course, developed most recently in opposition to each of these 
approaches.  PAL scholars hold that the state is not an ethnically neutral actor and that 
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the primary cause of ethnic rebellions is unequal access to public goods.  In pursuing this 
line of argument, PAL made at least three critical contributions to the field.  First, it 
challenged the field’s use of demographic indices that only indirectly measure actual 
power relations between ethnic categories of peoples and the state.  Second, it historically 
situated ethnic power relations within the rise of the nation-state system (while culling 
insights from both the DBC and MM schools). And third, it collected new data on ethnic 
power relations to test its theoretical expectations, convincingly demonstrating that ethnic 
group-state power relations represent the ‘master grievance’ at the root of virtually all 
ethnic rebellions.  While acknowledging the importance of opportunity structures, PAL 
fundamentally shifted intellectual debate regarding ethnic violence to issues of power--
demonstrating why ethnic violence, insurgency, and rebellion merit academic attention in 
their own right.   
 For all of its strengths, however, PAL falls short of addressing the rarity of ethnic 
rebellions.  Although GAO has addressed the question most directly, I argue that all four 
traditions largely overlook the importance of power relationships and competition 
between excluded ethnic groups themselves.  What is required is an explanation of ethnic 
rebellion’s rarity that is fundamentally grounded in the structural conditions that explain 
its existence. 
 To understand the rarity of ethnic rebellion two points emphasized in chapter 3 
are critical and must be extended.  First, it is essential to recognize that ruling elites are 
historically situated actors, who tend to limit the provision of public goods to those 
deemed socially “legitimate” members of the state, national or otherwise.  And second, 
state sanctioned categorical exclusion is neither total nor equal.  Why is this the case?  
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 Let’s return to my explanation of the rarity of ethnic rebellion discussed above.  
Contrary to states with an abundance of resources and ethnic exclusion, states with 
limited resources and ethnic exclusion do not have the resources to expand the social 
boundaries of inclusion.  The ability of ruling elites to stay in power, therefore, shifts 
from providing governance for the majority of the population to maintaining the 
committed support of a narrow base, while regularly attempting to thwart potential 
opposition. In their efforts to maintain power, ruling elites, in states with limited 
resources and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, thus tend to (1) quash any sign of dissent, 
and (2) make it as difficult as their limited resources allow for a unified opposition to 
develop.  In such situations, the ethnic diversity of the state’s excluded population is a 
powerful aid to ruling elites insofar as it fundamentally eases the regime’s efforts to 
cultivate mistrust among the ethnically excluded population and keep potential opposition 
fragmented.  Thus, the same logic of divide and rule, which motivated the divisive 
exclusion scenario in chapter 3, serves to reduce the absolute probability of rebellion 
even while continuing to exacerbate ethnic tensions.   
The model I propose suggests a substantial, yet simple, revision to the configural-
structural model proposed by PAL.  The recent finding that ethnic rebellions become 
increasingly likely as the relative size of a state’s ethnically excluded population 
increases requires re-examination.  By including the ethnic diversity of the excluded 
population within the theoretical framework, three ideal typical outcomes emerge, only 
one of which is consistent with the original framework:  Ethnic rebellions should be most 
common in states where a large proportion of the population is excluded along ethnic 
lines and the excluded are highly homogenous. Ethnic rebellions should be less likely if 
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(1) the proportion of the excluded population is very small, regardless of its ethnic 
diversity; or (2) the proportion of the excluded population is large but highly diverse.  
 From this standpoint, the rarity of ethnic rebellions is due to the fact that 
conditions conducive to their onset are largely limited to one of the three empirically 
observable scenarios.  And the configuration most likely to result in ethnic rebellion is 
the rarest due to its inherent instability.  To test the empirical support for these scenarios I 
once again employ the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Ethnic Armed Conflict (EAC) 
Datasets.
9
  These datasets are the best available to test these hypotheses.  To my 
knowledge, they are the most comprehensive attempt to code ethnic exclusion from state 
power, the political relevance of ethnicity, and the world’s civil wars, whether ethnic or 
not.  This ambitious undertaking represents a substantial improvement over the well 
known Correlates of War (COW) and Minorities at Risk (MAR) datasets, which do not 
distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts or limit their scope to those states 
with disenfranchised ethnic minorities, respectively.  Most importantly, the EPR allows 
the present analysis to move beyond simple demographic characteristics and actually 
examine the effect that varying levels of ethnic diversity within an excluded population 
has on the probability of ethnic rebellion.  
My findings suggest that ethnic fragmentation and unequal exclusion substantially 
aid in explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellion in a manner inspired by but contrary to 
GAO.  Conversely, although the logic of the original PAL argument holds, by allowing 
                                                 
9
 The version of the EPR I utilize is actually a combination of the EPR and Ethnic Armed Conflict Datasets 
provided by the Wimmer et al. (2009).  The original datasets  that make up this combined file can also be 
obtained via, Cederman, L. E., B. Min, and A. Wimmer. 2009. "Ethnic Power Relations Dataset." 
Dataverse Network, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796  and Cederman, Lars-Erik., Brian Min, and Andreas 
Wimmer. 2008. "Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset." Dataverse Network, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11797 
V1 [Version]. respectively.   
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for the ethnic fragmentation of the excluded population, the escalation of state sanctioned 
ethnic exclusion into ethnic rebellion is found to be less viable than previously thought.  
My results support the conclusion that the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population 
is an important structural resource that ruling elites marshal in their efforts to prevent the 
formation of a unified multi-ethnic opposition.  I thus explicitly follow in the footsteps of 
those arguing for ethnic-power relations approaches to ethnic rebellions (Cederman et al. 
2010; Wimmer et al. 2009).   In the process I respond to the critique leveled by GAO that 
ethnic rebellion is far more rare than grievance oriented explanations would suggest 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Laitin 2007).   
The Surprising Rarity of Ethnic Rebellion 
Similar to questions of ethnicity’s politicization and the development of ethnic 
exclusion, much of the ethnic violence and civil war literature has sidestepped addressing 
the limited frequency of ethnic rebellions in relation to the abundance of ethnic 
grievances found around the globe.  It is perhaps not surprising that the devasting human 
toll of ethnic violence has spurred attention to its roots rather than its rarity.  Yet Laitlin 
(2007) is correct in stressing that an adequate theory of ethnic violence must address its 
rarity.   
Below I will chart and contextualize the GAO school. I will show that the critique 
leveled by PAL provides a compelling rebuttal to GAO’s claim that ethnicity has no 
influence on the onset of anti-state violence.  Yet as currently constructed, PAL too falls 
short of adequately explaining the rarity of ethno-nationalist violence in the face of wide-
spread ethnic exclusion.  I then present my revision to the PAL approach and argue for 
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the inclusion of ethnic segmentation amongst the ethnically excluded population within 
the theoretical perspective.   
From its very beginning in the mid 1990s, GAO has stressed that anti-state 
violence is far more rare than the explanations debated have implied.  In fact, it was two 
empirically grounded observations, both of which directly challenged the theoretical 
expectations of the DBC and minority mobilization schools that motivated GAO’s early 
research.  First, if grievances play a central role fomenting ethnic violence as theorized by 
scholars (e.g Horowitz (1985), then the prevalence of such grievances worldwide should 
spur much more violence (for more on the fundamental logic of the minority-
mobilization school see, Gurr and Harff 1994; Harff and Gurr 2004).  Similiarly, if ethnic 
diversity were the central explanatory factor as premised by DBC (Smith 1987; Smith 
1991; Smith 1995; Smith 2003), then high levels of such diversity around the globe 
should spur more observable instances of violence  (see also, Calhoun 1997).   Thus, 
while the field as a whole witnessed the previously dominant primordialist position 
whither before social-constructivist criticisms, Fearon and Laitin charted a somewhat 
rogue approach attempting to explain the relative rarity of civil war and anti-state 
violence. 
GAO’s initial efforts to explain the rarity of ethnic violence focused on intra-
ethnic group dynamics.  Instead of focusing on the ethnic components of conflict, they 
attempted to demonstrate that the internal power-relations of ethnic groups tended to 
promote interethnic cooperation through such mechanisms as ‘in-group policing’ (Fearon 
and Laitin 1996).  Still grappling with the potential implications of “socially constructed” 
ethnic identities for the onset of ethnic violence, Fearon and Laitin’s (2000) meta-
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analysis of the field found little evidence that the social construction of ethnic identities 
actually contributed to ethnic violence.  In fact, their analysis showed that the only 
consistent link between the social construction of ethnicity and the onset of ethnic 
violence was through the efforts of political demagogues, in the Weberian sense of the 
term, to construct everyday primordialist ethnic narratives.   
Within the quantitative literature, the relevance of ethnicity in explaining civil war 
and violent insurgency had been fundamentally questioned.  Studies by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003; 2004) found that ethnic fractionalization, as 
measured by a state’s ethnic diversity, showed no evidence that ethnicity was linked to 
civil war and insurgent violence. Bolstered by these findings, Laitin (2007) made the 
following claims: (1) ethnicity was only a descriptive quality of some instances of anti-
state violence with no explanatory power; (2) grievances were far too common across the 
world to explain the relatively rarity of anti-state violence; and (3) opportunity structures 
that make anti-state violence feasible explain the onset of civil war and insurgent 
violence.   
Quantitative support for GAO, however, was not as uniform as Laitin’s (2007) 
classic book argued.  Other scholars indeed found evidence illustrating the link between 
ethnic fractionalization and insurgent violence.  Ethnic fractionalization was found to be 
a powerful predictor of ethnic civil war  (Sambanis 2001), low intensity conflicts (Hegre 
and Sambanis 2006), and secessionist conflicts (Buhaug 2006).  Nevertheless, amid the 
morass of contradictory findings, by the mid-2000s GAO  became the predominant 
explanation in the discipline.  Scholars on both sides argued, somewhat accurately, that 
opposing findings were the result of methodological inadequacies and the setting of poor 
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scope conditions.  Yet, as with so many academic debates, what the field really needed 
was better data.  
The Power and Legitimacy School: Bringing Ethnic Power Relations Back In  
In response to the fragmented debate, and a need for the necessary data to test 
elements of Wimmer’s (2002) theory, Cederman, Min, and Wimmer (2009; 2008) put 
together the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Armed Ethnic Conflict (AEC) Datasets.  
Although Wimmer’s (2002) theory was not widely known in quantitative circles at the 
time, the results of their analyses, based on this new data, created a sea change in the 
quantitative debate.  Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) addressed two critical issues 
plaguing quantitative analyses of ethno-nationalist violence.  First, where earlier 
quantitative studies had only poorly specified ahistorical mechanisms, such as primordial 
ethnic hatreds or organizational opportunity structures, their approach firmly situated the 
onset of ethnic violence within an historicized account of the nation-state system itself.  
For PAL, political modernity shifted the legitimacy of rule from divine right to ‘like over 
like’, the importance of popular political support continued to grow.  Where resources 
were limited and civil society was only weakly developed, the interrelated efforts of state 
and constituency building had a profound effect on the politicization of ethnicity and 
ethnic exclusion (Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).   
 To be sure, I have suggested substantial revisions to the specific structural 
constellations of resource abundance and state ethnic diversity that are empirically linked 
with the politicization of ethnicity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in chapters 2 and 
3.  Yet the basic escalatory of logic of Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion still 
holds.  PAL stresses that the primary motor of ethnic violence is to be found in the 
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constellations of ethno-political power relations between ethnic groups and the state.  Its 
primary contribution to the debate is a substantively robust and historically situated 
theoretical framework developed from qualitative case-study and comparative historical 
research.  
  PAL’s second major contribution is its relentless focus on measuring mechanisms 
and correctly indentifying scope conditions.  Rather than continuing to rely on 
demographic proxies (such as a state’s ethno-linguistic fractionalization) to gauge the 
importance of ethnicity on ethnic violence, its creation of the EPR allowed for the first 
direct quantitative measure of ethnic power relations not directly related to case selection.  
Although the widely used Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset improved our understanding 
of ethnic violence, it has remained focused solely on excluded ethnic minorities.  As a 
result, the dataset omitted those cases where an ethnic minority actually achieved a 
monopoly on power, or cases where several large ethnic groups exist in complex power-
sharing arrangements. Wimmer et al. (2009) point out that the MAR criteria excludes 
roughly fifty percent of cases included in the EPR.  Regrettably, this leads to research 
where the conditions linking ethnicity to insurgent violence are over specified and suffer 
from the effect of sampling on the dependent variable.   
 As a whole, previous quantitative work largely utilized ethnic diversity arguments 
unrelated to ethnic politics, depended on rough measures of ethnic diversity to measure 
such mechanisms, or relied on data that developed from scope conditions inconsistent 
with the identified research question.  In contrast, PAL’s response drew upon the EPR, 
which contained measures of ethnicity’s political relevance and directly measured ethnic 
group exclusion.  PAL combined the EPR and EAC, which coded the ethnic and non-
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ethnic characteristics, ethnic groups involved, and the secessionist/non-secessionist aims 
of the world’s conflicts from 1946 through 2005.  The result was data far stronger than 
that hitherto seen in the field. 
 Given the time and effort committed to theoretical development and the quality of 
the data marshaled by PAL, the resulting sea change in the field is not surprising.  
Contrary to GAO expectations, Wimmer et al. (2009) found that (1) ethnic rebellions 
increase in probability as the size of the excluded population increased; (2) ethnic 
infighting increases when the number of ethnic groups sharing power increases; and (3) 
incohesive states with shorter histories of indirect rule are more likely to experience 
secessionist conflicts.  Cederman et al. (2010) employed the group level version of the 
EPR and found that ethnic counter-elites are more likely to engage in ethnic rebellion (1) 
as exclusion increases; (2) their mobilization capacity increases; and (3) the more 
recently they had experienced previous conflict.  Rooted in excellent data, these findings 
demonstrate decisive evidence that constellations of ethnic power relations are 
fundamental in explaining the onset of ethnic violence.  By correctly specifying scope 
conditions, not over-aggregating types of ethnic conflict, and making a distinction 
between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, PAL demonstrates the variety of ways in which 
ethnic power relations contribute to different types of ethnic conflicts.  As such, PAL 
presents a fundamental challenge to GAO’s view that ethnicity is merely a descriptive 
quality in many cases of anti-state violence.   
 PAL’s results thus address two of the three critiques leveled by GAO. First, the 
evidence overwhelmingly contradicts the claim that ethnicity and ethnic power relations 
are not fundamentally relevant to explaining the onset of ethnic violence.  Second, the 
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evidence does suggest that ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts may share similar opportunity 
structures, such as recent violence.   However, on the third count, PAL falls short of 
explaining why ethnic violence and civil war are rare. 
Extending the Logic of Ethnic Infighting to Explain the Rarity of Ethnic Rebellions 
Although a formal explanation of the rarity of ethnic exclusion has not been posed 
by PAL, a simple extension of the logic explaining ethnic infighting provides an answer.  
Wimmer et al. (2009) hold that as the number of ethnically defined power sharing groups 
increases, the likelihood that one will choose to mobilize its ethnic base and violently 
attempt to gain inroads into state power also increases.  The theoretical reasoning behind 
this empirically supported expectation is twofold.  First, as the number of power-sharing 
partners increases, the possibility of shifting political alliances also increases.  Second,  
the larger the number of competing power-sharing groups, the greater the fear each of 
those groups have of losing their share of state power.   
This segmented center position is well supported by other research, which shows 
that power-sharing arrangements tend to be fundamentally unstable (Elkins and Sides 
2007; Elkins and Sides 2011).  Of course, resources also play an important role.  When 
resources are abundant, all ethnic groups have a strategic reason to “buy in” to a super 
ethno-nationalist identity.  A prime example of this type of case is Switzerland.  In this 
case, multiple ethnic groups share power in a state of democratized struggle.  There exists 
an abundance of public goods to appease all ethnic constituencies that results in a stable 
and strong multi-ethnic state.  However, the struggle over the balance of power between 
groups continues even in the presence of abundant resources.  It simply takes a different 
form. 
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When resources are scarce the divide between winners and losers in the power- 
sharing game becomes much more drastic.  As Wimmer (2002:93) so eloquently states,  
Where only one freeway can be built on the entire territory, where 
tribunals cannot handle the mountains of cases they are responsible for, 
where there are resources only for one reasonably good university, where 
police cannot possibly establish a well-staffed post in every neighborhood 
of the capital, favoritism solves the problem. 
 Every decision regarding the allocation of even minor state projects holds the seeds of 
profound political struggles because the outcome of each allotment has its corresponding 
winners and losers.  These struggles play their way out regardless of the resources at 
hand, but the presence of resources affords the possibility for compromise and a de-
escalation of tensions.  When resources are limited and absolute losers under the existing 
power-sharing system are predictable, each “partner” has little reason to completely buy 
in.  Instead, if the opportunity presents itself, ruling elites are often left in a situation 
where they feel no other choice but to mobilize their ethnic constituency and violently 
lay-claim to the state.    
The central point of importance in revisiting ethnic infighting is that a stable and 
unified state, in the presence of multiple ethnic groups, is extremely hard to achieve.  In 
such a situation, limited resources may make the formation of a stable unified state all but 
impossible. This logic is, of course, well developed byWimmer et al. (2009), but it is only 
applied to the onset of ethnic infighting.  However, there is no reason why it should not 
be extended to the formation of a unified excluded opposition.  The same structural 
difficulties faced in creating a unified stable state, in the face of multiple power-sharing 
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partners, are faced by those excluded groups attempting to develop a unified opposition 
to the regime in control of the state.   
Wimmer et al. (2009) are right to argue that as the size of the excluded population 
increases, the likelihood of ethnic rebellion also increases because the regime in control 
of the state is seen as less legitimate.  However, when the excluded population is 
ethnically fragmented, the lives of the various peoples often depend on the existence of 
unequal exclusion.  That is, members of excluded groups compete for the limited crumbs 
they can eke out of the current regime without inducing violent reprisal. The expectation 
that ethnic rebellions are more common as the proportion of the population that is 
excluded from state power increases assumes that the mechanisms of opposition are 
independent of the ethnic segmentation that makes up the ethnically excluded population.   
Theoretically, this seems to be an untenable assumption to be resolved empirically in the 
end. 
We can see that the logic explaining the onset of ethnic infighting should also 
explain why ethnic rebellions are so rare.  Should such a unified opposition overcome the 
obstacles and form, the leaders of its constituent members would be thrust into the same 
configuration of ethno-political power relations most likely to experience ethnic 
infighting.  The present Syrian civil war is a case and point.  The Bashir al-Assad regime 
has historically repressed any sign of dissent, while excluding multiple ethno-religious 
categories of peoples from access to the state.  An Alawite minority has held a monopoly 
on state power since the early 1970s.  For decades the strategy of divide and rule (or 
divisive exclusion) has held sway, as I posit in chapter 3.  However, the initial successes 
of the Arab Spring weakened the Assad regimes ability to prevent a semi-unified 
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opposition from coalescing.  Confronted with this systemic “world opening,” to borrow a 
term by John Foran (2005), the Syrian state found itself facing the most unified 
opposition it had seen since the regime’s rise to power.  Although the opposition to the 
Bashir al-Assad regime took to the streets in an initially peaceful protest, it soon clashed 
with harsh reality.  As the late civil rights activist Stokely Carmichael put it: ‘In order for 
nonviolence to work, your opponent must have a conscience.’   Resistance to oppression 
in the Syrian case has escalated into a violent civil war between the Assad regime and an 
opposition, which remains woefully fragmented along ethno-religious lines.  Thus, while 
a world historical moment opened to allow the excluded population of Syria to at least 
temporarily unite, the Assad regime’s legacy of divisive exclusion continues to haunt 
rebel forces.  Such forces continue to struggle against the Syrian state, while aspiring to 
hold their fragile alliance together. 
Given the high level of ethno-religious exclusion, the Syrian government’s 
capacity (with it dominant Alawite minority) to avoid ethnic rebellion as long as it did 
highlights the importance of including the ethnic segmentation of the excluded within an 
explanatory framework.  Individuals can see a government as illegitimate while fearing a 
potential alternative.  As chapter 3 stresses, the majority of the world’s states that exclude 
part of their populations along ethnic lines pursue either xenophobic exclusion or divisive 
exclusion.  Of these two scenarios, only the path of divisive exclusion entails a significant 
risk of ethnic rebellions, as it is characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity and 
limited resources.  The logic of ethnic infighting, which makes the formation of stable 
power-sharing regimes more difficult as the number of included ethnic partners increases, 
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also applies to the difficulties excluded counter-elites face in forming unified opposition 
movements.  The theoretical implications of this extension are provided in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
Extensions of the Power and Legitimacy School: 
 Explaining the Rarity of Ethnic Rebellion 
Explanation of Ethnic 
Rebellion 
Resources 
Size of 
Excluded 
Population 
Diversity of 
Excluded 
Population 
Probability of Ethnic 
Rebellion 
Power and Legitimacy 
School Expectation 
Limited High --- High 
Revised Expectations  
Institutionalized 
Repression  
Limited High High Low 
State Initiated Ethnic 
Civil War 
Limited High Low High 
   
A number of structural combinations have been omitted from Table 4.1 because 
they logically or empirically do not exist.  For example, while states in the modern 
political era with abundant national resources do tend to exclude small portions of their 
populations (i.e., xenophobic exclusion from chapter 3), they simply do not tend to 
exclude large sections of their populations.  Ethnic rebellions do not occur in these states 
because the excluded population is too small to mount a full scale rebellion and because 
the abundance of resources usually allows the ruling elite to extend the boundaries of 
state inclusion when necessary.  On the other hand, states with limited resources often do 
exclude vast swaths of their population and it is in these states that ethnic rebellions are 
most likely.  However, ethnic rebellions are not as likely as the original PAL explanation 
would expect.  States with large excluded populations that are also highly ethnically 
diverse should tend to avoid ethnic rebellions, as ruling ethnic elites endeavor to keep the 
various ethnic groups in near perpetual competition with one another through 
institutionalized repression.  Thus, as the number of ethnic groups that makes up a sizable 
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excluded population increases, the impact of excluding such groups on the likelihood of 
ethnic rebellion should actually decrease (Core Hypothesis).  As a result, states with 
large excluded and ethnically diverse populations should have a low likelihood of ethnic 
rebellion; while states with large excluded populations that are relatively homogenous 
should have a much higher likelihood.   
Empirical support of this chapter’s core hypothesis would explain the rarity of 
ethnic rebellions in a manner consistent with the PAL framework.  States with large 
ethnically homogenous populations excluded along ethnic lines tend to be the result of 
failed power-sharing arrangements. The group in power may have won the conflict that 
ensued from ethnic infighting, but the resulting state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is 
intrinsically unstable. These types of conflicts tend to burn themselves out in violent 
fashion with consequent “peace” built on the rubble.  
The Rwanda genocide offers an example of just such a case of “stability through 
blood.”  Conversely, states with large ethnically excluded and diverse populations have a 
much lower likelihood of ethnic rebellion, even though they perpetually sit on the edge of 
the abyss.  These states, locked in vicious cycles of institutionalized repression, depend 
on maintaining delicate balances of power between excluded ethnic groups. Similar to the 
‘systemic world opening’ discussed by Foran (2005), states usually require an exogenous 
shock that fundamentally alters the calculus of excluded ethnic elites regarding the risks 
and benefits of committing to an anti-state alliance.  These types of openings can also 
occur as a result of leadership transitions and other rare domestic shifts.  The critical 
point for the core hypothesis of this chapter is that increased ethnic exclusion does not 
always create fertile ground for ethnic rebellion.  Rather, the relationship between the 
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sizeable excluded populations and ethnic rebellion is contingent upon the ethnic 
segmentation of the excluded population. 
Data Measures and Methods 
To empirically test the core hypothesis of this chapter, I employ the Ethnic Power 
Relations (Cederman et al. 2009) (EPR) and Ethnic Armed Conflict (Cederman et al. 
2008) (EAC) Datasets.  The EPR and EAC contain data from 1946 through 2005 on the 
entire population of sovereign states that had an estimated population of at least 1 million 
people or a territorial area of at least 500,000 square kilometers.  This includes 7,155 
country-year observations for 155 post-independence sovereign states.  The present 
analysis is concerned with the onset of ethnic rebellion within states where ethnicity has 
already been politicized and at least one ethnic group is excluded from state access.   
In this regard, the EPR provides two critical measures.  First, it provides a 
measure of state sanctioned ethnic group exclusion.  Ethnic group exclusion is coded as 1 
if at least one ethnic group was categorically excluded from the executive state power 
along ethnic lines.  Although this measure is only one type of state based exclusion, it 
remains the best available measure in the field, and covaries with many other forms of 
formal state sponsored discrimination.  Wimmer et al. (2009) correctly argue that ethnic 
rebellions cannot occur where ethnicity has not been politicized.  However, a review of 
the types of conflict indicated in their typology suggests that ethnic rebellions cannot 
occur unless at least one ethnic group is excluded from state access along ethnic lines.  I 
thus restrict the sample of cases to those logically eligible to experience an ethnic 
rebellion, defined as states that have excluded at least one ethnic group from power.  
Setting the scope conditions in this manner leaves 4372 country-years for 116 post-
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independence states.  Similarly, the outcome variable is a measure of ethnic rebellions.  
To capture only ethnic rebellions, the outcome variable excludes all non-ethnic conflicts, 
and includes only ethnic conflicts that involved at least one excluded group in anti-state 
violence. Ethnic ingroup conflicts are excluded from the present analysis but the category 
of ethnic rebellions contains both secessionist and non-secessionist conflicts.
10
  Full 
descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix C. 
Explanatory Variables of Interest 
The two concepts of interest in this chapter are the relative size of the excluded 
population and the extent to which this population is ethnically segmented.  Consistent 
with PAL, I use the same measure of ethnically excluded population size as used by 
Wimmer et al. (2009).  The EPR measure consists of the proportion of the population that 
is excluded from executive power.  Due to the distribution of this variable, a natural log 
transformation was used.  To measure the ethnic segmentation of the excluded 
population, I employ a count of the total number of ethnically excluded groups.  This 
measure is similar conceptually to the number of ethnic-ingroups sharing power (used by 
Wimmer et al. to measure center segmentation in their analysis of ethnic infighting).  The 
core hypothesis being tested suggests an interaction effect between these two measures.  
Supporting evidence relies on an interaction term between the size of the excluded 
population and the number of ethnic groups contained therein.  The core hypothesis 
suggests that the effect of excluded population size on ethnic rebellion is contingent on 
the number of competing excluded ethnic groups.  Specifically, I expect that as the 
number of ethnic groups within the excluded population increases, the effect of ethnic 
                                                 
10
 The complete documentation on the coding procedures used in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset and 
Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset may be found at  http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2009/toc068.html) or 
http://www.princeton.edu/~awimmer/AppendixEthnicPolitics.pdf. 
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exclusion on ethnic rebellion will become smaller.  Operationally, this means the 
interaction term should be negative and significantly different from zero. Due to the 
dynamics of the binary logit model, the meaning of this interaction coefficient must be 
developed through predicted probability plots to determine the extent to which the data 
actually support the central hypothesis. 
Control Variables 
The first two control variables are the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
index  and GDP per capita.  DBC suggests that higher levels of ethnic diversity make 
ethnic rebellion more likely.  Although their mechanisms are not explicit, I include the 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index as my measure of ethnic diversity.  The ELF 
index measures the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who speak 
languages from different ethno-linguistic categories.  The overlap between ethno-
somatic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties is often substantial, but this is not 
always the case.  Still, given the central importance of language to ethnicity in general 
and the absence of multiple indicators, the ELF index offers a solid analytical tool to 
measure the general ethnic diversity of a state.  The inclusion of this measure provides a 
more specific test regarding the unique effects of ethnic exclusion relative to simple 
ethnic diversity.  GDP per capita has been  routinely shown to be associated with ethnic 
rebellion onset (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), and the abundance of resources available to 
elites plays a central role in the power and legitimacy school.  To measure the resources 
available to ruling elites I draw upon the same data utilized by Wimmer et al. (2009), and 
use gross domestic product per capita in 2000 U.S. Dollars.  Since economic 
development and the resources from which states can draw revenues, such as taxes, have 
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a strong thoeretical connection with overall GDP per capita, the measure is an obvious 
choice for the relative abundance or scarcity of resources available to ruling elites.  The 
GDP data used in the Wimmer et al. (2009) study grants an overall coverage of 99.6 
percent of sample.
11
  Excluded ethnic group competition exists regardless of the 
resources available to ruling elites, but only states with abundance resources can afford to 
expand state access and avoid the onset of ethnic rebellion.  GDP per capita is thus an 
essential control variable in this analysis. 
I also include a number of other substantive control variables, to account for other 
possible hypothesized effects from the broader literature.  The first of these deals with 
previous imperial history.  The measure is the proportion of a territory’s existance spent 
in colonial depndency or subject to some form of indirect rule between 1816 and their 
independence (Wimmer and Min 2006).  This variable is included to control for the 
possibility that the central mechanism in Hechter’s (2000) argument linking indirect rule 
to the onset of nationalist violence is at least partially active in the onset of ethnic 
rebellion.  The second substantive control variable is population size.  A key theoretical 
mechanism stems from the resource limitations elites face in their efforts to provide 
sufficient public goods, but it also follows from the difficulty of distributing these public 
goods.   It logically follows that the larger the excluded population, the more goods 
required by the state and the harder it is to adequately distribute them.  Wimmer (2002) 
also argues that the breakdown of new democracies can provide the impetus for ethnic 
exclusion if a party, once voted into power, realizes they can maintain power along 
                                                 
11
 Data for the GDP per capita measure was drawn primarily from the Penn World Table 6.2 (79 percent), 
World Bank World Development Indicators (3 percent), and the remainder calculated from growth rates 
taken from Fearon and Laitin’s dataset, with values extended back to 1946.  
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narrower ethnic lines.  Harff and Gurr (2004) also argue that government form can 
exacerbate ethnic tensions or play a role in allieviating them.  Although there are 
conflicting results in the literature regarding regime form, I include regime type to 
provide the most complete test of my cetral hypothesis.  The regime type measure I 
include are a set of dummy variables for democracy and anocracy derived from the Polity 
IV dataset.  Following Wimmer et al. (2009), I also use the +6 and -6 cut points to 
distinguish between democracies, anocracies, and autocracies. 
The final three control variables I include are proportion of mountainous terrain, 
barrels of oil per capita and recent instability. As disscussed early in the paper, Fearon 
and Laitin’s (2003)  insurgency model  posits that opportunity structures are the trigers of 
civil war, as opposed to grievances.  Since, studies in this area have not taken ethnic 
power relations into account in their models, it is possible that their measure of 
mountainous terrain was capturing some element of the ethnic exclusion variance.  
Although Fearon and Laitin do not expect that ethnicity plays a role in the onset of such 
conflicts, it is a central part of their theoretical perspective that both ethnic and non-
ethnic rebellions are brought about through similar opportunity structures.  If their 
hypothesis is supported, there is thus no reason that mountainous terrain should not 
demonstrate the expected positve relationship with increased ethnic rebellion.  However, 
if proportion of mountainous terrain does not receive empirical support as a predictor of 
ethnic rebellion, its significance in predicting ethnic exclusion in the previous chapter 
suggest that the Fearon and Laitin finding and theoretical interpretation of the proportion 
of mountainous terrain measure  requires some substantial reconsideration.   
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Following a similar line of argument, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posit a second 
type of opportunity structure in the form of lootable resources.  Buhaug (2006) has also 
argued that oil production is a critical resource because it is commonly controled by the 
state.  In these situations the control of the state becomes an even larger prize and is thus 
worth greater risk to monopolize.  It is more than plausible that competition over such 
resources could also raise ethnic tensions and provide grounds for ethnic rebellion 
(examples include pre-2011 Sudan, as well as the current conflict in Souther Sudan).  To 
control for this possibility I use the EPR’s oil production per capita variable, which is 
computed from data compiled and analyzed by Wimmer and Min (2006).  Weak states 
have also been shown to be linked to ethnic rebellion and non-ethnic rebellion (Fearon 
and Laitin 2004).  Here the logic is that weak states are less able to keep oppostition 
groups from organizing and the very perception of weakness makes the chances of a 
rebellion’s success seem more likely.  To account for this possibility, I follow Wimmer et 
al. (2009) and utilize a measure of recent regime change as a proxy for state stability.  
The stability measures was coded 1 if a state had experienced a change in their Polity IV 
rating of 3 or more points in the prior 3 years.  Otherwise the stability measure was coded 
zero. 
Modeling Approach 
  To carry out the actual analysis, I have followed the standard modeling approach 
in the literature for civil war onset and employ a binary logit model to regress my 
explanitory variables on a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for country-years in 
which a state was experiencing an ethnic rebellion. Unlike the politization of ethnicity 
and ethnic exclusion, the temporal variation of ethnic rebellion is much higher.  I account 
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for this increased variability by following the guidance offered by Beck, Katz and Tucker 
(1998).  As reccomended, I include a cubic spline peace-year spline and count variable 
indicating the number of years since a state last experienced an ethnic rebellion.  I also 
include a previous rebellion-year count total variable to further control for inertia effects.  
In addition to these temporal variables I also include a calander year variable to control 
for possible changes in the international political climate.  Like most other statistical 
models, binary logit has a number of assumptions which many datasets routinely violate.  
For example, it is well known that the repeated observations of the country-year format 
violate the independence of observations assumption.  To account for many of these 
possible violations I employ robust standard errors, and cluster them by sovereign state to 
specifically address the non-independence of cases within states.  Finally there has been 
some debate in the field about how to handle ongoing ethnic rebellions within the model, 
since they should not be counted a new onsets.  I present results from models which both 
include and exclude these ongoing conflicts, to demonstrate the robust quality of my 
results. 
Results: Explaining the Rarity of Ethnic Rebellion 
The results for both model specifications, including and excluding ongoing 
rebellion-years respectively, are presented in Table 4.2.  As excpected, the excluded 
group-population size interaction term is statistically significant (p≤.01) and negative in 
Model 1.    
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Table 4.2 
Binary Logit of Ethnically Excluded Population Size, Number of Excluded Ethnic 
Groups, Excluded Population-Group Interaction and Controls on Ethnic 
Rebellion
†
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Exclusion Variables
‡
    
     Number of Excluded  
     Ethnic Groups  
-0.056* -0.073* 
(0.023) (0.036) 
     Excluded Population Size 
0.357** 0.268 
(0.131) (0.151) 
     Excluded Population-Group 
     Interaction 
-0.043** -0.055* 
(0.015) (0.023) 
     GDP per Capita 
-0.385* -0.750*** 
(0.152) (0.224) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
0.613 1.503* 
(0.360) (0.617) 
     Imperial Past 
0.827* 1.069* 
(0.365) (0.524) 
     Oil Production per Capita 
0.001 0.012 
(0.016) (0.008) 
          Anocracy 
0.695* 0.851* 
(0.320) (0.353) 
          Democracy 
0.879** 0.492 
(0.337) (0.412) 
     Population 
0.143 0.163 
(0.093) (0.123) 
     Percentage of Mountainous 
     Terrain 
0.046 0.141 
(0.092) (0.114) 
     Recent Regime Change 
0.060 0.008 
(0.272) (0.291) 
     Ongoing War 
3.670*** 2.027*** 
(0.266) (0.361) 
Time Control Variables
‡‡
 Suppressed Suppressed 
Constant 
-5.311*** -8.761*** 
(0.973) (1.155) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -439.93306 -283.2758 
Wald χ
2
 (d.f.) 
43804.40*** 
(74) 
3400.36*** 
(61) 
N  
(Number of States) 
4372 
(116) 
3718 
(115) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, Percent of Mountianous Terrain and Excluded Population 
Size were used in the analysis. 
‡‡ For the sake of presentation, all time control variables, including the 59 calander year dummy variables, were 
suppressed from this table.  Please see Appendix C for full result tables. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
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Moreover, the coeficient is significant (p≤.05 for model 2) and negative in both models 
indicating that results are robust to both common model specifications in the field.  
Substantively, these results suggest initial support for my core hypothesis that the 
relationship of excluded population size and ethnic rebellion onset is contingent upon the 
amount of ethnic segmentation contained within the excluded population itself.  To better 
demonstrate the overall effect and implications of this result, I provide Figures 4.1 and 
4.2, which provide the predicted probabilities of ethnic rebellion for the commonly 
observed number of excluded ethnic groups, by size of the ethnically excluded 
population.  Although both graphs largely convey the same substantive story, there 
remain a few important differences between them that warrant some discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the predicted probabilities for the model 1, which includes 
all continuing rebellion years.  When the logged excluded population proportion is at its 
highest, the probability of ethnic rebellion decreases as the number of excluded ethnic 
groups increase.  At the 75
th
 percentile, there is a slight negative slope, which indicates 
that highest quartile states with the largest excluded populations is where ruling elites 
actually lower the probability of ethnic rebellion by keeping the opposition fragmented.  
Between the 75
th
 percentile and the 50
th
 percentile, the relationship between the number 
of excluded groups and ethnic rebellion shifts from negative to positive.  These results 
suggest that ethnic fragmentation of the excluded population only reduces the onset of 
rebellion when the ethnically excluded population is large.  The minimum and 25
th
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Figure 4.1, Model 1 Predicted Probability of Ethnic Rebellion by Size 
of Excluded population & Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups 
 
Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only.  Although care 
was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability 
and precision.  In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, 
and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score.    
Syria 
Central African Republic 
Kuwait 
Chad 
Togo 
Laos Honduras 
Mexico 
Iran 
Kenya Afghanistan DRC Sudan 
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percentile lines have been omitted because states with those levels of excluded 
populations only excluded between 1 and 5 ethnic groups.  Within this more limited 
range they follow the same positive pattern as the 50
th
 percentile line, but with lower 
starting positions commensurate with a smaller excluded population.  Results from 
chapter 3 suggested that states with high ethnic diversity and limited resources were very 
likely to commit to state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.  These results suggest that these 
same states decrease their risk of ethnic rebellion by maintaining large ethnically 
segmented excluded populations.  This pattern helps explain why the likelihood of ethnic 
rebellions is so low, above and beyond the pressures of other organizational opportunity 
structures.  These finding suggest that the population of states Wimmer et al. (2009) 
specifically target for being the most fertile soil for ethnic rebellions, are just those states 
that reduce their risk of ethnic rebellion the most by maintaining ethnically segmented 
excluded populations.  While it may be difficult for an ethnic minority to actually gain a 
strangle hold on the state, the fact that they are usually able to hold onto power while 
excluding broad swaths of their population along ethnic lines is not by simple 
coincidence.  Rather the evidence suggests that these most ethnically exclusive of states 
avoid rebellion through institutionalized repression meant to keep the ethnically excluded 
population in competition with one another.  The stability of these regimes is 
fundamentally rooted in their ability to prevent the formation of a unified opposition to 
the state.  The politicized ethnic boundaries between the groups making up the excluded 
population serves as a structural resource that allow ruling elites to achieve this goal.  
Results from model 1, thus, provide supporting evidence that the simple relationship 
between the size of the excluded population and the onset of rebellion is not always 
150 
 
positive.  Rather, the evidence powerfully indicates that the effect of excluded population 
size on the probability of ethnic rebellion is contingent upon the ethnic segmentation of 
the excluded population itself. 
 Although models 1 and 2 largely suggest the same story, there are some 
differences that should be noted.  Where model one includes all rebellion-years, years of 
continued rebellion are omitted from examination in model 2.  Similar to model 1, the 
ongoing war variable is included to indicate that there was a previous conflict underway, 
when a truly new ethnic rebellion began.  States that have been dropped due to continued 
conflict renter the model once all conflicts have ended.  They can thus experience a 
second failure.  The inclusion of the previous rebellion-years variable and clustering of 
standard errors allows the model to avoid seeing more ‘new’ ethnic rebellions than have 
actually occurred.  These changes produce two key differences in the predicted 
probability plots presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  Where model 1 produced predicted 
probabilities over .04, as Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the model 2 results all remain below 
.01.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
 
 
 
The fulcrum point of the graph also shifts from eight excluded ethnic groups in model 1, 
to five in model 2.  However, as the similar patterns shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
indicate, the results of model 2 suggest the same substantive conclusions as model 1.  The 
effect of excluded population size is at its highest when the number of excluded groups is 
lowest, and decreases as the number of excluded ethnic groups increases.  As shown in 
model 1, it is states in the upper quartile of excluded population size that gain the most 
resistance to ethnic rebellion by maintaining high levels of ethnic segmentation within 
their excluded population.  The results are thus robust to model specification.  These 
findings indicate that the effect of excluded population size on ethnic rebellion is 
contingent upon the number of excluded ethnic groups comprising excluded population.   
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Figure 4.2, Model 2 Predicted Probability of Ethnic Rebellion by Size 
of Excluded population & Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups 
 
Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only.  Although care 
was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability 
and precision.  In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, 
and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score.    
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The empirical results I present allow the power and legitimacy school to address 
the question of why ethnic rebellions are so rare.  Many of those states originally thought 
to be at the highest risk of ethnic rebellion under the original power and legitimacy theory 
actually have a much lower risk of rebellion.  Indeed the ethnic fragmentation that 
characterizes states with large excluded populations arguably played a decisive role in an 
ethnic minority achieving a monopoly over state power.  In these cases the ruling elite 
strive to cultivate the same conditions of ethnic mistrust that both allowed, and allow for, 
their continued domination.  Although the exclusion of a relatively large and ethnically 
homogenous group is the most likely way to foment an ethnic rebellion, empirical 
examples of these types of states are quite rare.  Much more common are states with 
relatively large excluded populations that are comprised of a moderate to large number of 
ethnic groups.  These states marshal the same structural factors that make high numbers 
of ethnic power sharing groups more likely to fall into ethnic infighting (Wimmer et al. 
2009), to their advantage.  By cultivating ethnic mistrust and politicizing ethnic 
differences between groups ruling elites prevent the mobilizations multi-ethnic 
opposition movements.  In doing so, they drive down the likelihood of ethnic rebellion in 
that set of states, commonly deemed most likely to experience a revolt. 
The predicted probability plots shown above utilize specific values.  However, the 
interaction between the percent of the population excluded and the number of excluded 
groups can be clearly seen through a three dimensional predicted probability scatter plot.  
This plot is useful for determining where the data are driving the findings and where 
further interpretation would be unwarranted extrapolation.  Figure 4.3 thus provides the 
predicted probabilities from model 1 by excluded groups, and excluded population size. 
153 
 
 
 
Consistent with results of the model, the probability of ethnic rebellion increases as the 
size of the excluded population increases.  As the bend, similar to lifting the corner of a 
piece of paper, demonstrates, however, the probability of ethnic rebellion drops as the 
number of excluded ethnic categories increases.  The number of excluded categories 
shown in the plot above has been capped at 20, which excludes three extreme cases.  
Although the data is sparse in some areas, the general shape of the plane driving the 
results rests upon the body of the data and not simply a few outliers or renegade cases.  
Where the data is “thickest” the expected relationship is well demonstrated.  The results 
thus strongly support my extension of Wimmer’s ethnic infighting mechanism to 
explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellions.  Where the ruling elite can take advantage of 
ethnic group competition between excluded groups and foment ethnic fractionalization, it 
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easier for them to avoid the kind of organized resistance that can lead to ethnic rebellion 
and civil war. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter extends the mechanism of center segmentation, developed by the 
power and legitimacy school to explain ethnic infighting, to also explain the relative 
rarity of ethnic rebellions.  The same factors that tend to make ethnically based power-
sharing systems of government more unstable as the number of partners increases, plays a 
similar role in preventing ethnically segmented excluded populations from mobilizing 
wide-spread multi-ethnic resistances to ethnically exclusionary regimes.  Difficulties in 
maintaining multi-ethnic alliances in the face of state efforts to cultivate ethnic mistrust, 
while subject to violent repression of even the smallest dissent, serve to make large scale 
ethnic rebellion less probable in precisely those states where such revolts are commonly 
theorized to be most likely.  Contrary to current views proffered by the power and 
legitimacy school of thought, larger ethnically excluded populations are not necessarily 
more likely to commit to a course of ethnic rebellion.  The relationship is actually 
contingent upon the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population.  Large ethnically 
excluded populations with limited ethnic segmentation are more likely to organize and 
violently rebel, than large ethnically excluded populations with high levels of ethnic 
segmentation. 
These results refine and extend previous insights offered by the power and 
legitimacy school of thought on ethnic rebellion in two ways.  First, these results offer an 
explanation of the relative rarity of ethnic rebellion that does not prematurely dispense 
with the theoretical role ethnic factors play in the onset of ethnic rebellion itself.  Second, 
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this extension makes the power and legitimacy and greed-and-opportunity schools the 
only approaches to address the structural factors that make ethnic rebellions so rare in the 
face of large scale exclusion.  To be sure, elements emphasized by the greed-and-
opportunity approach, such as weak states, conditions conducive to the successful 
evasion of government forces, and the presence of lootable resources may receive 
broader empirical support if measured with better data.  And these factors should 
theoretically be relevant for the onset of specifically ethnic rebellions.  However, the 
results presented here find greater empirical support for the position that the rarity of 
ethnic rebellion can be explained in the very logic of ethnic exclusion.  This argument 
rests on a combination of established observations within the discipline and the findings 
of this chapter.  First, ethnic rebellions are not logically possible in states where ethnicity 
has not been politicized, or ethnic exclusion has not occurred.  Within the modern 
political era only about 68 percent of the world’s states are therefore logically eligible.  
Second, states with relatively abundant resources can often extend inclusion and thus 
avoid ethnic rebellion.  Within the subsection of states with limited resources, states with 
(1) relatively small ethnically excluded populations are less likely to experience an ethnic 
rebellion, (2) large ethnically excluded populations, with high ethnic segmentation, are 
less likely to experience an ethnic rebellion, and (3) states with large ethnically excluded 
populations, with low levels of ethnic segmentation, are most likely to result in ethnic 
rebellion.  However, this third configuration is empirically rare, precisely because it is so 
prone to ethnic anti-state violence.  Contrary to the greed-and-opportunity claim that 
ethnicity is purely a descriptive element of some violent insurgencies and civil wars, my 
findings, in conjunction with other results from the power and legitimacy school, 
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compellingly suggest that the overall rarity of ethnic rebellions is to be found in the logic 
of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion itself.  My inclusion of excluded group ethnic 
segmentation thus allows the power and legitimacy framework to explain the overall 
rarity of ethnic rebellion onset, without resorting to the greed-and-opportunity solution of 
jettisoning the theoretical importance of ethnic power relations. 
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Chapter 5: Substantive Theoretical Extensions and Concluding Remarks 
 Substantive Theoretical Extensions 
 This dissertation identifies configurations of ethnic diversity that are structurally 
associated with three critical locations along the spectrum of ethnic tensions.  The 
institutionalization of ethnic politics, the emergence of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, 
and the onset of ethnic rebellion have been the three focal points of examination.  The 
evidence presented in chapter two suggests that the structural channeling effect of ethnic 
diversity on the politicization of ethnicity is contingent upon the resources available to 
state.  The results of chapter 3 show a similar contingent relationship between ethnic 
diversity, state resources and ethnic exclusion.  Chapter 4 rounds out the set of analyses 
by demonstrating the relationship between excluded population size and ethnic rebellion 
expected by the power and legitimacy school as actually contingent upon the ethnic 
fractionalization of the excluded population.  By also examining possible explanations 
from the diversity-breeds-conflict and greed-and-opportunity schools the dissertation 
further speaks to the limitations of these approaches while highlighting a few points 
where they continue to make important contributions.  Together, this set of results and 
findings, thus, both refines and extends previous insights articulated by the power and 
legitimacy school, and strengthens its place as the most comprehensive explanation of 
ethnic violence in the field.   
The politicization of ethnicity is the first element of the ethnic tensions spectrum 
examined.  A central mechanism in Wimmer’s (2002; 2013b) theory of nationalist 
exclusion and ethnic conflict holds that as the modern state has become more powerful 
and pertinent to the daily lives of individuals it has increasingly become the principal 
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prize in multi-ethnic ‘races for the state.’   The findings of chapter two add nuance and 
generalized evidence to this argument.  When the state is impoverished and on the brink 
of failure, higher levels of ethnic diversity tend to have little effect on the politicization of 
ethnicity.  However, politicized ethnic boundaries are more likely in states with higher 
levels of resources that represent more lucrative sources of public goods.  Strong states 
with abundant resources may be able to avoid ethnic rebellion, but the abundance of 
resources at the state’s command is directly related to the politicization of ethnicity.  A 
state’s various ethnic groups increasingly organize, my findings suggest, to ensure they 
are distributed their “fair share” of the public goods provided by the state, as the state 
increasingly has more public goods to distribute.  To my knowledge, the contingent effect 
of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity found in chapter two provides the first 
evidence supporting a generalization of this mechanism.  The contributions of chapter 
two are thus, two fold.  First, the results extend the power and legitimacy approach to 
include the importance of ethnic diversity as a structural factor in the politicization of 
ethnic boundaries.  And two, the results provide evidence that his theory regarding the 
state as the major prize of a multi-ethnic competition is generalizable beyond the cases of 
Iraq and Mexico, upon which it was founded.   
On the other hand, a number of mechanisms for the politicization of ethnicity did 
not receive empirical support.  Results showed no evidence that length of imperial or 
colonial domination generally played a role.  On the other hand, population size was 
found to be associated with the politicization of ethnicity.  This population size finding 
could be capturing ethnic diversity variance inherent in large states not captured by the 
linguistic foundation of the ethno-fractionalization measure.  Although included primarily 
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as a control, this population size finding requires further scrutiny.   Nevertheless, the 
findings of chapter two suggest that it is the resources and ethnic diversity of state, above 
and beyond population size pressures that play a fundamental role in motivating the 
politicization of ethnicity early on, thus laying the foundations for ethnic exclusion and 
ethnic violence.  If further research confirms these findings they also imply yet another 
difficulty that complicates the task faced by ruling elites attempting to maintain stability 
while pursuing strategies of development.  As the state becomes more powerful counter 
ethnic elites find it increasingly easier to mobilize their ethnic kin under the auspices of 
ensuring that they get their fair share of state spoils.  The importance of ethnically even 
development in those less developed states where ethnicity is not politicized would seem 
critically important. 
Similar to chapter two, chapter three extends and refines elements of Wimmer’s 
(2002) foundational framework in regard to ethnic exclusion, as well as providing 
empirical evidence in support of the generalization of mechanisms hitherto relying upon 
case based research on Iraq, Mexico, and Switzerland.  Chapter three completes the 
analytical separation between ethnicity’s politicization and state sanctioned ethnic 
exclusion, which have been largely conflated within the PAL school.  Once again my 
results point to the importance of including ethnic diversity amongst the structural 
concerns considered by ruling elites in the decision to commit to a course of ethnic 
exclusion.  In states where ethnicity is already politicized, ethnic exclusion, my findings 
show, is least likely in states that are very poor and have little ethnic diversity.  I label 
these types of states formally inclusive states since the public goods the state can 
distribute are extremely limited.   
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Contrary to theoretical expectations, high levels of ethnic diversity were not 
necessarily linked with decreases in the probability of ethnic exclusion when the 
resources available to the state were very high.  In these cases of multi-cultural inclusion 
I argued that very existence of the state is dependent upon such inclusion, since the 
legitimacy of every ethnic group’s claim to the public goods of the state simultaneously 
legitimates the claims of every other group. Equally essential is that resources are 
abundant enough for reasonable compromise to prevail.  However, results only 
demonstrated limited empirical support for this outcome.  In some ways this was not 
completely surprising.  There is a rich literature lamenting the instability of states with 
power sharing arrangements.  Although findings were directionally consistent with the 
multi-culturally inclusive scenario, the effect size was substantively small.  The theory 
explaining the existence of states, such as Switzerland, may yet hold, but due to their 
extremely limited number simply elude traditional large N quantitative techniques.  
Indeed the further examination states with abundant state resources and high ethnic 
diversity that have eluded ethnic exclusion remains an important lacuna for future 
research. 
The results provided in chapter three also suggest that those states most likely to 
engage in state sanctioned ethnic exclusion tend to follow patterns of xenophobic or 
divisive exclusion.  Xenophobic exclusion occurs in states with abundant resources and 
limited ethnic diversity, where as divisive exclusion is characterized by limited resources 
and high levels of ethnic diversity.  The overwhelming presence of xenophobic exclusion 
around the globe provides compelling evidence of how ruling elites, as all social actors, 
are historically and culturally situated.  Simply put, the ability to provide public goods to 
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the entirety of a state’s population does not mean that they will necessarily do so.  Ethnic 
minorities often have to mobilize in protest before they are granted full inclusion within 
these states.  The abundance of resources available to the state in these cases is usually 
sufficient to allow for the inclusion of these excluded ethnic minorities and prevents the 
escalation of protests into full ethnic rebellions.  Additionally, such protests rarely 
organize in an effort to monopolize the state, but rather press for greater equality in 
access and the rights of full citizenship within the state apparatus.  This is an important 
distinction, since it leaves open the possibility of compromise. 
As already referenced, chapter 3 also provides evidence for a second, and far 
more dangerous, ideal typical structural configuration, which tends to promote state 
sanctioned ethnic exclusion in what I label a divisive exclusion scenario.  These cases 
generally occur in states with high ethnic diversity and limited resources.  In such 
circumstances power sharing arrangements have been found to be fundamentally unstable 
(Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton, and Chernykh 2010; Elkins and Sides 2007).  When an ethnic 
minority in these situations is able to achieve a monopoly over the state they tend to, (1) 
actively oppress any form of dissent and (2) intentionally sow seeds of distrust amongst 
excluded ethnic groups, in an effort to prevent the formation of a unified multi-ethnic 
opposition to the regime.  The stability of these states depends on maintaining the status 
quo.  Any quasi-exogenous shock, either foreign or domestic, can have a devastating 
outcome.  When such shocks either weaken the regime’s ability to repress dissent, or 
motivate fragmented opposition groups to overcome their differences, the outcome is 
often violent and bloody.  Those supporting the regime fear reprisal from the opposition 
if the regime falls and thus tend to encourage the regime to bitterly resist.  On the other 
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hand, the legacy of ethnic fragmentation cultivated by the ruling elite is not often truly 
overcome, but rather temporarily smoothed over.  Those with control of the state 
apparatus and the modern machines of war, thus tend to up the cost of dissent even 
further by turning their military forces against the organized resistance.  Once this line 
has been crossed, the state is all but thrown into the abyss.  Rebel forces are often 
inclined to fight to the bitter end, since surrender likely means death, and the regime is 
equally fearful of the outcome should they lose.  Divisive exclusion is thus the most 
dangerous form of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion because these states do not have the 
resources to include the entirety of their population, and their very stability is predicated 
on the ethnic divisiveness and fragmentation that simultaneously hold them perpetually 
on the precipice of disaster. 
Although Wimmer’s (2002) theoretical framework argues that ethnic exclusion 
occurs most often in states with limited resources, my findings suggest that xenophobic 
exclusion is the dominant type of state sanctioned exclusion around the globe.  However, 
Wimmer’s theoretical rendering of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion most similarly 
resembles the divisive exclusion scenario without the emphasis on the structural influence 
of ethnic diversity.  Chapter three thus makes two substantive contributions to field.  
First, the results of chapter three further refine Wimmer’s theoretical approach by 
incorporating the ethnic diversity as a structural factor considered by ruling elites 
regarding the decision to commit to ethnic exclusion.  Second, while the chapter suggests 
some revisions to the power and legitimacy framework, it nevertheless remains 
thoroughly situated within the school.  The findings of chapter three therefore provide 
evidence generalizing a modified version of Wimmer’s (2002) theoretical approach 
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concerning the emergence of ethnic exclusion.  To date, the nation-state formation and 
ethnic violence portions of his theoretical framework have evidence for their 
generalizability beyond the cases upon which they were initially based (Wimmer, 
Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010), and the 
findings of chapter three are, to my knowledge, the first evidence supporting the 
generalization of power and legitimacy arguments regarding the formation of state 
sanctioned exclusion.  Chapters two and three thus continue in the footsteps of these 
scholars and continue the systematic empirical evaluation of Wimmer’s (2002) 
foundational theoretical perspective. 
Although the dissertation has been focused on extending the power and 
legitimacy approach, potentially important variables from both the GAO and DBC 
schools were included in the chapter 3 analysis of ethnic exclusion.  Democracies were 
indeed found to be less likely to commit ethnic exclusion than were autocracies, which is 
in line with original expectations of the DBC approach.   Imperial history and oil 
production showed no relationship to the onset of ethnic exclusion.  Interestingly, 
however, the mountainous terrain measure, argued to provide additional opportunities for 
anti-state insurgents to organize by the GAO school, was found to be positively related to 
ethnic exclusion. This finding raises questions about what exactly the percentage of 
mountainous terrain is exactly a proxy measure of.  It may be the case the this 
mountainous terrain measure was actually capturing cultural differences between 
mountain and non-mountain dwelling peoples within states, or possibly the difficulty of 
providing equal access to the states public goods over rough terrain.  Either way, the role 
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of mountainous terrain in the formation of ethnic exclusion requires further theoretical 
and empirical examination moving forward. 
Having addressed the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion in chapters 
two and three, chapter four turns to question of why ethnic rebellions are so rare.  An 
original observation within the greed-and-opportunity school, the rarity of ethnic 
rebellion in the face of widespread grievances around the globe motivated its examination 
by the GAO.  In fact, the rarity of ethnic rebellion has only been seriously addressed by 
GAO scholars.  The lack of explanation of ethnic rebellion’s rarity from the PAL 
represents a significant blind spot in the approach.  Although, I disagree strongly with 
Laitin’s (2007) conclusion that the widespread nature of ethnic grievances cannot explain 
a relatively rare event like ethnic rebellion, the foundational puzzle of why there are not 
more rebellions when grievances are so abundant remains an important academic 
question.  Any solid explanation of ethnic rebellion must explain this part of the ethnic 
violence puzzle. 
In chapter four, I extend the Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) argument 
regarding the emergence of ethnic infighting, to explain the structural difficulty of 
forming a unified multi-ethnic opposition within states characterized by divisive 
exclusion.  Wimmer et al. (2009) find that as the number of ethnic groups sharing power 
increases, the likelihood of violent ethnic infighting also increases because it is easier for 
political alliances to shift.  They call this ‘center segmentation.’  Wimmer et al, (2009) 
also find that the larger the ethnically excluded population, the higher the probability of 
an ethnic rebellion.  I extend the logic of center segmentation to explain the rarity of 
ethnic rebellion.  Under the auspices of a regime committing ethnic group exclusion, my 
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findings show, the likelihood of ethnic rebellion increases substantially as the size of the 
excluded population increases, unless the excluded population is ethnically fragmented as 
well.  Once again, I find evidence of a contingent relationship between the ethnic 
diversity and the outcome of interest.  The results of chapter four clearly indicate that 
when the excluded population is large and the ethnic diversity of the excluded population 
is low, the probability of ethnic rebellion is at its highest.  This effect diminishes as the 
number of excluded ethnic groups increases.  Alternatively, when the size of the 
population is smaller increases in the number of excluded ethnic groups actually increase 
the likelihood of ethnic rebellion.  Chapter four thus suggests that the same structural 
logic at play in the instability of power sharing regimes, also explains why ethnic 
rebellions are so rare. States can forestall large scale unrest from a large excluded 
population to the extent that they are able to maintain and cultivate a culture of ethnic 
mistrust amongst a number of competing ethnic groups. 
Contrary to the assumptions of the GAO school, ethnic fractionalization is thus 
essential to explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellions.  Although Wimmer et al. (2009) 
rightly point out that the state is not an ethnically neutral actor in their explanation of 
ethnic rebellion, they do not sufficiently develop the extent to which an ethnically un-
neutral state can usefully escalate the ethnic tensions between excluded ethnic groups to 
their benefit.  The findings of chapter four thus suggest empirical evidence for a revision 
of the Wimmer et al. (2009) configural institutional model of ethnic violence that allows 
it to also explain the rarity of ethnic rebellions in states where a large proportion of the 
population is excluded along ethnic lines.  As Wimmer et al. (2009:335) maintain, the 
state “is both the prize over which contending political actors struggle and a power 
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instrument for those who have control it.”  The principal substantive contribution of 
chapter four is that it demonstrates that when ethnic boundaries are politicized and ethnic 
groups excluded from state access, it is not just the ethnic excluded-included divide that 
matters for explaining ethnic rebellions but also the multiple excluded-excluded 
politicized ethnic boundaries that result in the ethnic fragmentation of the oppositional 
body politic. 
Although the results expected by the GAO and DBC approaches are mixed at 
best, there are nevertheless a few findings worth noting.  Consistent with the minority-
mobilization element of the DBC, government form is shown to have a relationship with 
rebellion onset.  Both rebellion models indicate that anaocracies are more likely than 
autocracies to experience anti-state insurgents.  However, consistent with other findings 
in the field, the relationship between democracy and anti-state violence continues to 
experience mixed support as the relationship expected by the DBC school was not robust 
to both model specifications.  Additionally, where imperial history was not found to 
influence the politicization of ethnicity or ethnic exclusion, it was found to be positively 
related to ethnic rebellion onset in both model specifications, which is consistent with the 
findings of Wimmer et al. (2009).  Finally, the GAO expectation that mountainous terrain 
increased opportunities for insurgents to organize thus increasing the likelihood of violent 
insurgency was not empirically supported.  This lack of support, combined with the 
significant relationship found in chapter 3 between mountainous terrain and ethnic 
exclusion suggests that this particular opportunity structure is most likely operating as 
theorized by GAO scholars.  Further research is required in regards to government form, 
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imperial history, and mountainous terrain to better understand the mechanisms at work 
behind these relationships. 
Concluding Remarks on an Emerging Practical Qualitative-Quantitative Dialogue 
Within the Field 
As a whole, this dissertation also contributes to an emerging brand of scholarship 
that takes the potential fruits of a multi-method dialogue concerning the origins of ethnic 
rebellions and civil war seriously.  Although multi-method dialogues are almost 
common-place in many research fields, this has not been the case within area of conflict 
studies, debates over the rise of nationalism or nation-state formation.  The intrinsically 
historical quality of these questions placed such scholarship squarely in the crossfire of a 
qualitative/quantitative methodological debate focused on firm theoretical and 
ontological differences (for a solid review of both sides see Abbott (2001), and 
Goldthorpe (2000)).  In a rare move across the methodological aisle, Andreas Wimmer, 
has taken steps to systematically test the generalizability his 2002 theory of nationalist 
exclusion and ethnic conflict within a quantitative framework.  Between to 2006 and 
2010, he and colleagues quantitatively examined segments of his theory addressing the 
rise of the nation state and the rise of nationalism (Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and 
Feinstein 2010), as well as the link between ethnic exclusion and ethnic violence 
(Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009).  In doing so, what I have come to describe 
as the power and legitimacy school has organically arrived at a sensible and pragmatic 
solution to the polemical methods debate that dominated the 1990s.  To be sure, there is 
less resistance to this move from quantitative circles than qualitative circles, given 
historical sociology’s rich tradition of ideographic research and its sometimes substantial 
168 
 
aversion to the aim of generalization.  Nevertheless, the organic emergence of this 
methodological third way over the last eight years within this area of research represents 
an approach to scholarship committed to the collaborative accumulation of knowledge 
that I hope can provide a working example for others in the discipline.  Indeed, given the 
profound influence this vein of research has had on my professional development and the 
extent to which it has motivated this dissertation, I would feel remiss if I did not take this 
opportunity to properly highlight the importance of continuing this multi-method 
collaboration. 
The heated methods debate of the 1990s essentially burned itself out without ever 
really arriving at any solid consensus.  Although this is not the place for an extensive 
review of these debates, one central element of them is particularly relevant here.  As 
Steinmets (2004) has clearly shown, the qualitative v. quantitative debates were actually 
between, four camps of scholars: quantitative scholars arguing against the usefulness of 
historical projects within the social sciences (for a review see, Goldthorpe 2000), a 
historical narrative approach to explanation rather than causation (for a review see, 
Abbott 2001),  the classic comparative historical school (for a review see, Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003) and those ultimately arguing that every historical case is so unique 
that the broad comparisons found in the scholarship profoundly suffer from a fatal 
‘incommensurability’ of case problem (the position taken by the classic historian). As can 
be seen from the well known reviews of each approach, the debate did little to change the 
minds of their opposing colleagues but did much to articulate the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach.  Thus, while many fields outside those traditionally 
deemed historical and comparative in content have developed a strong and productive 
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engagement between quantitative and qualitative scholars (Amenta 2003), the wide-
spread emergence of such productive dialogues within the fields which originated the 
methods debate have largely failed to materialize. 
The conflict literature sits at a relative unique intersection within the context of 
these methodological divides.   The seminal works of Ernest Gellner (2006) and Donald 
Horowitz (1985) and Hechter (2000) on one side, with scholars, such as James Fearon 
and David Laitin (1996), and Nicholas Sambanis (2001) building upon the legacy of early 
quantitative scholarship made possible by the vision of Robert Gurr’s Minorities at Risk 
project (begun in 1985) on the other.  For the most part, as one might expect given the 
sometimes polemical methodological battles that raged during the decade of the 1990s, 
these literatures have largely existed in parallel and barely interacted.  A quick glance at 
the reference sections of either and it is clear they were not really speaking to one 
another.  Even as a debate regarding whether ethnicity was actually a causal factor in the 
onset of ethnic rebellions and violent insurgency within the quantitative literature, 
qualitative scholars simply continued to probe the links between ethnicity and conflict 
(Budryte 2005) or, for example, democracy and  genocide (Mann 2005).   
The power and legitimacy response to the increasingly popular GAO approach to 
explaining ethnic rebellions represented a second push from Andreas Wimmer and 
colleagues to cross the methodological divide and champion a broad qualitatively 
developed theoretical perspective within the quantitative debate.  Rather than attempt to 
bring multiple methods into a single study, the collaboration between scholars within the 
power and legitimacy school has sought to systematically apply the strengths of 
quantitative techniques in assessing the level of empirical evidence for portions of 
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Wimmer’s (2002) foundational theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence.  
Rather than pursue a line of inquiry that solely adds additional case based and 
comparative research in the, truly impressive, style of John Foran (2005), this ambitious 
research agenda has resulted in the consultation of regional and country specific experts 
in the coding of new datasets (Cederman et al. 2009; Cederman et al. 2008) aimed at 
explicitly measuring specific theoretically important mechanisms.
12
  Within such a 
framework, the strengths of a multitude of scholars can be harnessed toward the goal of 
expanding our knowledge of ethnic violence and civil war.    
Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012), for example, use game theoretic techniques 
drawing on historical data from the French and Ottoman empires to demonstrate the 
importance of civil society development in the emergence of the nation-state, while 
Wimmer and Feinstein’s (2010) quantitative analysis found that nation-state formation 
was associated with the break-up of empires in manners consistent with theory.  Of 
course, not all findings support theoretical expectations.  Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) 
also found no evidence for their expected world-polity isomorphic borrowing effects, 
raising questions about that portion of the Wimmer theory of nationalist exclusion and 
ethnic violence.  In proceeding in this fashion, power and legitimacy scholars have 
harnessed the strengths of quantitative research techniques in assessing the existence and 
strength of empirical evidence supporting specific and well specified theoretical 
expectations.  In short, rather than attempt some grand definitive multi-method project, 
they have opted to pursue a steady and pragmatic middle course and develop an 
                                                 
12
 The citation of John Foran’s (2005) analysis of social revolutions is not meant to slight his impressive 
and comprehensive work, as the absolute frequency of social revolutions is far smaller than ethnic 
rebellions and quantitative techniques are truly not applicable.  A rich comparative analysis of ethnic 
rebellions within a Boolean framework would no doubt yield substantial insight. 
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overwhelming body of evidence supporting the explanatory endeavor from both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses. 
In regards to this emerging trend within the power and legitimacy school, this 
dissertation, in many ways simply continues along this emergent course.  Yet, on the 
whole, this dissertation makes one other small but significant contribution. By extending 
my analysis of ethnic rebellion to include examinations of ethnicity’s politicization and 
state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, my results also provide an example of the benefits to be 
gained from engagement between quantitative and qualitative scholarship. The primary 
finding from this dissertation speaking directly to this point concerns the influence of 
mountainous terrain on any rebellion type expected by the GAO school of scholars.  The 
quantitative questions that emerge from the power and legitimacy school carry a similar 
tone and timbre to those of the greed-and-opportunity school, with the exception that the 
latter emerges from within a broader qualitatively derived theoretical framework while 
the latter has been satisfied to largely limit their debate with other quantitative 
scholarship.  The broader contribution of this dissertation therefore lays in clearly 
demonstrating the dangers of failing to adequately take advantage of this wealth of 
qualitative scholarship.     
Fearon and Laitin (2003) specifically argue that grievances are ubiquitous and 
that it is the opportunity structures that make violent insurgency viable that lead to the 
outbreak of rebellion.  In many respects this position may be true.  Indeed, the goal of 
explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellion, and rebellions in general is a truly important 
question since, as they rightfully argue, existing theories of ethnic violence expect far 
more ethnic violence than empirically occurs.  However, they continue on and make the 
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claim that ethnicity is not actually relevant in the emergence of anti-state conflicts 
commonly deemed ethnic in nature (for a review of the position see Laitn 2007).  Their 
2003 argument and 2007 rebuttal demonstrate a firm disengagement if not disregard, for 
the qualitative scholarship on the issue, which, when referenced, is argued to see ethnicity 
as causal everywhere. 
As I show in chapter 4, however, when one takes the broader processes linked to 
the escalation of ethnic tensions seriously, the dynamics of ethnic power relations 
themselves explain the overall rarity of ethnic violence.  Yet, more importantly, the 
mountainous terrain measure, argued to measure an opportunity structure easing the 
organization of anti-state insurgencies by the GAO approach, was not shown to be related 
to the onset of ethnic violence while it was shown to be related to ethnic exclusion.  The 
basic claim that opportunity structures which favor anti-state insurgents should increase 
both ethnic and non-ethnic rebellions alike seems abundantly plausible.  Thus, if the 
mountainous terrain measure was indeed tapping the mechanism argued for by Fearon 
and Laitin (2003), then it should remain active in an analysis of ethnic rebellion onset.  
My results simply do not support this conclusion.  Rather, they actually tie mountainous 
terrain to the onset of ethnic exclusion, suggesting that the measure is actually tapping 
some kind of ethnic tension or public goods distribution variance, inconsistent with the 
GAO school’s broader claims about the role of ethnicity.  The ability of the present 
analysis to demonstrate this weakness of the mountainous terrain finding within the GAO 
approach rests firmly in theoretically situating ethnic rebellion within the broader 
spectrum of ethnic tensions; a practice which qualitative scholars seem to excel.  To be 
sure, my argument is not against the basic position of the GAO school regarding the role 
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of opportunity structures.  Indeed, I am sympathetic to the argument that opportunity 
structures which ease the organization of insurgencies are an important explanatory part 
of the anti-state violence puzzle.  As my results concerning the role of mountainous 
terrain demonstrate, when the body of qualitative scholarship is ignored or dismissed the 
resulting claims can easily be overdrawn.  Quantitative scholarship on ethnic violence or, 
more broadly, any type of anti-state violence that fails to draw from the extensive 
qualitative work on the subject does so at its peril.  In the case of the GAO school, a 
general lack of engagement with the qualitative scholarship on the issue has resulted in a 
narrow focus on the immediate causes of violent onset, which obscured the relationship 
between mountainous terrain and ethnic exclusion.  These types of oversights within the 
quantitative scholarship on anti-state violence are much more likely to be avoided 
through consistent and sustained engagement with the relevant qualitative scholarship. 
Wimmer’s foundational theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict 
represents the most robust, theoretically deep, and historically situated theory of ethnic 
violence and civil war in the field.  Over the last decade scholars have subjected the 
elements of this theory regarding state formation and the rise of the nation-state (Wimmer 
and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010) and ethnic violence (Cederman et al. 2010; 
Wimmer et al. 2009) to quantitative scrutiny.  As a byproduct of their efforts, power and 
legitimacy scholars are starting to accumulate a sizeable body of scholarship 
demonstrating the rich benefits to be had by engagement across the methodological aisle. 
By addressing the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, the results of this 
dissertation, as a whole, thus contribute to a small but growing body of quantitative 
scholarship committed to the production of historically situated and bounded research.  
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The inter-method dialogue promoted within the power and legitimacy school nevertheless 
remains in its infancy.  Nevertheless, it is my hope that it may yet continue to thrive and 
bloom.  The quantitative element of scholarship on conflict and civil war can only be 
bettered through a full engagement with its qualitative sibling.  The dialogue between 
quantitative and qualitative scholarship that has come to define the power and legitimacy 
school approach to scholarship is beginning to bare productive fruits that could, and I 
hope will, be usefully extended and embraced by those hailing from alternative 
theoretical perspectives within the field.  
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Appendix A 
Descriptive statistics for the data used in chapter 2 are provided in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Substantive Variables Used in Chapter 2 
Variable Name 
Mean/ 
Proportion 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Ethnicity Politically 
Relevant 
.821 --- 0 1 7138 
Lagged LnGDP per 
Capita 
1.178 1.145 -3.580 4.703 6955 
Lagged Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
.381 .285 .001 .925 6997 
Lagged GDP-ELF 
Interaction 
.335 .475 -1.468 2.526 6952 
Lagged Imperial Past .475 .315 0 1 7000 
Lagged LnPopulation 
Size 
9.188 1.390 5.581 14.076 7060 
Year 1979 16.508 1946 2005 7155 
Previous Politicized 
Ethnicity Year Count 
21.009 17.798 0 59 7155 
Prior Non-Politicized 
Ethnicity Year Span 
4.283 11.358 0 59 7138 
Non-Politicized Ethnicity 
Year Spline 1 
-5923.626 23606.72 -205379 0 7138 
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Full chapter two model results with time control parameter estimates provided in 
Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. 
Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF 
Interaction and Controls on the Political Relevance of Ethnicity
†
 
 Full Model 1 Full Model 2 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Politicization Variables
‡
   
     GDP per Capita 
0.207 -0.388 
(0.162) (0.245) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
2.894** 2.566* 
(1.087) (1.021) 
     GDP-ELF 
     Interaction 
 3.279*** 
 (0.771) 
Other Control Variables   
     Imperial Past 
0.363 0.289 
(0.552) (0.565) 
     Population 
0.334* 0.408* 
(0.170) (0.161) 
Time Control Variables   
     5-Year period:1950   
          1955 
1.448* 1.380* 
(0.624) (0.559) 
          1960 
0.224 0.260 
(0.591) (0.587) 
          1965 
-0.165 -0.064 
(0.589) (0.550) 
          1970 
0.315 0.181 
(0.705) (0.668) 
          1975 
0.314 0.115 
(0.791) (0.762) 
          1980 
1.479 0.727 
(2.463) (1.937) 
          1985 
7.189 6.127 
(5.199) (4.610) 
          1990 
13.079 12.364 
(18.646) (8.792) 
          1995 
-1.380 -1.692* 
(0.730) (0.785) 
          2000 
0.173 -0.040 
(0.972) (1.091) 
          2005 
1.338 1.047 
(0.858) (0.894) 
     Previous Politicized  
     Ethnicity Year Count 
0.096* 0.101* 
(0.048) (0.043) 
     Prior Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Span 
-3.192 -3.026 
(1.904) (1.744) 
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     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 1 
-0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.000) 
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 2‡‡ 
  
  
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 3‡‡ 
  
  
Constant 
0.127 
(21.906) 
-0.792 
(1.346) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -86.9915 -84.2645 
Wald χ
2
 
2035.97*** 
(18) 
1156.53*** 
(19) 
N  
(Number of States) 
6935 
(153) 
6935 
(153) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, was used in the analysis. 
‡‡The Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Spline 2 and 3  were dropped due to colinearity which suggests only one knot 
between the beginning and end points of the data.   
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
An argument has been made that a single interaction coefficient is not sufficient 
to test the four core hypotheses in chapter two.  As a robustness check I present three 
alternative model specifications which explicitly test the hypothesized non-linear effect 
of ethnic diversity on politicized ethnicity for both abundant and limited resources.  Two 
interaction terms are included which consist of the original interaction term multiplied by 
a dummy variable indicating abundant resources and a dummy variable indicating limited 
resources.  For this model specification the GDP and ELF index variables have been 
standardized.  The results of this type of model specification are sensitive to what is 
defined as abundant and limited resources.  For example, states at mean levels of GDP 
per capita may have fewer resources than the richest states but they may yet have enough 
to avoid the problems faced by states with extremely limited resources.  I thus define the 
cut point between abundant and limited resources at -1 standard deviation, the mean, and 
1.5 standard deviations GDP per capita.  Due the specification of the four core 
hypotheses would be empirically supported it both interaction terms are significant and 
positive.   
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As Table 2.4 illustrates, the interaction terms of interest are both significant and 
positive in the -1 standard deviation centered and the 1.5 standard deviation model as 
expected.  The non-significant result for the interaction-high variable in the mean 
centered model occurs because the effect of limited resources is empirically restricted to 
the very poor states.  All these models tell the same substantive story as those presented 
in the body of chapter 2. 
Table 2.4. 
Binary Logit of Standarized GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, 
GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on the Political Relevance of Ethnicity
†
 
 -1 Std Centered 
Model 
Mean Centered 
Model 
1.5 Std Centered 
Model 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Politicization Variables
‡
    
     GDP per Capita 
0.915*** 0.897** 0.976** 
(0.244) (0.217) (0.214) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
1.840*** 2.052** 1.836** 
(0.324) (0.409) (0.336) 
     GDP-ELF 
     Interaction-Low 
1.140*** 1.282** 1.078** 
(0.289) (0.368) (0.263) 
     GDP-ELF 
     Interaction-High 
0.856* 0.500 0.938* 
(0.351) (0.528) (0.383) 
Other Control Variables    
     Imperial Past 
0.237 0.189 0.283 
(0.591) (0.576) (0.564) 
     Population 
0.403* 0.397* 0.406* 
(0.157) (0.159) (0.160) 
Time Control Variables    
     5-Year period:1950    
          1955 
1.417* 1.417** 1.379* 
(0.570) (0.546) (0.557) 
          1960 
0.259 0.279 0.264 
(0.588) (0.588) (0.584) 
          1965 
-0.048 -0.061 -0.069 
(0.548) (0.554) (0.551) 
          1970 
0.145 0.129 0.175 
(0.668) (0.676) (0.668) 
          1975 
0.078 0.012 0.115 
(0.758) (0.770) (0.761) 
          1980 
0.735 0.683 0.724 
(1.948) (1.966) (1.940) 
          1985 6.135 6.087 6.125 
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(4.585) (4.552) (4.601) 
          1990 
12.404 12.322 12.381 
(8.483) (8.431) (8.915) 
          1995 
-1.715* -1.766* -1.698* 
(0.756) (0.785) (0.787) 
          2000 
-0.060 -0.114 -0.034 
(1.120) (1.071) (1.094) 
          2005 
1.031 0.935 0.998 
(0.889) (0.877) (0.888) 
     Previous Politicized  
     Ethnicity Year Count 
0.101* 0.102* 0.101* 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
     Prior Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Span 
-3.025 -3.026 -3.026 
(1.733) (1.729) (1.742) 
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 1 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 2‡‡ 
   
   
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 3‡‡ 
   
   
Constant 
1.244 1.330 1.213 
(1.432) (1.473) (1.456) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -.84.1554 -83.7758 -84.2226 
Wald χ
2
 
1506.63*** 
(20) 
1457.20*** 
(20) 
1443.36*** 
(20) 
N  
(Number of States) 
6935 
(153) 
6935 
(153) 
6935 
(153) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, was used in the analysis and all politicization variables have been standardized 
except for the high and low resources dummies. 
‡‡The Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Spline 2 and 3  were dropped due to colinearity which indicates only one knot 
between the beginning and end points of the data.   
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive statistics for the data used in chapter 3 are provided in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Substantive Variables Used in Chapter 3
† 
Variable Name 
Mean/ 
Proportion 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Ethnic Group Exclusion .832 --- 0 1 5861 
Lagged LnGDP per 
Capita 
1.093 1.117 -3.580 4.703 5699 
Lagged Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
.427 .274 .004 .901 5733 
Lagged GDP-ELF 
Interaction 
.379 .450 -1.392 2.526 5699 
Lagged Imperial Past .475 .320 0 1 5733 
Lagged Barrels of Oil 
per Capita 
1.522 11.982 0 272.403 5784 
Lagged Anocracy .245 --- 0 1 5713 
Lagged Democracy .332 --- 0 1 5713 
Lagged LnPopulation 
Size 
9.266 1.416 5.755 14.076 5784 
Year 1979 16.627 1946 2005 5861 
Previous Ethnic 
Exclusion Year Count 
21.233 17.796 0 59 5861 
Prior Non-Ethnic 
Exclusion Year Span 
3.133 9.241 0 59 5861 
Non-Ethnic Exclusion 
Year Spline 1 
-3548.856 17469.49 -205379 0 5861 
Non-Ethnic Exclusion 
Year Spline 3 
-1170.246 4619.292 -40404 0 5861 
†Only states where ethnicity was politically relevant were used in the analysis for chapter 3 
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Table 3.5 presents the chapter 3 models, including the previously suppressed time 
control variables. 
Table 3.5. 
Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguisitic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF 
Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Group Exclusion
†
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Politicization Variables
‡
    
     GDP per Capita 
0.488** 0.488* 1.467*** 
(0.183) (0.195) (0.436) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
 -0.113 1.172 
 (0.657) (0.670) 
     GDP-ELF 
     Interaction 
  -2.052** 
  (0.750) 
Other Control Variables    
     Imperial Past 
0.303 0.291 0.846 
(0.505) (0.521) (0.539) 
     Oil Production per Capita 
0.002 0.002 -0.000 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) 
     Form of Government 
     Reference: Autocracy 
   
          Anocracy 
-0.292 -0.296 -0.312 
(0.308) (0.305) (0.322) 
          Democracy 
-0.584 -0.591 -0.767* 
(0.343) (0.342) (0.347) 
     Population 
0.189 0.188 0.165 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.117) 
     Percentage of Mountainous 
     Terrain 
0.318** 0.315** 0.405** 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.119) 
Time Control Variables    
     Year:1946-1948    
          1949 
0.669 0.675 0.556 
(0.536) (0.542) (0.536) 
          1950 
1.160 1.165 1.034 
(0.699) (0.705) (0.678) 
          1951 
1.779** 1.783** 1.696** 
(0.634) (0.638) (0.633) 
          1952 
2.397** 2.398** 2.302** 
(0.654) (0.655) (0.674) 
          1953 
1.079 1.085 0.851 
(0.931) (0.938) (0.964) 
          1954 
1.404 1.404 1.169 
(0.781) (0.783) (0.822) 
          1955 
2.068** 2.063** 1.812* 
(0.714) (0.711) (0.763) 
          1956 
2.798** 2.793** 2.486** 
(0.733) (0.726) (0.793) 
182 
 
          1957 
7.950 7.942 7.485 
(5.785) (5.863) (6.174) 
          1958 
8.891 8.887* 8.405* 
(3.735)* (3.778) (4.097) 
          1959 
1.056 1.074 0.810 
(0.958) (0.966) (0.960) 
          1960 
1.420 1.446 1.187 
(0.772) (0.802) (0.809) 
          1961 
0.389 0.415 0.128 
(0.483) (0.509) (0.529) 
          1962 
0.726 0.753 0.458 
(0.508) (0.555) (0.580) 
          1963 
0.284 0.308 0.042 
(0.514) (0.574) (0.573) 
          1964 
1.366 1.389 1.131 
(0.884) (0.932) (0.956) 
          1965 
0.743 0.770 0.408 
(0.530) (0.578) (0.614) 
          1966 
1.056 1.087 0.680 
(1.174) (1.189) (1.161) 
          1967 
1.188 1.215 0.895 
(1.187) (1.236) (1.160) 
          1968 
0.515 0.537 0.326 
(0.614) (0.650) (0.656) 
          1969 
0.905 0.927 0.829 
(0.653) (0.679) (0.658) 
          1970 
4.045 4.061 3.930 
(3.530) (3.552) (2.745) 
          1971 
1.213 1.241 1.056 
(0.688) (0.732) (0.801) 
          1972 
1.757 1.783 1.540 
(1.739) (1.749) (1.795) 
          1973 
0.442 0.466 0.209 
(0.808) (0.867) (0.865) 
          1974 
0.751 0.773 0.513 
(0.801) (0.863) (0.831) 
          1975 
1.184 1.202 0.935 
(0.722) (0.774) (0.740) 
          1976 
1.509* 1.523* 1.250 
(0.688) (0.729) (0.703) 
          1977 
2.616 2.627 2.338 
(1.368) (1.368) (1.307) 
          1978 
2.419* 2.429* 2.071* 
(1.050) (1.066) (0.982) 
          1979 
1.563** 1.584** 1.298 
(0.542) (0.601) (0.581)* 
          1980 
1.558 1.580 1.283 
(1.565) (1.572) (1.650) 
          1981 
0.205 0.233 -0.058 
(0.671) (0.713) (0.755) 
          1982 
1.325 1.356 1.021 
(0.833) (0.891) (0.978) 
          1983 
0.533 0.562 0.234 
(0.835) (0.925) (0.831) 
          1984 
0.704 0.730 0.394 
(0.907) (0.988) (0.942) 
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          1985 
1.016 1.034 0.552 
(0.809) (0.873) (0.870) 
          1986 
1.584 1.599 0.934 
(2.399) (2.398) (1.916) 
          1987 
0.702 0.731 0.452 
(0.993) (1.043) (0.961) 
          1988 
1.123 1.155 0.967 
(0.910) (0.985) (0.939) 
          1989 
0.445 0.474 0.261 
(1.120) (1.216) (1.163) 
          1990 
2.112 2.148 1.997 
(3.897) (4.006) (4.018) 
          1991 
-0.601 -0.580 -0.773 
(0.834) (0.875) (0.862) 
          1992 
0.304 0.328 0.143 
(0.731) (0.776) (0.775) 
          1993 
0.628 0.655 0.450 
(0.754) (0.798) (0.797) 
          1994 
1.123 1.152 0.929 
(1.464) (1.422) (1.551) 
          1995 
0.382 0.412 0.187 
(0.576) (0.594) (0.682) 
          1996 
0.718 0.753 0.579 
(0.930) (0.951) (0.986) 
          1997 
0.712 0.750 0.611 
(0.614) (0.693) (0.713) 
          1998 
1.270* 1.311 1.159 
(0.647) (0.751) (0.732) 
          1999 
1.869** 1.911* 1.780* 
(0.679) (0.796) (0.752) 
          2000 
4.848** 4.904** 4.900** 
(1.640) (1.741) (1.638) 
          2001 
4.442** 4.496** 4.542** 
(1.323) (1.470) (1.514) 
          2002 
3.194 3.234 2.993 
(6.777) (6.926) (6.763) 
          2003 
0.234 0.266 0.018 
(0.863) (0.907) (0.909) 
          2004 
0.316 0.350 0.126 
(0.788) (0.846) (0.838) 
          2005 
0.755 0.794 0.559 
(0.710) (0.803) (0.775) 
     Previous Politicized  
     Ethnicity Year Count 
0.030 0.030 0.031* 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
     Prior Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Span 
-1.971** -1.972** -1.930** 
(0.213) (0.214) (0.213) 
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 1 
0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 2‡‡ 
   
   
     Non-Politicized 
     Ethnicity Year Spline 3‡‡ 
-0.008**  -0.007** 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant 
-0.221 0.116 -0.561 
(1.169) (1.154) (1.012) 
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Log Pseudolikelihood -377.3892 --377.3527 -367.7335 
Wald χ
2
 
(d.f.) 
104360.02*** 
(68) 
113783.40*** 
(69) 
121978.93*** 
(70) 
N  
(Number of States) 
5632 
(128) 
5632 
(128) 
5632 
(128) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, and Percent of Mountianous Terrain were used in the analysis. 
‡‡The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to colinearity which suggests only two knots between the 
beginning and end points of the data.   
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
 Two alternative specifications of model 3 were conducted as robustness checks 
and the sake of completeness.  In these models each category the measures of GDP per 
capita, the ELF index, and their interaction were broken up into a set of dummy variables. 
To balance the strain on the data due to the increased number parameter estimates and the 
continuous nature of the GDP per capita and ELF measures, I split the two variables into 
quartiles, creating 16 dummy variables.  I specifically hypothesize that states with limited 
resources and little ethnic diversity are less likely to exclude ethnic groups than states 
with limited resources and high levels of ethnic diversity.  Within this dummy code 
model, the “GDP .25-ELF.25” measure should be statistically significant and negative 
when the reference category is “GDP .25-ELF 1.00” This expectation is tested in model 
3a.  In model 3b I change the reference category to “GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00” and test the 
hypothesis that states with abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity are more likely 
to commit to ethnic exclusion than states with abundant resources high ethnic diversity.  
Empirical evidence for this hypothesis would be shown by a statistically significant and 
positive coefficient for the “GDP 1.00-ETH .25” dummy variable when the “GDP 1.00- 
ELF 1.00” dummy is the reference group.  Results for models 3a and 3b are provided in 
Table 3.6.  Given the number of dummy codes for the time controls and the dummy 
codes for the GDP-ELF interaction I once again suppress the time controls. I note, 
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however, to further reduce the strain on the data introduced by utilizing 59 year dummies 
to control for time, I instead and used a set of dummy variables, set in 5 year, increments. 
Table 3.6. 
Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguisitic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF 
Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Group Exclusion
†
 
 Model 3a Model3b 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Predictors of Interest   
GDP per Capita-ELF Index 
Quartile Categories
‡
 
Omitted Reference Category 
GDP .25-ELF 1.00
‡
 
Omitted Reference Category 
GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00
‡
 
GDP .25-ELF .25 
-1.489** -2.779 
(0.562) (1.438) 
GDP .25-ELF .50 
-0.630 -2.497** 
(0.614) (0.958) 
GDP .25-ELF .75 
0.182 -0.480 
(0.523) (0.868) 
GDP 25-ELF 1.00 
---- 0.662 
---- (0.691) 
GDP .50- ELF .25 
1.575 -1.205 
(0.821) (1.491) 
GDP .50-ELF .50 
2.552** 0.055 
(0.973) (0.782) 
GDP .50-ELF .75 
0.607 0.127 
(0.799) (0.997) 
GDP .50-ELF 1.00 
0.118 1.867* 
(0.424) (0.755) 
GDP .75-ELF .25 
4.292** 1.512 
(1.518) (1.377) 
GDP .75- ELF .50 
5.877** 3.380* 
(1.467) (1.599) 
GDP .75-ELF .75 
3.702** 3.222* 
(1.174) (1.263) 
GDP .75-ELF 1.00 
-1.513* -1.566 
(0.740) (0.972) 
GDP 1.00-ELF .25 
2.779 1.291 
(1.438) (1.273) 
GDP 1.00-ELF .50 
2.497** 1.867* 
(0.958) (0.755) 
GDP 1.00- ELF .75 
0.480 0.662 
(0.868) (0.691) 
GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00 
0.053 ---- 
(0.668) ---- 
Other Control Variables   
     Imperial Past 
0.339 0.339 
(0.480) (0.480) 
     Oil Production per Capita 
0.049 0.049 
(0.041) (0.041) 
     Form of Government 
     Reference: Autocracy 
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          Anocracy 
-0.234 -0.234 
(0.344) (0.344) 
          Democracy 
-0.582 -0.582 
(0.371) (0.371) 
     Population 
0.260* 0.260 
(0.132) (0.132)* 
     Percentage of Mountainous 
     Terrain 
0.350** 0.350 
(0.108) (0.108)** 
Time Control Variables Suppressed Suppressed 
Constant 
-0.552 -0.499 
(1.250) (1.279) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -387.4449 -387.4449 
Wald χ
2
 
(d.f.) 
794.43*** 
(36) 
794..43*** 
(36) 
N  
(Number of States) 
5633 
(129) 
5633 
(128) 
†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, and Percent of Mountianous Terrain were used in the analysis. 
‡‡The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to colinearity which suggests only two knots between the 
beginning and end points of the data.   
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
 
 As Table 3.6 demonstrates, the results are substantively similar to the conclusions 
drawn in chapter 3.   As expected the “GDP .25-ELF .25” category estimate is negative 
and statistically significant (p≤.01).  This indicates evidence for the expectation that 
states with limited resources and low ethnic diversity are structurally incentivized to 
pursue a strategy of formal inclusion, while states with limited resources and high levels 
of ethnic diversity conversely incentivized to pursue strategies of divisive exclusion.  
Although not specifically hypothesized, the positive significance of “GDP 1.00-ELF .25” 
compared to “GDP .25-ELF 1.00” is consistent with the basic logic motivating the 
hypotheses.  These findings have three implications.  First, they suggest that states in the 
bottom of both quartiles are the least likely to exclude segments of their population along 
ethnic lines.  Second, they indicate that ethnic exclusion is more likely for states where 
resources are limited and ethnic diversity high relative to states in the lower quartile on 
both measures.  And third, they indicate that exclusion is more likely in states with 
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abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity than it is in states with limited resources 
and high diversity.  Together, these create a general ranking for the influence of the 
hypothesized structural factors on likelihood of exclusion in each ideal typical scenario.  
The factors associated with the formal inclusion scenario push states into the lowest 
probability of ethnic exclusion.  The second most common type of ethnic exclusion 
follows the pattern of divisive exclusion, with states following a pattern of xenophobic 
exclusion the most frequent type of ethnic exclusionary outcome.   
 The evidence for the multi-culturalist scenario is less consistent.  As Table 3.5, 
model 3b shows, the “GDP 1.00-ELF .25” measure, although positive, is not registering a 
statistically significant difference with “GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00.”  The “GDP 1.00-ELF .50” 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, which indicates some support for the 
hypothesis that states that have abundant resources and high ethnic diversity have a lower 
probability of ethnic exclusion than states that have an abundance of resources and a high 
diversity.  The lack of significance of the “GDP 1.00-ELF .25” dummy but the 
significance of the “GDP 1.00-ELF .50” dummy suggests some support for the 
hypothesized relationship.  However, it also indicates that the relationship is not as clean 
as theoretically expected.   The “GDP 1.00-ELF1.00” category has a higher probability of 
ethnic exclusion than the “GDP .25-ELF .25” category but is not indicated to be lower 
than the “GDP .25-ELF 1.00” category.  The “GDP .50-ELF 1.00” category is 
significantly positive, relative to the “GDP 1.00-ELF1.00” category, as is the “GDP 1.00-
ELF .50”.  These relationships provide some evidence that state’s with abundant 
resources and mid-levels of ethnic diversity, as well as states with mid-level resource 
availability and high ethnic diversity are more likely to experience ethnic exclusion than 
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states with an abundance of both resources and ethnic diversity.  In light of the strength 
of the evidence from model 3a, it seems clear that while states with an abundance of 
resources and high ethnic diversity have some incentive to avoid ethnic exclusion, this 
incentive is not as high as theoretically expected.  As a whole however, they paint a very 
similar picture to model 3, presented in Table 3.3 (see Table 3.5 above for the table 
showing the time controls).  
 
 
Appendix C 
 Descriptive statistics for the data used in chapter 4 are provided in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Substantive Variables Used in Chapter 4
† 
Variable Name 
Mean/ 
Proportion 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Ethnic Rebellion 0.167 --- 0 1 4557 
Ethnic Rebellion Onset 0.026 --- 0 1 3899 
Lagged LnGDP per Capita 1.137 1.053 -2.008 4.703 4738 
Lagged Number of  
Excluded Ethnic Groups 
4.184 7.183 0 55 4768 
Lagged LnProportion of 
Population Excluded 
-2.132 1.303 -5.298 -0.020 4742 
Excluded Group-Population 
Interaction 
-7.514 10.649 -80.461 -0.020 4742 
Lagged Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.424 0.269 0.005 0.902 4772 
Lagged Imperial Past 0.468 0.327 0.000 1 4772 
Lagged Barrels of Oil per 
Capita 
1.718 13.079 0.000 272.403 4815 
Lagged Anocracy 0.257 --- 0 1 4764 
Lagged Democracy 0.321 --- 0 1 4764 
Lagged LnPopulation Size 9.411 1.430 5.755 14.076 4815 
LnPercent of Mountainous 
Terrain 
2.436 1.323 0.000 4.407 4879 
Change in Regime in Last 
Three Years 
0.133 --- 0 1 4879 
Lagged Ongoing War 0.222 --- 0 1 4772 
Year 1978.968 16.768 1946.000 2005 4879 
Model 1 Previous Ethnic 
War Year Count 
3.048 7.751 0 57 4879 
Model 1 Prior Peace Year 
Span 
17.776 16.889 0 59 4557 
Model 1 Peace Year Spline 
1 
-5714.940 7962.200 -30510 0 4557 
Model 1 Peace Year Spline 
2 
-11510.110 17736.320 -70176 0 4557 
Model 1 Peace Year Spline 
3 
-10268.710 17563.640 -74304 0 4557 
Model 2 Previous Ethnic 
War Year Count 
0.195 0.561 0 7 4879 
Model 2 Prior Peace Year 
Span 
20.776 16.464 0 59 3899 
Model 2 Peace Year Spline 
1 
-9466.147 12045.510 -44880 0 3899 
Model 2 Peace Year Spline 
2 
-13935.350 19630.740 -75240 0 3899 
Model 2 Peace Year Spline 
3 
-11319.640 17556.800 -71400 0 3899 
†Only states where ethnicity was politically relevant and at least one ethnic group was excluded were used in the 
analysis for chapter 4 
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Table 4.4 
Binary Logit of Ethnically Excluded Population Size, Number of Excluded Ethnic 
Groups, Excluded Population-Group Interaction and Controls on Ethnic 
Rebellion
†
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Logit Coeficient 
(S.E.) 
Exclusion Variables
‡
    
     Number of Excluded  
     Ethnic Groups  
-0.056* -0.073* 
(0.023) (0.036) 
     Excluded Population Size 
0.357** 0.268 
(0.131) (0.151) 
     Excluded Population-Group 
     Interaction 
-0.043** -0.055* 
(0.015) (0.023) 
     GDP per Capita 
-0.385* -0.750*** 
(0.152) (0.224) 
     Ethno-Linguistic 
     Fractionalization 
0.613 1.503* 
(0.360) (0.617) 
     Imperial Past 
0.827* 1.069* 
(0.365) (0.524) 
     Oil Production per Capita 
0.001 0.012 
(0.016) (0.008) 
          Anocracy 
0.695* 0.851* 
(0.320) (0.353) 
          Democracy 
0.879** 0.492 
(0.337) (0.412) 
     Population 
0.143 0.163 
(0.093) (0.123) 
     Percentage of Mountainous 
     Terrain 
0.046 0.141 
(0.092) (0.114) 
     Recent Regime Change 
0.060 0.008 
(0.272) (0.291) 
     Ongoing War 
3.670*** 2.027*** 
(0.266) (0.361) 
          1948 
-0.448 --- 
(0.754) --- 
          1949 
-1.476 1.322 
(1.145) (0.910) 
          1950 
0.849 2.214** 
(0.834) (0.814) 
          1951 
-0.126 --- 
(1.276) --- 
          1952 
0.740 1.140 
(1.396) (1.370) 
          1953 
0.179 --- 
(0.852) --- 
          1954 
0.839 --- 
(0.626) --- 
          1955 
-0.010 --- 
(1.016) --- 
          1956 
2.048 1.860 
(1.077) (1.183) 
          1957 0.930 1.382 
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(0.629) (0.833) 
          1958 
2.380** 2.436* 
(0.870) (0.983) 
          1959 
0.330 --- 
(0.950) --- 
          1960 
-0.190 1.266 
(1.080) (0.852) 
          1961 
0.975 2.059* 
(0.833) (1.005) 
          1962 
0.079 --- 
(1.015) --- 
          1963 
0.704 1.504 
(1.198) (1.259) 
          1964 
0.896 --- 
(0.601) --- 
          1965 
2.772*** 3.135*** 
(0.656) (0.769) 
          1966 
2.404* 2.999*** 
(1.036) (0.812) 
          1967 
1.389** 1.792 
(0.511) (1.063) 
          1968 
1.421** --- 
(0.543) --- 
          1969 
0.979 --- 
(0.813) --- 
          1970 
2.179*** 2.296* 
(0.612) (1.130) 
          1971 
2.591* 2.947** 
(1.034) (1.027) 
          1972 
1.703 2.714** 
(1.004) (0.942) 
          1973 
1.973** --- 
(0.731) --- 
          1974 
2.591** 2.685* 
(0.804) (1.055) 
          1975 
1.520*** 3.038** 
(0.440) (1.005) 
          1976 
1.962* 1.692 
(0.772) (1.084) 
          1977 
1.888* 1.992 
(0.943) (1.399) 
          1978 
2.693*** 1.737 
(0.765) (1.291) 
          1979 
2.698*** 2.945*** 
(0.768) (0.795) 
          1980 
2.681** 2.974** 
(0.935) (1.026) 
          1981 
1.958*** 2.960** 
(0.494) (1.012) 
          1982 
2.213* 2.254* 
(0.943) (0.979) 
          1983 
2.568*** 2.640** 
(0.653) (0.950) 
          1984 
1.708* 2.274 
(0.734) (1.227) 
          1985 2.761*** --- 
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(0.655) --- 
          1986 
2.132** 2.537** 
(0.785) (0.977) 
          1987 
2.010*** 1.974* 
(0.493) (0.969) 
          1988 
2.608* --- 
(1.019) --- 
          1989 
2.664** 2.927** 
(0.937) (0.919) 
          1990 
2.376* 3.525*** 
(1.060) (0.848) 
          1991 
1.981* 3.045*** 
(0.818) (0.899) 
          1992 
0.736 3.357*** 
(0.754) (0.773) 
          1993 
1.422* 1.902* 
(0.608) (0.891) 
          1994 
0.537 2.088* 
(0.603) (0.959) 
          1995 
0.738 --- 
(0.854) --- 
          1996 
0.566 2.494** 
(0.867) (0.763) 
          1997 
0.999 1.562 
(0.786) (1.147) 
          1998 
0.498 1.511 
(0.674) (1.265) 
          1999 
0.975 0.671 
(0.829) (0.705) 
          2001 
1.508* 2.003* 
(0.741) (0.921) 
          2002 
-0.026 1.640 
(0.927) (1.258) 
          2003 
-0.462 0.645 
(1.066) (1.475) 
          2004 
0.992 1.156 
(1.282) (1.349) 
      Previous Ethnic War Year   
      Count 
0.071*** 0.452 
(0.018) (0.235) 
      Prior Peace Year Span 
-0.492*** 0.036 
(0.107) (0.082) 
     Peace Year Spline 1 
-0.003* 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
      Peace Year Spline 2 
0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
      Peace Year Spline 3 
0.000 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
-5.311*** -8.761*** 
(0.973) (1.155) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -439.93306 -283.2758 
Wald χ
2
 (d.f.) 
43804.40*** 
(74) 
3400.36*** 
(61) 
N  
(Number of States) 
4372 
(116) 
3718 
(115) 
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†All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year.  Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are 
reported in parentheses. 
‡The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, Percent of Mountianous Terrain and Excluded Population 
Size were used in the analysis. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
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